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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the idea of a European Union (EU) minimum wage 
policy, exploring what it might look like given the significant obstacles that 
stand in the way of its realisation. The idea of a minimum wage policy for the 
EU has a long and varied history and can be traced to the inception of the 
Single Market. Over the course of European integration, suggestions have 
been made for the Union to coordinate wages in Member States, against both 
absolute and relative values. Justifications for intervention have varied but 
predominately focus on the prevalence of low wage work in Europe. However, 
the limited competence of the Union to act in the area of pay, coupled with the 
heterogeneity of industrial relations systems in Member States, makes the 
realisation of an EU minimum wage at the hands of the Union highly unlikely. 
 
In light of these impediments, this thesis articulates an alternative policy. This 
policy would be instituted by the European social partners and implemented by 
an ‘autonomous’ European social partner agreement. Given the scope of social 
partner agreements, this approach would lead to a more ‘transnational’ wage 
policy akin to collective agreements signed between European industry 
federations and employers’ associations organised across national boarders. In 
outlining the contours of this policy, valuable insights are gained into the 
operation of the European social dialogue and its potential to serve as an 
alternative space for societal governance. Furthermore, a potential ‘hybrid’ 
regulatory form for such a policy is suggested – between an autonomous 
agreement and ‘new’ governance processes – that would improve the 
effectiveness of its implementation.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Few policies divide opinion, across the political spectrum, like minimum wages. 
Depending on how they are set, whether by legislation or collective agreement, 
both trade unions and employers’ associations raise economic and social 
concerns. Trade unions in countries with strong collective industrial relations 
systems have viewed those that are implemented by way of statutory 
legislation as an infringement of their autonomy to regulate wages and thus as 
a threat to their position in society. At the same time, fears are often raised that 
statutory minimum wages place downwards pressure on collectively agreed 
pay, hurting not helping those in need. Conversely, employers’ associations 
resist minimum wages of both forms, arguing that increasing wages leads to 
price inflation and to higher levels of unemployment (resulting from, for 
example, businesses passing on higher costs to customers or reducing wage 
bills by making redundancies). 
 
However, successful experiences with statutory minimum wages has led to a 
softening of this once universal opposition (although variants had been 
adopted as far back as the turn of the 19th century, it was not until the 1980s 
that they were used to protect workers from the changes wrought to economies 
by globalisation, including the deregulation of labour markets in the name of 
economic liberalisation). A prominent example is the introduction of a statutory 
minimum wage in the UK. Although initially opposing its introduction, the 
Trades Union Congress has been a leading supporter of the national minimum 
wage; viewing it as a complement to, rather than a replacement for, a strong 
collective industrial relations system. Moreover, the introduction of a statutory 
minimum wage in Germany in 2015, with significant support from trade unions, 
is perhaps further evidence of acceptance (especially in countries that have 
traditionally supported collective regulation). 
 
On the other side of industry, campaigns such as ‘Fight for $15’ in the US and 
the Living Wage Foundation’s living wage in the UK, have proven remarkably 
successful in placing pressure on businesses to voluntarily pay their staff 
higher wages. Interestingly, the idea of ‘socially just’ wages has begun to catch 
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the attention of those on the right of the political spectrum. In 2016, a ‘national 
living wage’ was introduced in the UK by a Conservative government (although 
set as a wage floor and not to ensure that workers earn enough to maintain a 
decent standard of living).1 Furthermore, in the US, a recent report by 
ThinkProgress suggests that increasing the federal minimum wage is a 
‘political goldmine’, with significant levels of support amongst senior 
conservative, specifically Republican and Independent politicians.2 
 
Importantly, this thesis departs from state-centric analyses of minimum wages, 
interrogating the idea of a transnational policy. Of those that have been 
suggested, arguably the most controversial is that of a European Union 
minimum wage policy. Responses to this proposal are often negative, usually 
questioning its practicality. Common issues raised include the Union’s lack of 
competence in the area of pay;3 differences between Member States, in terms 
of their industrial relations systems (whether favouring state intervention or 
abstention); and of prevailing wage rates. Conversely, proponents argue that 
such a policy would provide a human face to the process of ongoing economic 
integration; alleviate the problem of ‘social dumping’; and encourage 
transnational mobility across the Union (specifically of workers). 
 
With increasing frequency over the last decade, these suggestions have been 
raised in debates concerning the future of the Union. There has long been a 
perception amongst proponents of ‘social Europe’, that Europe’s social model 
                                                        
1 The introduction of the national living wage by a Conservative government was 
viewed by some as an attempt to appeal to working class voters and to promote so-
called ‘Blue-collar Conservatism’. See George Wilson, ‘What Now for the National 
Minimum Wage?’ (Huffington Post, 13 May 2015) 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/george-wilson/minimum-wage_b_7272708.html> 
accessed 5 November 2017. 
2 ThinkProgress, ‘Raising the Minimum Wage is a Political Goldmine’ (August 2013) 
<https://thinkprogress.org/raising-the-minimum-wage-is-a-political-goldmine-
7ac7826042c2/> accessed 5 November 2017. 
3 Article 154(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  
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has been neglected at the expense of economic integration.4 The onset of the 
financial crisis brought this reality home for many citizens, who were faced with 
austerity measures that could be traced directly to the Union,5 with anti-EU 
sentiment visible in the streets of major capitol cities across Europe.6 In the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, there has been a concerted effort by the Union 
to address some of these concerns. In his 2015 State of the Union address, 
President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Junker, emphasised the 
need to develop Europe’s social model and restated his commitment to 
introduce a European Pillar of Social Rights.7 Importantly, the Pillar provides 
rights to fair wages and adequate minimum wages. This thesis does not 
suggest that an EU minimum wage would solve these problems, rather that it 
would form a valuable part of a concerted attempt at their resolution (e.g. an 
attempt to re-launch social Europe through a new programme of legislation). 
 
Importantly, the idea of regulating pay at EU-level asks deeper questions than 
whether there should be a more social Europe versus further economic 
integration. Any call for competence to be transfer to the Union in order to 
harmonise an area, whether by setting strict standards in Member States or 
allowing for diversity, inevitably leads to the proponent(s) political motivations 
being called into question.  
 
At first blush, the idea of an EU minimum wage policy appears to be very 
similar to those common in many Member States e.g. set at a certain nominal 
value but applying across the whole of the Union. However, there are a number 
                                                        
4 For an overview of debates, see Philip P. Whyman, Mark Baimbridge and Andrew 
Mullen, The Political Economy of the European Social Mode (Routledge 2012). 
5 As was the case for the ‘structural adjustment programmes’ extended to indebted 
states e.g. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (which are discussed in detail in 
chapter 4). 
6 For example, in Greece, the anti-austerity movement spawned SYRZIA, the political 
party that later went on to win the 2015 legislative election (headed by Alexis Tsipras). 
7 European Commission, ‘State of the Union 2015: Time for honest, unity and 
solidarity’ <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5614_en.htm> accessed 
1 July 2017. 
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of proposals that are more sophisticated than this model. One example is those 
that are based upon coordinating wages around a target value set against 
mean or median wages, either for all Member States or certain groups e.g. 
northern/central/eastern Europe, to be achieved by way of a Directive (ignoring 
the Union’s restricted competence). Alternative methods of implementation 
include non-binding guidelines set by an Open Method of Coordination process 
e.g. the European Employment Strategy. 
 
However, strong responses to such proposals are, in reality, deeper seated 
than support either for or against minimum wages. As tools that are almost 
exclusively employed in pursuit of social objectives, such as to prevent in-work 
poverty, questioning whether there should be an EU-level policy implies that a 
problem exists. For this thesis, that problem is of low wage work and increasing 
levels of inequality. The number of low wage workers in the EU has been rising 
for a number of years and according to recent figures stands at 17.2% (roughly 
1 in every 6 workers).8 Similarly, measures of inequality in general, and wage 
inequality, in particular, have been steadily rising since the end of 2008 (with 
the onset of the financial crisis). These problems manifest themselves not only 
in terms of how they affect individuals (whether they have enough money to 
provide for themselves and for their families), but also at a higher level of 
abstraction, in terms of how they affect society. 
 
The Union has often shied away from this issue, arguing that due to its limited 
competence to act in the area of pay (due to its exclusion under Article 153 
TFEU), the adoption of measures like an EU minima would not be possible 
without either a change to the Treaties or Member States, independently, 
instituting their own policy. Debates on the idea of an EU policy often take this 
binary choice as a starting point; either suggesting a change to the Treaties or, 
on the other hand, Member States developing their own minimum wage policy 
outside the auspices of the Union. However, the Union’s insistence that it 
cannot act in the area of pay is misleading. From the inception of the internal 
                                                        
8 Eurostat, ‘Earnings statistics’ <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Earnings_statistics> accessed 4 November 2017. 
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market to more recent controversies over public procurement rules and the 
posting of workers, the Union has indirectly interfered in how wages are set 
and how wage-setting mechanisms function in Member States. For example, 
famous Court of Justice cases such as Enderby and Cadman illustrate that in 
the pursuit of policy objectives related to pay (here equality between sexes), 
the Union has interfered in how wages are set.9 
 
More recently, however, this tiptoeing around the edges of its competence, has 
exploded into all out intervention, with serious negative consequences for 
workers. The origins of this more direct intervention can be traced to the early 
development of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), seeing full fruition with 
the launch of so-called ‘New’ European economic governance around the time 
of the financial crisis of 2008. Whether through the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines or recommendations under the European Semester of policy 
coordination, the Union has developed a more direct method for influencing 
wages and wage-setting mechanism in Member States. For example, policy 
tools – like ‘Country-Specific Recommendations’ – are issued under the 
European Semester system ‘advising’ Member State to reduce wage rates and 
decentralise collective bargaining in certain sectors to improve 
competitiveness. In comparison to old(er) forms of wage governance, this 
approach is premised not on ‘traditional’ sanctions – like Court infringement 
proceedings – but ‘softer’ methods such as ‘peer review’ and ‘naming-and-
shaming’. 
 
With the exceptional events of the financial crisis, however, these methods 
have taken on an altogether more sinister hue. The ‘structural adjustment 
programmes’ singed between ‘the Troika’ of the European Commission, ECB 
and IMF which extended financial aid to indebted Member States e.g. Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal, made receipt dependent upon wide-ranging economic 
and labour market reforms. This included reducing prevailing wage rates 
                                                        
9 Case C-127/92 Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority [1993] ECR I-5535; and Case 
C-17/05 Cadman v Health & Safety Executive [2006] ECR I-9585. 
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(usually by cutting statutory minima) and decentralising collective bargaining to 
sectoral and enterprise levels. 
 
This form of intervention is anything but ‘indirect’, presenting a false choice 
between either default and domestic financial crisis and the dismantling of 
centuries old industrial relations systems or the reduction of protections for the 
most vulnerable. Indeed, as this thesis argues, these measures have had a 
visible impact on collective bargaining coverage, trade union density and 
prevailing wage rates. Collectively, these measures illustrate the fallacy of the 
Union’s non-intervention concerning pay in Member States, indeed, such has 
been its impact that commentators have suggested new economic governance 
methods could be repurposed and used as a basis for the adoption of a more 
progressive wage policy (in particular, that of an EU minimum wage). 
 
Contrary to common suggestions that the Union or the Member States should 
be placed at the helm of an EU minima, this thesis argues that greater attention 
should be paid to the capacity of the social partners, including both 
representatives of management and labour at EU and national level, to 
establish an equivalent. Importantly, this choice is influenced by current 
conceptual and practical limitations in the commentary and literature that 
surrounds discussions regarding the introduction of an EU minimum wage. 
This research is, with very few exceptions, wedded to the centrality of the 
Union and Member States in the development and implementation of such a 
policy. Moreover, it fails to appreciate the political reality of regulating matters 
relating to pay at EU-level. Although intervention may be possible through 
methods such as economic governance, the political desire for a policy that 
resembles a statutory or collectively agreed minimum wage in Member States 
is not present at either the national or EU-level. 
 
Consequently, for any proposal to be of real value, it must be achievable in 
practice. This thesis seeks to develop a proposal that could be adopted by law-
makers (understood to include the social partners). This involves finding a 
workable basis and outlining how such a policy would operate. These points 
are two of the most significant gaps in current knowledge which, in the author’s 
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view, are preventing suggestions for the adoption of an EU minima from 
developing from merely an idea to a serious proposal for regulatory 
intervention. There is little utility in suggesting a proposal for change if its 
realisation is hamstrung by its poor articulation. 
 
In the pursuit of a workable proposal, this thesis turns to literature from a 
variety of different fields in order to flesh out its contours. Current research is 
undertaken almost exclusively by political scientists, to the neglect of other 
important disciplines. Indeed, a comprehensive (legal) analysis of this topic has 
not yet been undertaken, specifically of the potential bases for action and how 
such a policy would function. This thesis explores these points through the lens 
of multiple academic disciplines: including legal sociology, the study of 
regulation, legal theory, governance theory, reflexive law, hybridity, law and 
new governance, and post-colonial cultural theory. This thesis does not 
research the empirics of minimum wages or the attitudes of trade unions, 
employers’ associations or the Member States towards the adoption of a 
European minimum wage policy. Although these are very important 
endeavours, and are drawn upon in this work, they have been undertaken 
elsewhere.10 
 
This thesis, therefore, adds to current knowledge by developing a proposal that 
could potentially form the basis of an EU wage policy. In doing so, it covers 
areas in current debates that have not been fully explored. 
 
On the potential basis for an EU minima, in light of the limited competence of 
the Union to act in the area of pay, attention is turned to the Member States 
and the methods they could utilise if, amongst themselves, they wished to 
proceed alone (namely away from the European Commission). Of the legal 
bases considered, because of the Article 153 TFEU exemption on pay, none 
                                                        
10 For example, see, respectively, Line Eldring and Kristin Alsos, European Minimum 
Wage: A Nordic Outlook (Fafo 2012); and Bengt Furåker and Mattias Bengtsson, ‘On 
the road to transnational cooperation? Results from a survey of European trade 
unions’ (2013) 19(2) European Journal of Industrial Relations 161. 
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could, realistically, serve as a foundation for an EU minima. This turns focus to 
potential normative bases; those that are not premised on public power (or the 
state’s law-making monopoly). Subsequently, the centrality of the Union and 
Member States in formulating and implementing such a policy is challenged. 
The success of the social partners with the autonomous route of the European 
Social Dialogue, whereby they can give effect to their own agreements across 
the EU, directs attention towards the possibility that an EU minima could be 
based on a societal process; one that is focussed on actors such as trade 
unions acting independently of public power. 
 
This suggestion has important consequences; not only does it remove the 
centrality of the Union in the development of such a policy but its has 
implications for its scope. For example, social partner agreements are 
commonly reached at cross-industry or sectoral levels, they do not ever, and 
they cannot, cover an entire national economy. Any policy based on the social 
dialogue would be less of an EU-wide minima and, more realistically, a 
‘transnational’ wage policy, restricted to the national affiliates of European 
signatory associations. 
 
This determination, which is a consequence of practical considerations, 
changes the complexion of current debates on an EU minima. Often the social 
dialogue is cited as a potential foundation for a minima but the scope of 
autonomous agreements is either not fully considered or ignored. Importantly, 
utilising the social dialogue does not rule out future action by the Union, 
indeed, regulation via the social dialogue has led to legislation being initiated 
by the European Commission in a number of areas (for example, the 
autonomous Agreement on Crystalline Silica has had an important influence on 
the levels at which occupational exposure limits will be set for silica dust – and 
indeed its eventual inclusion – in discussions on the Carcinogens Directive).11 
Moreover, autonomous agreements have been reached by the social partners 
                                                        
11 See European Council, ‘Carcinogens or mutagens at work: Council sets new 
exposure limits’ (July 2017) <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2017/07/11/carcinogens-mutations-at-work/> accessed 3 January 2018. 
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that cover constituent elements of pay (including the Work in Fishing 
Agreement).12 
 
Looking in closer detail at the operation of European social dialogue in the 
search for a basis for an EU minima, however, reveals a complex system of 
governance which requires further investigation if the most is to be made of the 
opportunities it provides as an alternative space for the social partners to give 
effect to their own agreements. By way of example, the autonomous route is 
dependent for its success on the national procedures and practices of 
management and labour for implementation, and the ability of the social 
partners to organise at EU-level and reach agreements. 
 
Explained in another way, it appears less ‘autonomous’ of public forms of 
power and more contingent on the existence of institutional structures and 
support for success. Furthermore, the development of ‘new’ governance-style 
instruments and their adoption by the social partners raises questions about 
the impact they are having on the uptake of autonomous agreements, for 
example, are they interchangeable and, as a consequence, in competition, or 
is it possible they could be used together (alongside each other or in an 
arrangement designed to facilitate their interaction)? 
 
It is of imperative importance that these ‘hidden dynamics’ are fully understood 
if an EU minimum wage policy is to be designed that could realistically stand a 
chance of being adopted by the social partners and of serving a solidarity 
enhancing function. Here, studying the autonomous route of the social dialogue 
through the lens of transnational legal pluralism sheds light upon the 
complexity involved in its operation. To-date, this approach has been 
overlooked by scholarship on European industrial relations and this thesis 
                                                        
12 Europeche Cogeca and EFT, ‘Agreement between the social partners in the 
European Union’s sea-fisheries sector of 21 May 2012 concerning the implementation 
of the Work in Fishing Convention, 2007 of the International Labour Organization’ 
(2012) <http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?mode=dsw&docId=9089&langId=en> 
accessed 24 February 2018. 
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constitutes a first exploration of the utility of this theory for better understanding 
the social dialogue. The insights gain from this theoretical approach are utilised 
in the pursuit of creating a workable proposal for an EU minima and serve as 
an example of theory informing the development of policy. 
 
 
Moreover, the insights gained from this approach present the social dialogue 
as an alternative space for societal governance; where labour law’s main 
objectives of constraining market power/furthering concerns regarding 
economic/social justice can be achieved because of, not in spite of, the 
fragmentation of European law (especially with regard to the complexity of 
industrial relations at European level). This mode of governance is no longer 
viewed as occurring separately from the institutions of the Union and the 
Member States, rather its dependency is revealed. These insights have the 
potential to reach beyond the proposal under consideration and to contribute to 
the development of policy in other areas, for example, the use of the social 
dialogue to regulate ‘hard’ issues such as working hours. 
 
Especially noteworthy for the development of transnational legal pluralism – as 
a theory – is how its application to the social dialogue illustrates its limitations, 
specifically, its underestimation of the continuing importance of the state. This 
point is not recognised in current literature and serves to illustrate the 
methodological value of using empirical evidence – by way of the case study of 
the social dialogue – to inform the development of (legal) theory. 
 
Insights form transnational legal pluralism also reveal the full range of 
instruments available to the social partners – whether legal or not – and 
encourage experimentation with their combination in furtherance of labour 
law’s objectives.13 For the autonomous route of the social dialogue, this 
involves exploring the possibility of combining autonomous agreements and 
so-called new generation texts (new governance-style instruments developed 
                                                        
13 For example, see Adelle Blackett and Anne Trebilcock (eds), Research Handbook 
on Transnational Labour Law (Edward Elgar 2015). 
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by the social partners in response to the uptake of similar institutionalised 
policy tools around the turn of the millennium). 
 
This approach is said to improve the effectiveness of social partner 
agreements, which is especially important in light of the limited support they 
receive from the national affiliates of social partners and Member States after 
their implementation. This combination is informed by research on hybridity, 
law and new governance, which is used as a basis to develop a 
‘transformative’ understanding of the combination of different policy 
instruments. This framework is unique and contributes a new perspective to the 
design of regulation, in particular, for European social partner agreements, that 
has not previously been explored. Here, autonomous agreements are seen as 
proving a framework – for setting a target minimum wage – which is supported 
by new governance instruments – such as reporting exercises – for ensuring 
progress is made towards the realisation of a target wage by covered national 
affiliates. 
 
As such, it is possible to articulate a form of EU minimum wage policy which 
takes into account the difficulties of regulating in Europe, however, its success 
will still be dependent on a wide range of structural and institutional factors. 
 
Moreover, this unique approach to the design of regulation has potential 
implications beyond suggestions for the design of an EU minima, as a strategy 
that could be adopted for improving the effectiveness of other agreements 
(including national level collective agreements). However, this approach to the 
design of an EU minima is not without its limitations. As highlighted in literature 
on transnational law, institutional help and support must be forthcoming in 
order for it to stand a realistic chance of success in practice. Alternative 
regulatory strategies such as hybridity may be capable of improving the 
implementation of autonomous social partners agreements but they are still 
dependent in large part on the European Commission, the social partners and 
the national procedures and practices of their affiliates for their effective 
implementation. 
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In methodological terms, the combination of these different theories and their 
insights – from legal sociology, the study of regulation and governance theory 
(to name a few) – results in an approach that has not previously been applied 
in the area of European labour law. Research on hybridity, law and new 
governance, and, in particular, transnational legal pluralism, is especially 
instructive for developing an understanding of law-making in Europe that takes 
full account of the panoply of instruments available to regulators (whether 
through formal modes of governance e.g. Council Directive or informal e.g. the 
autonomous route of the European social dialogue). 
 
As alluded to above, the added value of this approach is that by better 
understanding the reality of regulating social Europe, targeted and thus more 
effective proposals can be made (which need not be limited to the idea of an 
EU minima). In effect, this thesis employs insights from multiple academic 
disciplines – on the nature and purpose of law – as a basis against which a 
more accurate description of regulating in Europe is articulated. This 
understanding is subsequently operationalised in pursuit of developing a 
proposal for an EU minima that is workable and furthers debates over its 
potential form. 
 
Given the positivistic and/or descriptive nature of the theories this thesis utilises 
– such as the systems theoretical underpinnings of transnational legal 
pluralism – their employment in pursuit of a particular normative outcome (that 
of providing a workable proposal for an EU minima) is possible. For this thesis, 
the normative orientation for such action is to address the problem of 
increasing wage inequality in Europe. As such, the idea of an EU minima is 
viewed as a contribution towards reversing rising wage inequality in Member 
States and, at the same time and on a more human level, ensuring workers 
receive fair remuneration for their labour. 
 
In what follows, this thesis proceeds through 6 substantive chapters. 
 
In chapter 2, a preliminary investigation of minimum wages is undertaken, both 
at a general level of abstraction and, where possible, against the specific 
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situations in Member States. A working definition of minimum wages is provide, 
along with a brief discussion of how minimum wages are commonly used. This 
is followed by a discussion of the effects of minimum wages on employment, 
competitiveness, and industrial relations. Next the demographics of minimum 
wages are outlined, in terms of the personal and employment characteristics of 
minimum wage workers. The history of minimum wages and their relationship 
with national industrial relations systems are then explored (which is restricted 
to four Member States whose national industrial relations systems have 
influenced the development of others). Finally, the regimes and levels at which 
minimum wages are set in Member States are compared against one another 
using various statistical measures. This chapter provides a background for the 
third chapter that investigates proposals for the coordination of minimum 
wages across Member States. 
 
In chapter 3, debates on the idea of an EU minimum wage policy are explored. 
The chapter being by investigating references to wages and minimum wages in 
international and European agreements and conventions. This is followed by a 
study of one of the earliest attempts to explore the possibility of establishing an 
EU minimum wage policy, the Commission Opinion on an Equitable Wage.14 
Here, the lack of support from Member States cited as the main reason for its 
failure. The positions and views of the European Parliament and trade unions 
on the adoption of an EU minima are discussed, suggesting that although 
support exists (especially in the European Parliament), division along national 
lines has prevented the adoption of a uniform position in favour of its further 
investigation. Next more contemporary debates are considered. These include 
how and to what extent minimum wages in Member States could be 
coordinated and the levels at which they could be set. Finally, the features of 
minimum wage systems in Member States that are underdeveloped or ignored 
in debates on the idea of an EU minimum wage policy are outlined. 
 
                                                        
14 European Commission, Commission opinion on an equitable wage COM(93) 388 
final. 
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In chapter 4 charts the impact of EU law and policy on wages and wage-setting 
mechanisms in Member States and explores how Union intervention in this 
area has developed over the course of European integration. Initially old(er) 
methods of EU wage governance are assessed –  focussing on legislation and 
the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice – before Economic and Monetary 
Union and the beginnings of economic governance are explored. This is 
followed by a review of what has been referred to as ‘new’ European economic 
governance and its effects upon wages and wage-setting mechanisms in 
Member States (with specific focus on the European Semester). Finally, the 
financial assistance programmes administered at the hands the IMF-led 
‘Troika’ to indebted Member States after the financial crisis are discussed. This 
chapter highlights the fallacy of the Union’s assertion that it cannot act in the 
area of pay and reveals the regressive wage policies it pursues. Furthermore, it 
serves as a basis for the articulation of an alternative, solidarity enhancing, 
wage policy. 
 
In chapter 5, the concept of a solidaristic wage policy as the normative 
justification for an EU minimum wage policy is explored. First, the foundations 
of the policy are traced to the work of Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner and 
their work on creating a redistributional wage policy. Second, the evolution of 
wages and wage dispersion in Europe is analysed, illustrating how with the 
development of European economies from the 1980s onwards, positive wage 
gains and reductions in wage dispersion have been lost (this is especially clear 
in Member States that followed and departed from solidaristic wage policies). 
Third, critiques of solardistic wages – from the right of the political spectrum – 
are discussed. These are subsequently set against early suggestions by 
European Trade Union Congress for the adoption of solardistic wages in 
Europe. 
 
Chapter 6 questions on which legal or normative basis an EU minimum wage 
policy could be established. It explores a wide range of bases in detail, 
exposing areas that are neglected by current scholarship. It suggest literature 
on this topic has tended to focus on action the Union can undertake, at the 
expense of investigating the potential of alternative modes of governance; 
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specifically those that involve actors such as trade unions and employers’ 
associations. Consequently, trade union initiatives for the transnational 
coordination of collective bargaining are explored, followed by those for the 
negotiation of transnational collective agreements and, finally, the European 
social dialogue. 
 
In light of the Union’s limited ability to regulate in the area of pay, it is perhaps 
not surprising that chapter 6 suggests the only way forward for an EU minima 
is at the hands of trade unions and employers’ associations, whether through 
the social dialogue or initiatives aimed at wage coordination, however, it is 
argued this would not necessarily lead to the side-lining of the Union and its 
institutions. Rather the Union and its institutional and policy framework would 
retain a viral role in ensuring its success. 
 
In chapter 7, the autonomous route of the social dialogue is studied through the 
lens of transnational legal pluralism in order to shed light upon the complexity 
evident in its operation. Initially, the origins of transnational legal pluralism are 
discussed, including how the theory views the relationship between the state 
and law and the consequences this has for rulemaking. These points are then 
explored against the operation of the European social dialogue, highlighting the 
importance of utilising all instruments available to the social partners – namely 
autonomous agreements and new generation texts – in order to ensure the 
effectiveness of their actions. 
 
This point is picked up in the final chapter on the design of an EU minimum 
wage policy. Here, literature on hybridity is appraised and used as a basis 
against which to outline how an autonomous social partner agreement detailing 
an EU minima could be combined with new generation texts in order to 
improve the effectiveness of its operation. This model is informed by the 
governance architecture of the autonomous social partner agreement on 
Crystalline Silica, which is explored as a case study.15 
                                                        
15 Agreement on Workers Health Protection through the Good Handling and Use of 
Crystalline Silica and Products containing it (OJ [2006] C279/2). 
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2. Investigating minimum wages 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Before discussing the idea of an EU minimum wage policy and assessing the 
strengths and weakness of current debates, a preliminary investigation of 
minimum wages is necessary. This chapter provides background information 
on the history of minimum wages, how they have been used by policymakers 
and, importantly, how they are set in Member States. It serves as a foundation 
for the rest of the thesis; setting down the details necessary for the discussions 
and arguments that are developed in the following chapters. From a policy 
perspective, it highlights the difficulty of coordinating minimum wages amongst 
a group of 28 Member States with very different industrial relations systems. 
 
Minimum wages have a rich and varied history, crossing disciplinary and policy 
boundaries. As much controversy is generated today when an academic or 
politician suggests their introduction, or as is more often the case, increasing 
their level, as faced Winston Churchill when he sponsored the Trades Boards 
Act of 1909. There are signs that after years of debate dominated by concerns 
about the negative effects of minimum wages on employment, broader 
considerations are gaining traction. Nowhere is this more evident than in the 
U.S., where the ‘Fight for $15’ campaign organised by fast food workers has 
gained broad support centred around reducing poverty and inequality. Activists 
see Fight for $15 as a means of helping workers achieve ‘living wages’, 
although as is often the case in the EU, such demands lack finer details. 
 
Current proposals for an EU minimum wage policy suffer from similar 
problems, which are further complicated by suggesting transnational or EU-
wide operation. Proposals often have well formed ideas regarding institutional 
operation but fail to articulate a clear vision of what type of minimum wage an 
EU policy would advocate. Would it be directed towards reducing poverty and 
inequality like the Flight for $15, or would it be aimed at protecting vulnerable 
workers as envisaged by Churchill? Answers to these questions are bound to 
broader considerations, such as what are the effects of minimum wages on 
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employment, who are the most frequent recipients, and how have they 
developed over time? The success of any EU minimum wage policy is 
dependent not only upon its articulation but also its relationship with national 
industrial relations systems, in terms of the different regimes and levels at 
which minimum wages are set in Member States. 
 
These issues are considered in further detail in this chapter, in general and 
where possible, against the specific situation in Member States. First, a 
working definition of minimum wages is provide, along with a brief discussion of 
how minimum wages are commonly used. Second, the effects of minimum 
wages on employment, competitiveness, and industrial relations is briefly 
considered. Third, the demographics of minimum wages are outlined, in terms 
of the personal and employment characteristics of minimum wage workers. 
Fourth, the history of minimum wages and their relationship with national 
industrial relations systems are explored. This is restricted to four Member 
States whose national industrial relations systems have influenced the 
development of others. Finally, the regimes and levels at which minimum 
wages are set in Member States are compared against one another using 
various statistical measures. 
 
2.2 Background 
 
It is important to have a clear understanding of what is meant by the term 
‘minimum wage’ and of how minimum wages are used. 
 
2.2.1 Definition 
 
In simple terms, a minimum wage is a legally mandated lower boundary for 
wages. Some definitions restrict the meaning of minimum wages to those set 
by the state (and implemented by statute),1 whereas others include those set 
by employers associations and trade unions (and implemented by collective 
                                                        
1 Gerald Starr, Minimum Wage Fixing: An International Review of Practices and 
Problems (ILO 1981) viii. 
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agreement).2 Definitional differences therefore turn on a distinction between 
public and private law. This work considers minimum wages to be lower wage 
boundaries set by statute or by collective agreement, including those extended 
by the state, that cover large numbers of workers across multiple industries. 
According to this definition, all Member States have a form of minimum wage. 
 
2.2.2 Purpose 
 
Minimum wages have traditionally served one of two purposes: either (1) as 
social justice tools; or (2) as macroeconomic policy tools. Each can be 
subdivided depending upon the broader policy objectives they are considered 
as instruments of. 
 
Social Justice 
 
The oldest justification for the introduction of minimum wages is as a means of 
protecting vulnerable workers. Minimum wages are seen as a last resort and 
should only be used when specific groups of workers, because of certain 
characteristics e.g. gender, are in a weak bargaining position in the labour 
market. This notion of vulnerability is associated with the absence of effective 
collective bargaining in specific trades or industries. The role of the state is to 
provide a substitute method for collective bargaining, and is based upon the 
belief that any subsequent agreement will be more acceptable to employers 
associations, trade unions and the community, than when imposed by the state 
unilaterally or with limited consultation. Additionally, those involved are argued 
to gain valuable experience as part of the process, reducing the need for 
similar interventions by the state in the future. However, the objective of 
protecting vulnerable workers is closely linked to the idea of providing a morally 
acceptable wage below which employment is considered unacceptable. This 
                                                        
2 Wendy Cunningham, Minimum Wages and Social Policy: Lessons from Developing 
Countries (The World Bank 2007) 19. 
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approach is often criticised for not going far enough to reduce poverty, as 
minimum wages are artificially low and are not universal or coordinated.3 
 
Minimum wages may be used to ensure the payment of ‘fair wages’, with the 
state intervening to determine what a fair or equitable wage is in a certain 
industry or occupation, as opposed to improving the relative position of the 
lowest paid. Greater concern is had for ensuring equal pay for equal work and 
for establishing minimum wages close to prevailing wage rates. Isolating 
wages from excessive competitive pressures is also important, and is justified 
against the principle, expressed in the Preamble to the Declaration of 
Philadelphia, that labour is not a commodity. In similarity with protecting 
vulnerable workers, this may be achieved by providing a substitute method for 
collective bargaining or by introducing statutory minimum wages for specific 
occupations. In the case of collective bargaining, unlike when protecting 
vulnerable workers, focus is directed towards reducing industrial conflict and 
providing a stable basis for negotiation. Minimum wages are thus used as an 
instrument of industrial relations policy, rather than as a means of achieving 
predetermined goals for the modification of wage structures. It is worth noting 
that fair wages are not to be confused with ‘living wages’. Although having a 
history that dates back to the turn of the 20th century, living wages have 
courted recent attention in the wake of the financial crisis; living wages are 
informal benchmarks based upon the minimum income necessary for a worker 
to meet their basic needs and are different to subsistence based 
measurements.4 
 
The adoption of ILO Convention No. 131 and Recommendation No. 135 of 
1970 envisage minimum wages covering all workers. According to these 
instruments, rather than protecting only vulnerable workers or providing fair 
wages, minimum wages should be set as ‘basic floors’, protecting all workers 
from low wages. This is the case in a large number of Member States, and 
                                                        
3 Starr (n 1) 21. 
4 In the U.K., see The Living Wage Foundation, ‘What is the Living Wage?’ 
<http://www.livingwage.org.uk/what-living-wage> accessed 20 April 2017. 
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although universally applicable (with some exceptions), the number of workers 
receiving minimum wages is relatively small, as they are often set at ‘safety 
net’ levels, instead of at levels that have a major influence on prevailing wage 
rates. This role for minimum wages rests on the belief that labour market 
imperfections justify establishing a wage floor, but that economic constraints 
restrict the level at which they can be set e.g. because of employment 
considerations.5 Minimum wages are also regarded as having a narrow 
effective scope and therefore should be directed towards the lowest paid (with 
collective agreements covering remaining workers).6 Understood in this way, 
minimum wages ‘follow’ rather than ‘lead’ wage developments, and exert only 
minimal upward pressure at the lower end of wage structures. In light of the 
increasing incidence of low pay and the normalisation of minimum wage work 
in Member States, the idea of basic floors as social policy instruments effecting 
only a limited number of workers can be questioned. 
 
Macroeconomic policy 
 
The broadest role envisaged for minimum wages is as macroeconomic policy 
tools; as a means of changing the level and structure of wages inline with 
national economic objectives, including growth, income redistribution, and price 
stabilisation. Although having broad coverage, unlike wage floor arguments, 
minimum wages are set at comparatively high levels, and are intended to 
determine the wages received by large numbers of workers. This implies an 
understanding of labour markets that is the direct opposite of that forwarded by 
the basic floor concept; that if left unregulated, labour markets are likely to 
maintain wages at low levels, having negative economic and social 
consequences.7 
 
 
 
                                                        
5 Starr (n 1) 40. 
6 ibid. 
7 Starr (n 1) 48. 
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2.3 The effects of minimum wages 
 
The effects of minimum wages are hotly debated, both academically and 
politically. Below literature on the effects of minimum wages on employment, 
competitiveness, and industrial relations is briefly considered. 
 
2.3.1 Employment 
 
Standard economic models argue that if the minimum wage is set below the 
competitive wage, employment is unaffected, if it is set above the competitive 
wage, employment is reduced. In a competitive labour market, the extent of 
this reduction is dependent upon by how much the minimum wage exceeds the 
competitive wage and the elasticity of demand for labour. Increasing the 
minimum wage makes low paid, often low skilled, workers too expensive for 
employers to hire at a profit and, at the same time, intensifies competition for 
jobs (those previously unwilling to work for the minimum wage are attracted by 
higher pay). As a consequence, the minimum wage hurts those it is intended to 
help. Importantly, standard models make two assumptions: (1) that all workers 
are covered by the minimum wage; and (2) that all employers comply with the 
minimum wage.8 With regard to the former, any adverse employment effects of 
the minimum wage are tempered by less than universal coverage, with workers 
displaced from covered sectors having the option to migrate to uncovered 
sectors when searching for work. With regard to the latter, non-compliance can 
be understood as the de facto equivalent of an uncovered sector (where 
workers are employed below the minimum wage). Furthermore, some standard 
models assume heterogeneous labour, neglecting that workers are not perfect 
substitutes for one another.9 When analysing the employment effects of the 
minimum wage, focus should be directed towards low paid groups in particular, 
rather than the labour market in its entirety. 
                                                        
8 See David Metcalf, ‘On the Impact of the British National Minimum Wage on Pay and 
Employment’ <http://cep.lse.ac.uk/research/labour/minimumwage/WP1481c.pdf> 
accessed 20 April 2017. 
9 ibid. 
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The possibility that the minimum wage may increase employment is also 
acknowledged by standard economic models. In the case of monopsony, 
where a single buyer of labour exists, if the minimum wage is set above the 
monopsonic equilibrium, employment increases.10 By how much the minimum 
wage can be increased without a fall in employment is dependent upon the 
elasticity of labour supply (the more inelastic the labour supply, the greater the 
scope for increasing the minimum wage). In oligopsonistic labour markets, 
where multiple employers compete with one another for workers, employment 
may rise if the minimum wage is set moderately above the competitive wage. 
In practice, this occurs where all employers offer higher pay (e.g. to comply 
with an increase in the minimum wage), leading to greater labour market 
participation. In contrast to standard models, Keynesian approaches suggest 
that a higher minimum wage may increase employment by changing the supply 
and demand structure of affected industries (at the macroeconomic level).11 As 
low paid workers have a high propensity to consume, increasing the minimum 
wages is argued to encourage employment by lifting or ‘stimulating’ aggregate 
demand and output. 
 
For both standard economic models and Keynesian approaches, the effects of 
minimum wages on employment are thus far from clear. Whereas for standard 
models, negative employment effects are based upon purely competitive 
labour markets, for Keynesian approaches, positive employment effects are 
based upon uncertain supply and demand structures. This theoretical divide is 
replicated in empirical analysis. Until the early 1980s, the consensus amongst 
labour economists was that minimum wages had a negative impact upon 
employment, especially for the low skilled. However, from the early 1990s 
onwards, a new wave of studies found minimum wages had little negative and, 
                                                        
10 See Alan Manning, ‘How do we know that real wages are too high?’ (1995) 110(4) 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1111. 
11 See Hansjörg Herr and Milka Kazandziska, ‘Principles of Minimum Wage Policy – 
Economics, Institutions and Recommendations’ (2011) Global Labour University 
Working Paper No.11. 
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in one landmark study, even a positive impact upon employment (for young 
workers).12 Recent studies based upon standard models have stressed the 
importance of accounting for ‘adjustment channels’ or ‘offsets’ when assessing 
the impact of minimum wages on employment.13 Rather than making workers 
redundant, employers may reduce non-wage elements of work as a response 
to higher minimum wages, in order to maintain levels of profitability. This may 
include working hours, training or other fringe benefits such as health 
insurance, the wages of higher earners, or price increases (which is seen as a 
way of fighting deflation).14 The occurrence of ‘double-job holding’ amongst low 
paid workers has also been linked to reduced working hours resulting from 
increases in the minimum wage. When taking these factors into account, 
studies have shown that appropriately set minimum wages need not have large 
negative effects on job prospects if wage floors are properly differentiated for 
specific groups of workers and non-wage labour costs are kept in check.15 
 
2.3.2 Competitiveness 
 
If unit labour costs – calculated as the ratio of labour costs per hour (wages) to 
output per hour (productivity) – increase, competitiveness may be harmed. An 
increase in the minimum wage without a corresponding increase in productivity 
could damage the competitiveness of national companies, as they face 
additional costs in comparison to international competitors. This is considered 
especially problematic in labour intensive industries, where labour costs 
represent a higher proportion of total costs. A number of objections can be 
raised against these arguments. First, increases in the minimum wage have 
                                                        
12 See David Card and Alan Krueger, ‘Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case 
Study of the Fast-food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania’ (1994) 84(4) The 
American Economic Review 772. 
13 See John Schmitt, ‘Why Does the Minimum Wage Have No Discernible Effect on 
Employment?’, Center for Economic and Policy Research 
<http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/min-wage-2013-02.pdf> accessed 20 
April 2017. 
14 See Herr and Kazandziska (n 11). 
15 Eurofound, Pay in Europe in the 21st Century (Eurofound 2014) 86. 
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been shown to foster improvements in productivity (known as ‘beneficial 
constraints’),16 having a positive effect upon unit labour costs and therefore 
competitiveness.17 Modern variants of the ‘economy of high wages’ argument 
suggest that workers feel more valued when paid more and are more 
motivated to work harder.18 Furthermore, increased unit labour costs can act 
as a spur for companies to find ways of improving efficiency and to be 
innovative. Second, trade focussed industries often employ very few low wage 
workers, unlike non-trade focussed industries (compare manufacturing and 
services). Increases in the minimum wage only have a limited impact upon 
internationally competitive industries, as low wages are very rarely a factor in 
their success. Third, unit labour costs are not the sole determinates of 
competitiveness. In addition to wages and productivity, exchange rates, 
inflation, and non-wage factors – such as product quality and design – are also 
important. 
 
2.3.3 Industrial Relations 
 
Modern institutionalist and heterodox approaches consider the effects that 
interaction between minimum wages and collective bargaining has upon 
employment, competitiveness, and social objectives. Although minimum wages 
have a direct effect upon those that earn below the threshold, they also have 
an indirect effect upon those that earn above the threshold.19 So called ‘ripple’ 
or ‘spillover’ effects have been shown to extend to a sizable proportion of the 
lower half of the wage distribution. This is as minimum wages are often used 
as ‘reference’ or ‘starting points’ for individual and collective wage negotiations 
                                                        
16 See Peter Brosnan and Frank Wilkinson, ‘A National Statutory Minimum Wage and 
Economic Efficiency’ (1988) 7(1) Contributions to Political Economy 1. 
17 See Colm McLaughlin, ‘The Productivity-enhancing Impacts of the Minimum Wage: 
Lessons from Denmark, New Zealand and Ireland’ (2007) Centre for Business 
Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 342. 
18 See David Card and Alan Krueger, Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of 
the Minimum Wage (Princeton University Press 1995). 
19 See Richard Freeman, ‘The Minimum Wage as a Redistributive Tool’ (1996) 
106(436) The Economic Journal 639. 
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at the bottom of the wage distribution. When increased, workers seek to retain 
the distance between their own pay and the minimum wage. The strength of 
collective bargaining determines the impact of ripple or spillover effects.20 
When collective bargaining is strong, an increase in the minimum wage can 
effect more workers in the lower half of the wage distribution than the (low 
paid) workers that are its usual target. When collective bargaining is weak, 
trade unions may not be able to make the most of increases. Consequences 
include ‘wage compression’ from below, flat earning trajectories and, under 
certain circumstances, ‘low wage traps’. Conversely, the strength of collective 
bargaining may be effected by the level at which minimum wages are set. High 
minimum wages have been shown to have a ‘crowding out’ effect on collective 
bargaining in low wage sectors.21 There is little need or incentive for employers 
and workers to engage in collective bargaining when minimum wages are set 
considerably above prevailing collectively agreed pay. To the extent that this is 
reflected in empirical analysis, the idea that minimum wages are a substitute 
for weak collective bargaining can be reversed. 
 
2.4 Demographics of minimum wage earners 
 
Workers earning minimum wages often share certain demographic 
characteristics. These can be divided between those that are personal (e.g. 
gender) and those that are related to employment (e.g. occupation). 
 
2.4.1 Personal Characteristics 
 
Gender 
 
The most widely repeated claim regarding minimum wage workers is that a 
higher proportion are female, than male. In the EU, this is apparent from EU-
SILC data; based upon a fictitious ‘harmonised minimum wage’ set at 60% of 
                                                        
20 See Damien Grimshaw (ed), Minimum Wages, Pay Equity, and Comparative 
Industrial Relations (Routledge 2013). 
21 Eurofound (n 15) 89. 
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the national median wage in Member States, Eurofound estimate that roughly 
22% of recipients would be female in comparison to 11% male.22 Amongst 
OECD states, on average, the proportion of female to male minimum wage 
workers is roughly double. Based upon the estimates of Eurofound, there are 
exceptions. In Cyprus, the gap between men and women earning Eurofound’s 
harmonised minimum wage would be roughly 20% (5% male versus 20% 
female), in Demark, there would be no significant statistical difference.23 A 
reason suggested for the difference between female and male minimum wage 
workers is contractual: a higher proportion of women are employed on a part-
time basis than men.24 To the extent that this is true, gender appears as a 
substitute for differences between part-time and full-time employment. 
 
Age 
 
As alluded to when reviewing literature on the employment effects of minimum 
wages, recent studies have focussed upon younger workers. Teenagers are 
considered to be the group most affected by minimum wages, followed by 
those aged 20 – 24.25 Over the age of 25, the incidence of minimum wage 
workers steadily decreases, only to increase again above the age of 50.26 The 
number of workers at either end of the age distribution represents a relatively 
small proportion of the total workforce in Member States. However, each group 
is not of equivalent size; in Sweden, teenagers outnumber those over 50, 
whereas in the UK, the reverse is true. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
22 Eurofound (n 15) 130. 
23 ibid 131. 
24 ibid 132. 
25 See Jerold Waltman, The Politics of the Minimum Wage (University of Illinois Press 
2000). 
26 ibid. 
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Race 
 
Race is often neglected in the study of minimum wage demographics. Statistics 
are not complied by Eurostat or by the majority of Member States. In the U.K., 
research based upon Labour Force Survey data shows that 6% of minimum 
wage earners are White, 3% Black Caribbean, 5% Black African, 9% Black 
Other, 12% Bangladeshi, and 14% Pakistani.27 Higher rates amongst first 
generation migrants are also evident in Member States. The proportion of 
migrants in the tenth percentile of the wage distribution (where low wage 
workers are generally situated), as a fraction of the total population, is 
generally higher than that of natives: 16% versus 9% in Spain; 14% versus 9% 
in Belgium; 13% versus 10% in France; and 10% versus 9% in Portugal.28 
 
Education 
 
It is perhaps not surprising that less educated workers are more likely to earn 
minimum wages than more educated workers. Workers with only a secondary 
level qualification (school) are more likely to earn minimum wages than those 
with a tertiary level (university) qualification. Based upon Eurofound’s 
estimates, this is especially true of Southern European Member States, but 
less so of those in the North (with collectively agreed minimum wages).29 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
27 Simon Peters, ‘Ethnic Inequality in Low Pay’, Manchester Policy Blogs 
<http://blog.policy.manchester.ac.uk/posts/2015/03/ethnic-inequality-in-low-pay/> 
accessed 20 April 2017. 
28 Madeline Zavodny, ‘Who benefits from the minimum wage – natives or migrants?’ 
IZA World of Labor <http://wol.iza.org/articles/who-benefits-from-minimum-wage-
natives-or-migrants.pdf> accessed 20 April 2017. 
29 Eurofound (n 15) 132. 
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2.4.2 Employment characteristics 
 
Occupation 
 
Less educated workers are often employed in elementary, skilled agricultural, 
forestry and fishery, and service and sales occupations.30 These occupations 
also have a high concentration of minimum wage workers, across multiple 
sectors, including hotels and restaurants (horeca), agriculture, arts and 
entertainment, and retail. A high proportion of minimum wage workers are 
employed in small companies, with less than 50 employees, particularly in 
horeca, agriculture, and arts and entertainment.31 Importantly, recent research 
has shown that in the wake of the financial crisis, mid-skilled job are being 
replace by low-skilled jobs,32 having the potential to change the composition of 
minimum wage workers by occupation. In the U.K., this has been highlighted 
with regard to administrative professionals and workers in the construction and 
building sector.33 
 
Employment contract type 
 
A division can be made between those minimum wage workers employed on 
full-time contracts and those on part-time contracts. As groups, the latter are 
considerably larger than the former and, as discussed above, are, on average, 
comprised of twice as many women than men. It is worth noting that part-time 
employment represents only 20% of total employment in the EU,34 but there 
are substantial differences between Member States; Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and the U.K. have sizable numbers of part-time workers. A high proportion of 
                                                        
30 ibid 123. 
31 ibid 125. 
32 See Laura Gardiner and Adam Corlett, Resolution Foundation ‘Looking though the 
hourglass: hollowing out of the UK jobs market pre- and post-crisis’ 
<http://www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/looking-through-the-hourglass-
hollowing-out-of-the-uk-jobs-market-pre-and-post-crisis/> accessed 20 April 2017. 
33 ibid. 
34 Eurofound (n 15) 129. 
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minimum wage workers are also employed on temporary (atypical), rather than 
permanent contracts. 
 
2.5 A brief History of minimum wages 
 
The history of minimum wages is complex and for clarity can be divided 
between pre-industrial and industrial society. It is difficult to trace the 
emergence of minimum wages to any one specific period in time, but a 
necessary prerequisite is the idea of ‘wage labour’ (or for Marx and modern 
economists ‘labour power’). Wage labour is dependent upon two abstractions: 
first, labour must be separated from the person and the product of work; 
second, for the purposes of payment, a method of measuring labour is required 
(‘labour time’).35 In modern European states, minimum wages developed with 
industrial relations systems, contributing towards the heterogeneity of regimes 
present in the EU. Those Member States investigated in this section exemplify 
these different systems, and have influenced the development of industrial 
relations in other Member States (for example, Denmark and the Northern 
European Member States). Importantly, the adherence to pluralism common to 
these Member States stands in marked contrast to the totalitarian and centrally 
planned systems that developed during the second half of the 20th century. 
 
2.5.1 Pre-industrial society 
 
The first recorded example of a minimum wage can be found in ancient 
Mesopotamia.36 Dating to circa 1750 BC, the Code of Hammurabi, named after 
the sixth Babylonian king, consisted of 282 laws. Almost half of the Code was 
dedicated to issues of contract, amongst which provisions on the amounts to 
be paid for various forms of work were detailed. These ranged from field 
labours: “if anyone hire a field labourer, he shall pay him eight gur of corn per 
year”, to veterinary surgeons: “if a veterinary surgeon perform a serious 
operation on an ass or on an ox, and cure it, the owner shall pay the surgeon 
                                                        
35 See Moses Finlay, The Ancient Economy (University of California Press 1973). 
36 Starr (n 1) 1. 
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one-sixth of a shekel as a fee” (the Code is considered a primitive, or early, 
constitution).37 
 
Moving from the Bronze Age to the Middle Ages, wage control can be found in 
various forms across Europe. In Britain, in order to prevent workers from 
overcharging for their labour, given its scarcity after the Hundred Year’ War 
and the Black Death, the Statute of Labourers of 1351 enforced customary 
wages, in effect, creating ‘maximum wages’ in certain traders. Later powers 
were given to Justices of the Peace to set wages, which from the Statute of 
Artificers of 1562 onwards were used protectively. The Act of Apprentices of 
1563 provided that wages in each district were to be assessed by Justices of 
the Peace, who should meet to find ways of “[yielding] unto the hired person 
both in time of scarcity and in time of plenty a convenient proportion of 
wages”.38 Along with statutory laws, the guilds also regulated wages and 
working conditions. 
 
Across Europe, from the 14th century, craftsmen began to form associations 
based upon trades in order to protect their common interests. The guilds 
reflected the medieval ideal of harmonious collaboration between masters, 
journeymen, and apprentices. Wages, working conditions, pensions, sickness 
and unemployment assistance were controlled and administered by guilds. 
However, the guild system of collective self-regulation began to fail towards the 
16th century as masters usurped all powers and journeymen abandoned the 
idea of becoming masters themselves; growing tired of having wages and 
working conditions unilaterally imposed upon them. The decline of the guilds 
and the development of combinations signalled the birth of pre-industrial trade 
unionism. No longer did employers and workers organise together (if, indeed, 
workers ever had the choice to refuse), rather they began to organise 
separately. Combinations of journeymen, as journeymen’s clubs in Britain, 
                                                        
37 See Leonard King, ‘Hammurabi’s Code of Laws’ 
<http://eawc.evansville.edu/anthology/hammurabi.htm> accessed 21 April 2017. 
38 See Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market: 
Industrialization, Employment and Legal Evolution (OUP 2005). 
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compagnonnages in France, gezellenbroederschappen in the Netherlands, 
and gesellenverbände in Germany, defended wages when cuts were 
threatened and negotiated for increases when living costs rose.39 The first 
collective agreements were reached between masters and combinations of 
journeymen in the 18th century, but were prevented from developing as 
complements to statutory laws on wages. In Britain, there were over 40 
statutes forbidding combinations in specific trades and numerous examples of 
judges declaring their actions to increase wages unlawful at common law. On 
the continent, in France, the ordonnances of King Charles VI (1382), Villers-
Cotterets (1539), the décret of 2nd January 1749, and the Edict of Turgot 
(1776) banned combinations. In the Netherlands, combinations were outlawed 
by policed regulations, which were also used in Germany until the 
Reichzunftordnung (Reich Guild Act) of 1731.40 
 
2.5.2 Industrial society 
 
The industrial revolution in Britain from the middle of the 18th to the beginning 
of the 19th century saw the repeal of combinations bans and the legal 
recognition of trade unions (and employers associations). Although trade 
unions were no longer subject to the criminal law, they were the civil law. They 
were tolerated, not repressed, but not recognised. The Combination Act of 
1825 provided that all combinations concerned with wages, prices, and hours 
of work were to be free from criminal sanction under statute and common law, 
but the Act outlawed violence, threats, intimidation, molestation, and 
obstruction. Thus, in theory, the piecemeal state regulation of wages that had 
occurred from the Middle Ages onwards was set to be complemented by a 
nascent body of collective labour law, independent of the state. Its 
development, specifically concerning minimum wages, was far from 
straightforward. This was also the case on the continent, where industrial 
                                                        
39 Antoine Jacobs, ‘Collective Self-Regulation’ in Bob Hepple (ed), The Making of 
Labour Law in Europe: A Comparative Study of Nine Counties up to 1945 (Hart 2010) 
193, 196. 
40 ibid 197. 
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revolution occurred later than in Britain and different social and political 
situations prevailed. Britain is examined in more detail next, followed by 
France, Germany and Denmark. 
 
Britain 
 
The term ‘collective laissez-faire’ was coined by Kahn-Freund to describe 
industrial relations in Britain before the middle of the 20th century. From the 
19th century onwards, the economic liberalism of thinkers such as J.S. Mill was 
used to justify the abstention of the state in the provision of welfare and the 
limited oversight of collective bargaining between employers associations and 
trade unions. Where protective legislation did exist, this was to regulate 
employment relations that could not be effectively reached by collective 
bargaining, in Kahn-Freund’s words protective legislation was “in a sense, a 
gloss or a footnote to collective bargaining”.41 It was not until the development 
of ‘new model’ trade unions – as labelled by Sidney and Beatrice Webb42 – that 
collective agreements covering wages became a part of the industrial relations 
landscape in Britain. By 1888, 10% of adult male workers were members of 
trade unions, which were increasingly organised across industries and cities, 
and in the public sector.43 Whereas trade unions were successful in securing 
minimum standards for their members without the need for legislation, it 
became clear that those who were excluded, including women, children, and 
young workers, were in desperate need of protection. 
 
Towards the turn of the 19th century, the problem of ‘sweating’ – the 
exploitation of vulnerable workers – caught the attention of social reformers 
                                                        
41 Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘Legal Framework’ in Allan Flanders and Hugh Clegg (eds), The 
System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain: Its History, Law and Institutions 
(Blackwell 1954) 42, 66. 
42 Sidney and Beatrice Webb, The History of Trade Unionism: 1666 – 1920 (Nabu 
Press 2011). 
43 Jacobs (n 39) 221. 
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and political liberals.44 Although not restricted to ‘homework’, sweating was 
described by a House of Lords select committee in 1890 as a combination of: 
 
a rate of wages inadequate to the necessities of the workers or 
disproportionate to the work done, excessive hours of labour, and the 
insanitary state of houses in which the work is carried on.45 
 
As a consequence of the dominance of collective laissez-faire, a national 
minimum wage was considered unthinkable, rather limited state regulation of 
wages in the ‘sweated’ trades was favoured. The result was the Trades Boards 
Act of 1909, which established machinery for setting minimum wages in trades 
or industries where prevailing wages were exceptionally low and collective 
bargaining was ineffective. Introduced by Winston Churchill, the Act was based 
upon the wage boards of Australia and New Zealand (the first states in the 
modern world to introduce minimum wages). Each trade board was comprised 
of an equal number of employers’ and workers’ representatives, with an 
uneven number of independent members (including academics and retired civil 
servants). Once a minimum wage had been set, the state ensured it was 
enforced. 
 
By the time of the second Trade Boards Act in 1918, roughly 3 million workers 
were protected from exceptionally low pay in more than 40 industries.46 Over 
70% of these workers were women and only one-fifth of the total workforce 
were covered.47 Unlike in other states, minimum wages in Britain, as an 
example of protective legislation, were not gradually extended to all workers, 
rather they remained confined to specific groups. The Edwardian hangover of 
                                                        
44 See Sheila Blackburn, A Fair Day’s Wage for a Fair Day’s Work?: Sweated Labour 
and the Origins of Minimum Wage Legislation in Britain (Ashgate 2007). 
45 Cited in Jerold Waltman, Minimum Wage Policy in Great Britain and the United 
States (Algora 2008) 42. 
46 Thilo Ramm, ‘Laissez-faire and the State Protection of Workers’ in Hepple (n 39) 73, 
88. 
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using trade boards as a proxy and start-up mechanism for collective 
bargaining, as opposed to for setting minimum wages in their own right, 
remained until the abolition of wage councils in 1993 (which replaced trade 
boards with slight alteration after the Second World War). The first national, or 
universal, minimum wage was not introduced in Britain until 1998. 
 
France 
 
On the continent, protective legislation had a far more prominent role in 
regulating working life than in Britain, even when collective bargaining had 
reached a stage of maturity. In France, before the enactment of the Waldeck-
Rousseau Act in 1884,48 trade unions were severely limited in their ability to 
organise and engage in collective bargaining (due to the hostility of French 
revolutionary ideology to sectional organisations between the state and society 
and the political fears of the ruling classes). Consequently, minimum wages 
were initially the result of statutory regulation, rather than collective 
agreements.  
 
In similarity with Fair Wage Resolutions in Britain,49 Décrets Millerand obliged 
government contractors to observe terms and conditions of employment no 
less favourable than those held in collective agreements between 
representative employers associations and trade unions in concerned trades or 
industries.50 At the turn of the 19th century, strikes in Decazeville and Longwy 
drew attention to the problem of economats (‘Tommy Shops’),51 as factories 
which forced workers into almost total dependence. Unlike the response to 
sweating in Britain, the first steps towards statutory regulation of minimum 
wages in France were motivated by war concerns. An Act of 10 July 1915 fixed 
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wages for women homeworkers who produce military kit (based upon living 
costs and skills).52 
 
The recognition of positive legal rights for trade unions was a watershed 
moment for industrial relations in France. In less than a year, trade union 
membership increased from 1 million to 5 million.53 The Matignon Agreement 
of May 1936 provided a procedure for the extension of collective agreements 
and for compulsory arbitration should employers associations and trade unions 
fail to reach agreement or disputes arise. Under the ‘Popular Front’ 
government that introduced the agreement, only 4% of cases referred for 
arbitration were decided by the state,54 which heavily favoured trade unions; 
conditions were therefore advantageous for high collectively agreed pay. 
However, collective agreement coverage was considerably lower in the private 
sector than in the public sector. This was addressed with the introduction of the 
Salaire Minimum National Interprofessionnel Garanti (the ‘SMIG’) in 1950, 
which can be seen as a complement to the established system of industrial 
relations in France. 
 
Germany 
 
The ‘social question’ was approached differently in Germany, by 1850 
‘socialism of the throne’ or the ‘welfare monarchy’ was favoured as a way of 
securing the loyalty of workers by providing a state system of social 
protection.55 The reforms of Otto von Bismarck evidence this form of 
paternalism; legislation against social risk was passed, specifically, as social 
insurance schemes. The ideological influence of the Bismarckian reforms are 
evident in the Weimar Constitution of 1919, which invested trade union rights 
with constitutional status; including that of association (Article 159) and to 
bargain collectively (Article 165). These were reinforced by the German 
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Collective Agreements Decree of 1918, which gave collective agreements 
automatic and compulsory effect. The work of Hugo Sinzheimer was no doubt 
influential, theorising collective agreements as private law contracts between 
employers associations and trade unions, serving social and normative or 
legislative functions.56 
 
Despite the recognition of positive legal rights for trade unions and one of the 
most advance systems of industrial relations in Europe, calls were made for the 
introduction of British style trade boards in Germany.57 As in Britain, these calls 
were at the behest of protecting specific groups of workers; the German Home 
Work Act of 1911 had provided for the establishment of ‘branch committees’ 
that could promote ‘wage or collective agreements’. The response from State 
Secretary von Bethmann-Hollweg left proponents in little doubt about the 
possibility of a statutory minimum wage, he considered it the “first step 
[towards a] socialist state”.58 That having been said, the German Home 
Workers Act of 1929 authorised branch committees to declare collective 
agreements generally binding, to establish minimum wages, and to decide 
settlements when necessary. Having been dismantled under National 
Socialism, industrial relations recovered after the Second World War. It was 
only with declining collective agreement coverage that calls for a statutory 
minimum wage resurfaced at the end of the century. 
 
Denmark 
 
The voluntary system of industrial relations in Denmark was similar to that in 
Britain, but with a stronger orientation towards partnership. A strong tradition of 
private societies, an aversion to compulsion, and the widespread acceptance 
of individual responsibility for protection against social risks, laid the 
foundations for the signing of the celebrated September Agreement of 1899.59 
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After the hardest and longest industrial conflict in Danish history, employers 
associations and trade unions agreed to acknowledge each others rights to 
exist and function. The September Agreement was immediately recognised by 
the Danish government and later supported by legislation.60 However, in 
comparison to France and Germany, negative immunities were favoured over 
positive legal rights. This gave collective bargaining in Demark a dynamic 
character, and avoided court oversight. The September Agreement remains 
the basis of Danish industrial relations today, with the continued partnership it 
promotes (partially) explaining the opposition of trade unions and employers 
associations to statutory minimum wages. 
 
2.6 Comparing Member States 
 
All Member States of the EU have a minimum wage, whether set by statute or 
by collective or tripartite agreement. The use of these regulatory instruments 
corresponds to whether Member States have sectoral or universal minimum 
wage regimes, and roughly to the levels at which they are set (in nominal and 
real terms). 
 
2.6.1 Regimes 
 
Of the 28 Member States of the EU, 22 have universal minimum wage 
regimes, whereas 8 have sectoral minimum wage regimes. Universal regimes 
set a wage floor for all workers, whereas sectoral regimes set a wage floor for 
specific groups of workers. With the entry into force of the Mindestlohngesetz 
in January 2015 (‘the Germany Act on the regulation of a minimum wage’), 
Austria, Cyprus, Demark, Finland, Italy, and Sweden are the only Member 
States with sectoral regimes. With Germany, these Member States constituted 
a visual ‘belt’ of sectoral regimes across the EU, without Germany, they form a 
‘pincer’. 
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Figure 1: Map of Minimum Wage Regimes in the EU (light grey indicates 
universal regimes, dark grey indicates sectoral regimes) 
 
 
 
The most common way of distinguishing between minimum wage regimes is by 
regulatory instrument; whether minimum wages are set by law (statute), by 
collective agreement (by representatives of management and labour), or by 
tripartite agreement (by representative of management, labour, and the state). 
The distinction between law and collective or tripartite agreement is not 
antithetical to that between different types of minimum regime, rather it can be 
seen as complementary. In Member States with universal regimes, minimum 
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wages are set by statute (e.g. France, Greece, and Croatia), whereas in 
Member States with sectoral regimes, minimum wages are set by collective 
agreement (e.g. Demark, Austria, and Italy). There are caveats to this rule; in 
some Western and Central and Eastern European Member States (e.g. 
Bulgaria and Poland), minimum wages are initially negotiated by a tripartite 
body, after which any subsequent agreement is given statutory effect. Belgium 
is a special case, as the minimum wage is set by a national collective 
agreement for the private sector as a whole. 
 
The means by which minimum wages are set in universal regimes are linked to 
the methods used for their adjusted. Member States that set minimum wages 
directly by statute usually consult representatives of management and labour 
before adjustments are made (e.g. Croatia, Latvia, and Lithuania). Increasingly, 
methods of adjustment are combined, for example, in Belgium, the negotiation 
of a national collective agreement for the private sector is supplemented with 
indexation to price developments. Since the financial crisis of 2008, unilateral 
decision-making or direct adjustment by the state has become more popular. 
Those Member States that make use of negotiation based methods of 
adjustment often have strong collective labour law traditions (prior to regulation 
by the state). 
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Table 1: Methods of Adjustment 
1. Indexation 
(automatic 
adjustment to 
price and/or 
wage 
developments) 
2. Negotiation 
(bipartite and 
tripartite 
negotiations 
between 
employers 
associations, 
trade unions, and 
the state) 
3. Consultation 
(institutionalised 
consultations 
between 
employers 
associations and 
trade unions) 
4. Unilateral 
Decision-making 
(unilateral 
decision-making 
by the state) 
Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg, 
Malta, 
Netherlands, 
Slovenia 
Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Germany, 
Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia (Belgium 
supplementing 1) 
Croatia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, 
Portugal, Spain, 
United Kingdom 
(France, 
Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, 
Slovenia 
supplementing 1) 
Czech Republic, 
Greece, Ireland, 
Romania 
Source: Amended from Schulten (2016) 
 
In Member States with sectoral regimes, minimum wages that are set by 
collective agreement are dependent for their effectiveness upon the strength of 
national industrial relations systems. In Northern European Member States, 
collective agreement coverage is particularly high: 91% in Sweden, 90% in 
Finland, and 85% in Denmark. In Austria, collective agreement coverage of 
97% has been achieved by a national framework agreement between 
employers associations and trade unions. This agreement establishes the 
functional equivalent of a national minimum wage of €1,000 per month, below 
which other collective agreements cannot derogate. High collective agreement 
coverage in Northern European Member States is the result of erga omnes 
extension; the process by which collective agreements are declared universally 
applicable by the state. This is suggested as a reason for the aversion of 
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Scandinavian trade unions to statutory minimum wages; they are seen as 
superfluous. Conversely, low collective agreement coverage of 58% was used 
as a justification for the adoption of a statutory minimum wage in Germany. Of 
those Member States with sectoral regimes, Cyprus is the only Member State 
with a statutory minimum wage (for certain occupations); which somewhat 
mitigates against its low collective agreement coverage of 52%. 
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Table 2: Minimum Wage Regimes in the EU 
 
Regulatory 
Instrument / Scope 
Law 
 
Collective or Tripartite 
Agreement 
Universal Regimes 
(with a national 
minimum wage, 
covering all 
workers) 
Western Europe 
France, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
United Kingdom 
 
Southern Europe 
Greece, Malta, Portugal, 
Spain 
 
Central and Eastern 
Europe 
Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovenia 
 
Western Europe 
Belgium, Germany 
 
Central and Eastern 
Europe 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland, 
Slovakia 
 
Sectoral Regimes 
(without a national 
minimum wage, 
but with minimum 
wages covering 
specific groups of 
workers e.g. for 
certain occupation) 
Cyprus 
Northern Europe 
Denmark, Finland, 
Sweden 
 
Western Europe 
Austria 
 
Southern Europe 
Italy 
 
Source: Amended from Schulten (2016) 
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2.6.2 Levels 
 
There are large differences between Member States in terms of the absolute 
levels at which minimum wages are set. Luxembourg has the highest minimum 
wage in the EU at €11.12 per hour, whereas Bulgaria has the lowest at €1.06 
per hour. Of the 22 Member States with universal regimes, three groups can be 
identified: those with minimum wages below €3 per hour; those with minimum 
wages between €3 and €7 per hour; and those with minimum wages above €7 
per hour. The first group is populated by Central and Eastern European 
Member States, the second by Central and Eastern European Member States 
at the lower end and Southern European Member States at the higher end 
(with the exception of Slovenia), and the third by Western European Member 
States. Of particular interest is the relationship between the third and second 
group, where the minimum wages of the former are considerably higher than 
those of the latter. 
 
Figure 2: National Minimum Wages per Hour (in Euros as of 1st January 2017) 
 
Source: WSI Minimum Wage Database (2017) 
 
Of the 6 Member States with sectoral regimes, only limited data is available on 
collective agreement coverage and average collectively agreed pay (Figure 3 
has been produced using data from two different sources). Accurate data was 
not available for Sweden; collective agreement coverage is estimated at 91% 
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according to the ICTWSS Database and average collectively agreed pay 
between €2,300 and €2,700 per month by various sources. Average 
collectively agreed pay has been calculated on a monthly basis due to 
differences in the length of the agreed working week in those collective 
agreements sampled.  
 
With the exception of Austria and Cyprus (as special cases), two groups of 
Member States can be identified: Finland and Italy have similar average 
collectively agreed pay levels, as do Denmark and Sweden. Although 
considerably lower than Denmark and Sweden, average collectively agree pay 
in Finland and Italy is comparable to those Member States with universal 
regimes and minimum wages above €7 per hour. With the second highest 
minimum wage after Luxembourg, the Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel de 
Croissance (the ‘SMIC’) in France is set at a basic rate of €1,458 per month. 
However, statutory minimum wages often serve as a ‘safety net’ for those 
workers who are not covered by higher, collectively agreed pay. 
 
Figure 3: Collective Agreement Coverage and Average Collectively Agreed 
Pay per Month (in Euros as of 2009 from EU-SILC) 
 
Source: ICTWSS Database (2013), EU-SILC (2010) 
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A more accurate comparison between Member States can be made by 
converting the nominal levels of minimum wages to ‘Purchasing Power 
Standards’ (PPS). PPS take account of differences in living costs. In contrast to 
the nominal levels of minimum wages, the differences between Member States 
in PPS are considerably smaller (the distribution of minimum wages in PPS is 
more consistent than in Euros per hour). Whereas the nominal minimum wage 
of the United Kingdom is just under double that of Slovenia, in PPS, it is less 
than 1. The ratio between the Member States with the highest (Luxembourg) 
and lowest (Bulgaria) nominal minimum wage is reduced from just over 11:1 to 
just over 4:1. 
 
Figure 4: National Minimum Wages per Hour (in PPS as of 1st January 2017) 
 
Source: WSI Minimum Wage Database (2017) 
 
The relative level of minimum wages in relation to national wage structures can 
be measured using the ‘Kaitz index’, which sets the national minimum wage as 
a percentage of the national median wage. Comparing Kaitz indices provides a 
clearer picture of the real levels of minimum wages between Member States, 
as opposed to measurements based upon absolute levels. 
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Figure 5: National Minimum Wages as a Percentage of National Median 
Wages 
 
Source: OECD 2013, Croatian Bureau of Statistics (2014), EU-SILC (2010), 
German Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2015) 
 
When compared with minimum wages in PPS, the order of minimum wages in 
Kaitz indices is considerably different. Luxembourg falls from its position as the 
Member State with the highest minimum wage in PPS to the Member State 
with the fourth lowest minimum wage in Kaitz indices. Trends in the opposite 
direction can be identified; whereas Croatia and Portugal have minimum wages 
in the middle of the PPS distribution, in Kaitz indices they belong to the first 
group of Member States with national minimum wages above 55% of the 
national median wage. A difference of 27 percentage points exists between the 
Member States with the highest (France) and lowest (Czech Republic) 
minimum wage in Kaitz indices. Context is given to these figures when they are 
set against international benchmarks; low wages are those below 60% of the 
national median wage, whereas poverty wages are those below 50% of the 
national media wage. Therefore, almost all Member States with universal 
regimes have minimum wages below low wage levels and over half have 
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minimum wages below poverty wage levels (which surprisingly includes all 
Western European Member States, bar France and Germany). 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
A workable EU minimum wage policy must accommodate the differences that 
exist between national minimum wage setting systems. The heterogeneity of 
these systems creates a substantial hurdle to the articulation of a more 
comprehensive policy; in terms of institutional coordination and the willingness 
of Member States and social partners to alter the operation of their regimes 
which are often of significant historical importance. 
 
As the discussion in the next chapter illustrates, because of these differences, 
very few proposals forward a policy instituted by the Union, imposed in a top-
down fashion and based around the same nominal value for all Member 
States. Indeed, considerable differences in the levels of minimum wages in 
Member States rules out coordination around a base value, for example, of €8 
per hour, in favour of measurements centred around relative values. As 
outlined in the next chapter, when commentators speak about the idea of an 
EU minimum wage policy, they often describe a policy based around a form of 
wage coordination between Member States. 
 
Furthermore, the means by which minimum wages are set and adjusted in 
Member States raises the question of who would be responsible for an EU 
minimum wage policy. Would it be the European Commission, trade unions 
and employers associations or Member States themselves? Moreover, what 
would the aim of an EU minimum wage policy be? Would it seek to address 
gender disparities between minimum wage workers or, more generally, the 
problem of low wage work? Would such an initiative be viewed as a social 
justice or macroeconomic policy tool? 
 
These questions are explored in the next chapter which provides a 
comprehensive overview of current debates on the idea of an EU minimum 
wage policy. 
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3. Debates on the idea of an EU minimum wage policy 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a in-depth background to past and present debates on 
the idea of an EU minimum wage policy. It discusses the obstacles that have 
stood in the way of the development of a more comprehensive policy and 
identifies areas that require further investigation if the objective of a workable 
proposal is to be realised. In doing so, it serves as a foundation for the 
following chapters of this thesis, against which ideas surrounding why such a 
policy is needed, how it could be implemented and who should be responsible 
for its operation, are articulated. 
 
After close to half a decade of austerity measures in Member States, the idea 
of an EU minimum wage policy is currently receiving more attention than at any 
other time during its relatively short history. When the current President of the 
European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, addressed the European 
Parliament before the vote to confirm his appointment on 15th July 2014, he 
called for the introduction of a minimum wage in all Member States.1 In his 
campaign for the Presidency, Juncker had developed this idea further, 
suggesting that an EU minimum wage policy could be introduced and “adjusted 
to national collective bargaining traditions and economic conditions [in Member 
                                                        
1 Euractiv, ‘Juncker calls for minimum wage in all EU countries’ 
<http://www.euractiv.com/sections/%20social-europe-jobs/juncker-calls-minimum-
wage-all-eu-%20countries-303484> accessed 2 November 2017. 
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States]”.2 Junker justified this proposal as a contribution to the “rehabilitation of 
the social market economy”.3 
 
Whereas Junker appears to favour a policy instituted by Member States (in 
cooperation with the institutions of the Union), much earlier, Jacques Delors 
suggested an EU minimum wage policy could be achieved through the 
collaboration of trade unions and employers’ associations organised at 
European level. Delors called on European trade unions to negotiate an EU 
minimum wage policy within the framework of the European Social Dialogue.4 
Although the Member States are still very much viewed as key players in 
current debates, suggestions similar to that of Delors are still being discussed. 
Indeed, the European trade union movement has worked for decades on the 
transnational coordination of wages.5 
 
If the idea of an EU minimum wage policy is to develop into a serious proposal, 
imagination is required in order to overcome the many hurdles that stand in the 
way of its realisation. For the Union-led proposal of Junker, significant political 
and institutional differences between Member States must be accommodated 
(notwithstanding the Union’s limited competence to regulate in the area of pay). 
For the social partner-led proposal of Delors, the asymmetry in bargaining 
power that exists between trade unions and employers’ associations organised 
at European level is a serious impediment to progress. In order to push debate 
                                                        
2 Jean-Claude Juncker, ‘Kernbotschaften von Jean-Claude Juncker, Spitzenkandidat 
der Europäischen Volkspartei (EVP) für das Amt des Präsidenten der EU-Kommission 
bei der Europawahl am 25. Mai 2014’ <http://juncker.epp.eu/news/kernbotschaften-
von-jean-claude-juncker-spitzenkandidat-der-europaischen-volkspartei-evp-fur> 
accessed 1 October 2017. 
3 RP Online, ‘Jean-Claude Juncker im Interview: Ich bin überzeugt, dass Europa 
Mindestlöhne braucht’ <http://www.rp-online.de/politik/ich-bin-ueberzeugt-dass-
europa-mindestloehne-braucht-aid-1.4080596> accessed 2 November 2017. 
4 Jacques Delors, ‘Speech at the Forum on the European Dimension’ in PES (ed), 
Social Europe: Second Contributions to the Debate (PES 2006) 8, 18. 
5 The transnational coordination of wages is discussed below and in more detail in 
chapter 6. 
  
65 
forward and develop a workable proposal, policymakers, social partners and 
academics must think within the confines of what is possible, not what is 
desirable; there is little value in focusing efforts on the idea of a Union-led EU 
minimum wage policy if Member States are opposed or, conversely, on a social 
partner-led proposal if both sides of industry cannot be brought to the 
bargaining table. 
 
On both fronts, recent events are encouraging. As arguably the most powerful 
member of the Union, the introduction of a statutory minimum wage in 
Germany from 1st January 2015 has reignited debate at EU-level. Whereas at 
one time most were fiercely opposed to the idea of an EU minimum wage 
policy, all major political parties in Germany are now in favour.6 Der Linke (the 
‘Left Party’) is the most ambitious, calling for “a binding European minimum 
wage regulation [of] the amount of 60 per cent of the relevant national average 
wage”.7 With regard to the idea of a social partner-led policy, the European 
Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) declared 2017 ‘the year of the pay rise’ 
and recommitted itself to supporting efforts to establish a transnational level to 
collective bargaining.8 
 
In what follows, first, references to wages and minimum wages in international 
and European agreements and conventions are investigated. Second, one of 
the earliest attempts to explore the possibility of establishing an EU minimum 
wage policy, the Commission Opinion on an Equitable Wage,9 is discussed 
and the lack of support from Member States cited as the main reason for its 
failure. Third, the positions and views of the European Parliament and trade 
                                                        
6 Thorsten Schulten, ‘Contours of a European Minimum Wage Policy’ (2014) Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung 1, 3. 
7 Die Linke, ‘Europa geht anders. Sozial, friedlich, demokratisch’ <http://www.die-
linke.de/partei/organe/parteitage/europaparteitag-2014/europa-geht-anders-sozial-
friedlich-demokratisch/> accessed 21 December 2017. 
8 See ETUC, ‘2017 – the year of the pay rise’ <https://www.etuc.org/press/2017-year-
pay-rise#.WffVgK10dR0> accessed 1 October 2017. 
9 European Commission, Commission opinion on an equitable wage COM(93) 388 
final. 
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unions are discussed, suggesting that although support exists (especially in the 
European Parliament), division along national lines has prevented the adoption 
of a uniform position in favour of its further investigation. Fourth, more 
contemporary debates are considered. These include how and to what extent 
minimum wages in Member States should be coordinated and the levels at 
which they should be set. Finally, the features of minimum wage systems in 
Member States that are underdeveloped or ignored in debates on the idea of 
an EU minimum wage policy are outlined.  
 
3.2 International and European agreements and conventions 
 
Potential normative foundations for an EU minimum wage policy can be found 
in various international and European agreements and conventions. These 
documents are not generally considered to be legally binding,10 rather they 
serve to illustrate the political commitment of a state to their values. 
Internationally, Article 23(3) of the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) states that “everyone who works has the right to just 
and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence 
worthy of human dignity”. Similarly, the Preamble of the 1919 Constitution of 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) calls for an “adequate living wage” 
for all workers. This is developed further with regard to minimum wages by ILO 
Conventions No. 26 of 1928 and No. 131 of 1970. According to Article 3(a) of 
the latter, considerations to be made when determining minimum wage levels 
include: 
 
The needs of workers and their families, taking into account the general 
level of wages in the country, the cost of living, social security benefits, 
and the relative living standards of other social groups. 
 
In Europe, Article 4(1) of the 1961 Council of Europe European Social Charter 
(ESC) states that “all workers have the right to a fair remuneration sufficient for 
a decent standard of living for themselves and their families”. In contrast to the 
                                                        
10 See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn, OUP 2008) 3 – 4. 
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focus of the ESC on ‘fair’ wages, Article 5 of the 1989 EU Community Charter 
of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (CFSRW) refers to the concept of 
‘equitable’ wages. It reads “workers shall be assured of an equitable wage i.e. 
a wage sufficient to ensure them a decent standard of living”. Furthermore, the 
CFSRW breaks the link between remuneration and family provision (as 
expressed in the UDHR, ILO Conventions, and the ESC). The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union does not contain any provisions on 
fair or equitable wages. It is has been argued wages were left out of the 
Charter because Member States sought to retain and develop low wage 
labour.11 As a result, establishing a right to a fair or equitable wage was 
dismissed. Indeed, in its communication on the Charter, the Commission 
considered the idea of an equitable wage not as a fundamental right but 
“simply… [as a] policy objective”.12 
 
In all international and European agreements and conventions, fair and 
equitable wages are related to a decent standard of living. In general, they aim 
to guarantee not only a minimum level of sustenance but also allow for 
adequate participation in society. The most advanced attempt to operationalise 
the concept of a fair wage was made by the Council of Europe (CoE) in the 
1970s, as a means to test compliance with the ESC. The CoE’s European 
Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) adopted a definition of a fair wage as 
being 68% of the gross national average wage. However, this threshold was 
abandoned in the 1990s in favour of 60% of the net national average wage, 
with difficulties in calculating the weight of tax and welfare benefits cited as 
reasons for the change. The ECSR was subsequently criticised, as moving 
from a gross to a net calculation shifted responsibility for providing fair wages 
                                                        
11 Thorsten Schulten and Andrew Watt, ‘European minimum wage policy – a concrete 
project for social Europe’ (2007) European Economic and Employment Policy Brief 
No. 2 (ETUI-REHS) 6. 
12 European Commission, Commission Communication on the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union COM(2000) 559 final 7. 
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from employers to the state.13 The ECSR evaluates the conformity of Member 
States with the ‘right to fair remuneration’ once every four years. 
 
3.3 Early attempts to develop an EU minimum wage policy 
 
As a response to the adoption of the CFSRW and in recognition the significant 
number of low wage workers in the EU, in 1993 the Commission published its 
Opinion on an Equitable Wage.14 Together with the input of the European 
Parliament, the Commission Opinion was the first and, so far, only institutional 
initiative exploring the possibility of establishing an EU minimum wage policy. 
The Commission Opinion called on Member States to “take appropriate 
measures to ensure that the right to an equitable wage is protected”,15 given 
that “the problem of low pay is an issue in all countries of the European 
Community”.16 Moreover, the Commission argued “very low income levels at 
both individual state and Community level… [cause] problems concerning 
social justice and social cohesion that could have a detrimental effect on 
economic performance in the long term”.17 
 
In order to address some of these problems, the Commission recommended 
Member States consider “legislation on discrimination, in particular on grounds 
of gender, race, ethnic origin or religion”,18 along with “mechanisms for the 
establishment of negotiated minima and the strengthening of collective 
bargaining arrangements”.19 It also committed itself to monitor wage 
developments and the implementation of equitable wages in Member States,20 
                                                        
13 See Carol Murray, ‘The Definition of Adequate Remuneration’’ (2004) 85 Radical 
Statistics 30. 
14 European Commission (n 9). 
15 ibid 9. 
16 ibid 7. 
17 ibid 7. 
18 ibid 9. 
19 ibid 9. 
20 ibid 10. 
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and invited the social partners to address these issues at “Community, 
national, regional and local level”.21 
 
In reaction to the Commission Opinion, the European Parliament initially 
argued for binding guidelines, with the Social Affairs Committee later 
encouraging Member States “to establish a minimum wage which amounts to a 
certain proportion of the national average wage”.22 Although criticised for being 
vague,23 the Commission Opinion began a debate which conceptualised the 
idea of an EU minimum wage policy as involving the coordination of national 
minimum wages around a particular reference value or ‘norm’.  
 
Any further action by the Commission was ruled out in the second half of the 
1990s, due to political resistance from Member States. In 1997 the 
Commission published Equitable Wages – a Progress Report,24 which 
presented research on the areas highlighted for investigation in the 
Commission Opinion. Of the then 15 Member States, only 7 provided data on 
their national wage structure. The Commission believed “there were few signs 
that the Member States had viewed the Opinion as a catalyst for action” rather 
“the majority of Member States felt that the intervention on wage setting was 
not desirable and should be avoided if possible”.25 In similarity with the 
preliminary findings of the Commission Opinion, the Progress Report revealed 
growing wage inequality and suggested “the decline of traditional forms of 
collective bargaining in some Member States has reduced control over 
monitoring and maintaining an equitable wage”.26 At a time when EU 
competences in the social policy field were being extended, it was clear 
Member States did not want to transfer powers in the area of pay. However, 
                                                        
21 ibid 6. 
22 Thorsten Schulten, ‘Towards a European Minimum Wage Policy? Fair Wages and 
Social Europe’ (2008) 14(4) European Journal of Industrial Relations 421, 430. 
23 ibid. 
24 European Commission, Equitable Wages – a Progress Report COM(96) 698 final. 
25 ibid 1. 
26 ibid 1. 
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the Commission continued to discuss equitable wages, specifically with regard 
to financial participation schemes and in terms of its ‘quality of work’ agenda.27 
 
3.4 Positions and views of the European Parliament and trade unions 
 
Along with the Commission Opinion, the idea of an EU minimum wage policy 
has also been discussed by the European Parliament and trade unions. 
Whereas the Parliament has tended to consider the idea in terms of how it 
could be implemented through the Union’s institutional and policy framework, 
trade unions have focussed on national and transnational collective bargaining. 
 
3.4.1 European Parliament 
 
In the last decade, the idea of an EU minimum wage has been raised in the 
European Parliament more frequently than at any other time. During the 2014 
parliamentary elections, all major political groupings discussed its introduction. 
The Party of European Socialists made the introduction of an EU minimum 
wage its flagship policy, whilst the European People’s Party added its support 
towards the end of campaigning.28 Although the Alliance for Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe rejected the idea, some of their constituent parties were 
in favour.29 In the last Parliament, there was reportedly a consensus for its 
introduction, with a majority favouring regulation.30 In spite of this, no request 
was made for the Commission to investigate the possibility of legislation. To 
                                                        
27 Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead ‘Towards an EU Minimum Wage Policy?’ in Daniel 
Vaughn-Whitehead (ed), The Minimum Wage Revisited in the Enlarged EU (Edward 
Elgar 2010) 513; and see European Commission, Employment and Social Policies: a 
Framework for Investing in Quality COM(2001) 313 final. 
28 Le Mond, ‘Salaire minimum en Europe: comment se positionnent les partis?’ 
<http://www.lemonde.fr/europeennes-2014/article/2014/05/21/salaire-minimum-en-
europe-comment-se-positionnent-les-partis_4422374_4350146.html> accessed 18 
October 2017. 
29 ibid. 
30 Line Eldring and Kristin Alsos, European Minimum Wage: A Nordic Outlook (Fafo 
2012) 15. 
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date, debates have paid little attention to the idea of an EU minimum wage as 
a policy in its own right rather it has been almost exclusively discussed as part 
of wider efforts at alleviating poverty. 
 
A resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 15th November 2011 
discusses minimum wages in terms of an EU minimum income policy.31 As a 
concept, minimum incomes are broader than minimum wages; they include 
social security transfers and seek to ensure that all citizens have an income 
sufficient to live on, irrespective of whether they are working, unemployed or 
retired.32 Given the heterogeneity of national industrial relations systems, the 
idea of an EU minimum income policy is considered to be more 
accommodating of difference than that of an EU minimum wage policy.33 This 
is may be as the latter is often discussed in terms of statutory implementation 
in Member States (not by processes of national or transnational collective 
bargaining). The summary of the resolution states: 
 
Parliament wishes the Commission to launch a consultation on the 
possibility of a legislative initiative concerning a sensible minimum 
income which will allow economic growth, prevent poverty and serve as 
a basis for people to live in dignity. It wants the Commission to help 
Member States to share best practice in relation to minimum income 
levels, and encourages Member States to develop minimum income 
schemes based on at least 60% of the median income in each Member 
State.34 
 
In section 46, Parliament says it: 
                                                        
31 European Parliament, ‘Resolution on the European Platform against poverty and 
social exclusion’, adopted on 15 November 2011 (2011/2052/(NI)). 
32 Eldring and Alsos (n 30) 15; See Ramón Peña-Casas and Denis Bouget, ‘Towards 
a European minimum income: Discussions, issues and prospects’ in David Natali (ed), 
Social developments in the European Union (ETUI 2014). 
33 Eldring and Alsos (n 30) 16. 
34 European Parliament (n 31). 
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[B]elives that in-work poverty reflects inequitable working conditions, 
and calls for efforts to change this state of affairs, through pay levels in 
general and minimum wage levels in particular, which – whether 
regulated by legislation or collective bargaining – must ensure a decent 
standard of living.35 
 
Read against a similar resolution adopted on 15th November 2007,36 there 
appears to be considerable support within Parliament for an EU minimum 
income policy. Given the similarities between both policies, it can reasonably 
be assumed that the idea of an EU minimum wage has some of this support. 
However, it remains highly unlikely the Commission will consider investigating 
its feasibility, especially without a standalone resolution. On 7th April 2014, the 
Commission was asked by GUE/NGL MEP Patrick Le Hyaric if it was 
“prepared to fight for a European minimum wage”.37 The Commission 
responded “that wage-setting is a competence of Member States, and in many 
cases social partners”,38 in effect, ruling out the possibility of any action in the 
near future. 
 
3.4.2 Trade unions 
 
The largest trade union at EU-level is the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC). The ETUC is one of four European social partners, and represents the 
interests of workers and their national affiliates during consultations with the 
institutions of the Union and in negotiations with the representatives of industry 
organised at EU-level. 
                                                        
35 ibid. 
36 European Parliament, ‘Resolution on social reality stocktaking’, adopted on 15 
November 2007 (2007/2104(INI)). 
37 See European Parliament, ‘Parliamentary questions: European social model and 
response to the crisis’ 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=P-2014-
004317&format=XML&language=EN> accessed 18 October 2017. 
38 ibid. 
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Published in 2005 by a group of German, Swiss, and French academics, the 
Theses for a European minimum wage policy affords a key role to European 
trade unions,39 such as the ETUC, in designing and implementing an EU 
minimum wage policy. In contrast to institutional initiatives (e.g. the 
Commission Opinion) and debates in institutional fora (e.g. those on an EU 
minimum income policy in the European Parliament), it attributes a key role to 
process of national and transnational collective bargaining. This approach 
shifts reliance upon the institutions of the Union to establish an EU minimum 
wage policy to the trade unions themselves. The Theses argues that: 
 
The European trade unions have a key role in implementing a European 
minimum wage policy. They first need to develop their own concept for a 
European minimum wage policy. Such a concept would be linked, on 
the one hand, to the existing initiatives aiming at a European 
coordination of collective bargaining policy. On the other hand, the 
concept would serve as a basis for formulating ambitious objectives at 
European level and driving forward their implementation at national 
level.40 
 
The ETUC has never explicitly endorsed the idea of an EU minimum wage 
policy. Indeed, in contrast to the European Metalworkers Federation, the ETUC 
was slow in promoting ‘wage norm’ rules for national-level collective bargaining 
(according to which wages are to increase inline with inflation and productivity). 
That having been said, in 2007 the ETUC’s Executive Committee issued a 
statement on minimum wages, equality, and collective bargaining.41 It 
proposed that in pursuing fair wages, the ETUC should: 
                                                        
39 Thorsten Schulten et. al., ‘Theses for a European minimum wage policy’ in Thorsten 
Schulten, Claus Schäfer and Reinhard Bispinck (eds), Minimum Wages in Europe 
(ETUI 2006). 
40 ibid 357. 
41 ETUC, ‘On the Offensive on Pay: Towards Equality. Congress Statement on 
minimum wages, equality and collective bargaining’ 
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Explore continually the scope for united campaigns at European level… 
for common standards on minimum pay and income, and for collective 
bargaining strategies.42 
 
Further into its statement, the Executive Committee recognises that differences 
between national industrial relations systems may be too great to undertake a 
united campaign for an EU minimum wage policy.43 The idea of an EU 
minimum wage policy was reportedly discussed at the ETUC congresses in 
Seville in 2007 and in Athens in 2011 but is not mentioned in either 
manifestos.44 Whilst in the former, the ETUC said it would “seek to ensure 
higher minimum wages and real wage growth for European workers” and to 
“assess more intensively how to develop and coordinate collective bargaining 
at the European level”,45 in the latter, it pledged to uphold the principle of “the 
autonomy of social partners in collective bargaining and wage negotiations” 
and to “better coordinate collective bargaining” in light of EU crisis measures.46 
 
As a response to EU economic governance, in 2013 the ETUC outlined its new 
method of coordination for collective bargaining and wages,47 which seeks to 
strengthen its transnational processes as a response to unwelcome EU 
interventions. Although greater support for wage coordination can be seen as a 
positive in the campaign for an EU minimum wage policy, divisions between 
affiliates from different countries makes agreement highly unlikely. In a recent 
                                                                                                                                                                 
<http://www.etuc.org/sites/www.etuc.org/files/On_the_Offensive_on_Pay.pdf> 
accessed 18 November 2017. 
42 ibid. 
43 ibid. 
44 Eldring and Alsos (n 30) 19. 
45 ibid. 
46 ibid. 
47 ETUC, ‘The ETUC Coordination of Collective Bargaining and Wages in the EU 
Economic Governance’ <http://www.etuc.org/documents/etuc-coordination-collective-
bargaining-and-wages-eu-economic-governance#.VJNVScAg0> accessed 18 
November 2017. 
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study of national affiliate attitudes, trade unions from Germany and Spain were 
in favour, whilst those from Denmark, Norway and Sweden were opposed.48 Of 
course, in light of the decisions in Viking and Laval,49 and the adoption of the 
Posting of Workers Enforcement Directive,50 the attitudes of Nordic affiliates 
may change. 
 
3.5 Contemporary suggestions for an EU minimum wage policy 
 
The clearest articulation of an EU minimum wage policy can be found in the 
Theses for an EU Minimum Wage Policy (briefly discussed above). The 
Theses addresses some of the most commonly asked questions regarding 
ideas for an EU minimum wage policy, including: the extent to which minimum 
wages in Member States should be coordinated; the level at which minimum 
wages should be set; and the method of implementation that should be 
followed. Suggestions with regard to each tend to follow developments in the 
EU’s political and legal history. 
 
3.5.1 Extent of Coordination 
 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of ideas for an EU minimum wage 
policy is the extent to which minimum wages in Member States should be 
coordinated. Public debates show how polarising the idea of an EU minimum 
wage policy is: people are either fiercely in favour or fiercely opposed, very few 
sit on the fence.51 This is arguably a result of the way in which the debate is 
                                                        
48 Bengt Furåker and Mattias Bengtsson, ‘On the road to transnational cooperation? 
Results from a survey of European trade unions’ (2013) 19(2) European Journal of 
Industrial Relations 161, 172 – 173. 
49 Case C-438/05 Viking [2007] ECR I-10779; Case C341/05 Laval [2007] ECR I-
11767. 
50 See European Commission, Posting of workers: EU safeguards against social 
dumping MEMO/14/344. 
51 See Debating Europe, ‘Should the EU set a European Minimum Wage’ 
<http://www.debatingeurope.eu/2014/02/13/should-the-eu-set-a-minimum-
wage/#.VJQFhsAg1> accessed 19 November 2017. 
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often framed. Often the nuances are missed, with people given a choice 
between a universal EU minimum wage (with connotations of each Member 
State having a minimum wage of the same nominal value e.g. €8 per hour) or 
extending their own national minimum wage to other states (which for the 
Western Europeans usually polled is considerably higher than that of their 
Eastern European neighbours). As was outlined in the previous chapter, 
considerable differences between nominal minimum wage rates in Member 
States make both of these suggestions unworkable. 
 
Of course, this is a false choice, but it serves as a useful starting point when 
discussing suggestions for coordinating minimum wages in Member States. In 
its programme for the 2004 European Parliamentary elections, the French Parti 
Socialiste proposed the introduction of a universal EU minimum wage of €1000 
per month.52 This suggestion for harmonising minimum wages in Member 
States around a nominal value was widely criticised,53 given the significant 
economic differences between the (then) 25 Member States. 
 
A variation of this approach is for minimum wages in Member States to be 
harmonised by group or ‘cluster’. During the late 1990s, ‘cluster coordination’ 
was seen as a way of harmonising the nominal value of minimum wages in 
Member States with comparable economic performance.54 In terms of Member 
States with similar minimum wage levels, a distinction can be made between 
Northern, Western, and Central and Eastern European states. Moreover, this 
approach can also be applied to Member States which are characterised as 
functioning according to different types or varieties of welfare capitalism (e.g. 
liberal, corporatist-statist, or social democratic).55 However, the relative value 
                                                        
52 Parti Socialiste, ‘Une ambition socialiste pour l’Europe’ <http://www.elections-
europeennes.org/2004/tes/pdf/text_euro_cn.pdf> accessed 19 November 2017. 
53 Schulten (n 22) 432. 
54 See Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Die fortschrittlichen Kräfte’ in Pierre Bourdieu et. al., 
Perspektiven des Protests. Initiativen für einen europäischen Wohlfahrtsstaat (VSA 
1997) 11, 25. 
55 See Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1st edn, 
Polity Press 1999). 
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of minimum wage levels varies significantly within such groups, challenging the 
desirability of nominal coordination. 
 
The idea of cluster coordination was resurrected by Jean-Claude Juncker in 
January 2013. As the outgoing president of the Eurogroup (the group of 
Member States belonging to the Eurozone), Juncker told the European 
Parliament that the EU needed “a basis of social rights for workers, including of 
course one essential thing, a minimum wage – a legally compulsory minimum 
wage in the Eurozone Member States”.56 Although Juncker was short on 
details in his speech, it seems he was advocating harmonising the relative, not 
the nominal value of minimum wages in Eurozone Member States. In doing so, 
Juncker appears to have been experimenting with ideas for how to developing 
the so called ‘social dimension’ of Economic and Monetary Union.57 
 
Harmonising the relative value of minimum wages in Member States is not, like 
nominal approaches to harmonisation, about a universal EU minimum wage, 
rather it is about what the Party of European Socialists (PES) called in 2010 a 
‘European Pact on Wages’.58 According to the PES, such a pact should: 
 
[E]nsure that all workers and employees receive a wage above the 
poverty threshold, either through collective bargaining or by law, while 
ensuring compatibility with, and respect for, national traditions and the 
autonomy of social partners.59 
 
This would require trade unions and employers’ associations or the Union to 
define a reference value or norm around which minimum wages in Member 
                                                        
56 Bloomberg, ‘Juncker Says Euro-Area Countries Need Common Minimum Wage’ 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-10/juncker-says-euro-area-countries-need-
common-minimum-wage.html> accessed 18 November 2017. 
57 Junker later suggested a variation on this during his campaign for the Presidency of 
the European Commission (see the introduction to this chapter). 
58 PES, ‘A European Employment and Social Progress Pact for fair growth’ (2010) 
PES Council Policy Paper 1. 
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States were coordinated. Depending upon the criteria chosen, minimum wages 
in Member States would be set as a factor of national economic performance. 
 
3.5.2 Defining minimum wage levels 
 
Many different ways for defining minimum wage levels in Member States have 
been suggested, of which the most common is as a proportion of the national 
median or average (mean) wage. Recommendations usually range from a 
target value of 50% to 60% of the median or average wage, with each chosen 
to give effect to specific policy objectives. By way of example, 60% of the 
median wage was suggested in the Commission Opinion to combat the 
problem of low wage work in the EU (a low wage is defined as a wage falling 
below two thirds of the national median wage),60 whereas an initial value of 
50% of the average wage was suggested in the Theses for an EU minimum 
wage policy to avoid the threshold for ‘poverty wages’ (a poverty wage is 
defined as a wage falling below 50% of the national average wage).61 
Choosing between the median or average wage has important distribution 
consequences, implying a different understanding of what a fair or equitable 
distribution of income would be in the EU.62 
 
Linking an EU minimum wage policy to a percentage of the median wage in 
Member States would make it unresponsive to developments at the top of the 
wage distribution; the point where recent growth in wage inequality has 
occurred. As a measure of the middle position, the median would not account 
for this increase, however large. In contrast, the average would, although as 
average wages in Member States are higher than median wages, any value for 
an EU minimum wage policy would have to be considerably lower. 
 
A more sophisticated approach has been suggested by the French Parti 
Socialiste, whereby minimum wages in Member States would be defined on 
                                                        
60 European Commission (n 9) 2. 
61 Schulten et. al. (n 39) 374. 
62 Eurofound, Pay in Europe in the 21st Century (Eurofound 2014) 94. 
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the basis of national purchasing power standards, according to which after a 
certain convergence period all minimum wages in Member States would have 
the same purchasing power.63 Similar groups have called for an “EU target for 
minimum wages in terms of GDP per capita”.64 In line with such proposals, 
minimum wages would be defined as a proportion of overall national average 
income. Using GDP per capita would link minimum wages to productivity, 
although as has been recognised, this would be difficult to defend in the 
context of flat economic grown and high unemployment.65 Rather than GDP 
per capita, GDP per employee could also be used. Another approach would be 
for an EU-level body to set minimum wages in Member States. As with the UK 
Low Pay Commission, this could be performed on a yearly basis, after a 
general evaluation of the prevailing economic and social conditions in Member 
States, and/or with reference to specific goals, such as for convergence 
towards a predetermined target (e.g. 60% of the average wage within a 10 year 
period). 
 
3.5.3 Method of implementation 
 
Whereas the extent of coordination and ways for defining minimum wage levels 
in Member States have been investigated at some length, the question of how 
an EU minimum wage policy would be implemented has been somewhat 
neglected. Although there have been a number of suggestions, placing 
responsibility for implementation with either the institutions of the Union or 
trade unions, each is often examined only briefly. 
 
Given that Article 153 TFEU excludes pay from the areas in which the Union 
has competence, one popular suggestion is for a change to the Treaties. In 
                                                        
63 Gerard Filoche, ‘L’Europe et le Smic Unique Européen’ (2004) Democratie & 
Socialisme <http://www.democratie-socialisme.org/spip.php?article415> accessed 19 
November 2017. 
64 Poul Nyrup Rasmussen and Jacques Delors, The New Social Europe (PES 2007) 
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July 2014 the French Ministry of the Economy published a paper on the 
introduction of a ‘European minimum wage standard’, which argues an EU 
minimum wage policy could be introduced after such a change, through a 
Directive adopted by the Council and European Parliament.66 The obvious 
difficultly with this suggestion is that the approval of all 28 Member States 
would be required, at a time notoriously unfavourable for the adoption 
legislation in the social policy field. 
 
The use of Enhanced Cooperation under Articles 326 – 334 TFEU and Article 
20 TEU could allow those Member States that are in favour to move forward. 
The Commission could issue opinions, as it did with that on an equitable wage. 
Complementary systems for reporting and incentivisation could also be 
created, in a similar way to the former Commission initiative to promote worker 
participation in profit and enterprise results.67 
 
A potential ‘soft’ law method currently receiving attention is the European 
Semester. As a part of the EU framework for the coordination of economic 
policy, the European Semester has already been used to issue 
recommendations on minimum wages in Member States, however these have 
so far been regressive. Proposals for using the European Semester for 
implementing an EU minimum wage policy have suggested the gradual 
introduction of hard law measures.68 This process of ‘crystallisation’ is intended 
to build consensus before the introduction of binding recommendations, 
although, again, hard law measures would require Treaty amendment. 
 
The launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 and the subsequent 
institutionalisation of the ‘open method of coordination’ (OMC) had a significant 
                                                        
66 Maxence Brischoux et. al., ‘Pistes pour l’instauration d’une norme de salaire 
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67 Vaughn-Whitehead (n 27) 526. 
68 Thorsten Schulten and Torsten Müller, ‘Back on the agenda: a European minimum 
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impact upon suggestions for how to implement an EU minimum wage policy. In 
the context of the European Employment Strategy (EES), the OMC was initially 
seen by commentators as a way for the Commission to set targets for minimum 
wages in Member States.69 These were to be reached in accordance with 
national procedures and practices, ensuring respect for different industrial 
relations systems in Member States.70 
 
At the same time as debates regarding the development of a transnational 
dimension to collective bargaining,71 the OMC was increasingly discussed 
away from the Union’s institutions, as a collection of discrete governance 
instruments. Target-setting processes were viewed as complements to efforts 
to coordinate national and transnational collective bargaining.72 In 2006, the 
European Federation of Public Service Unions suggested setting targets for the 
lowest collectively agreed wages as a part of a campaign to improve the 
coordination of transnational collective bargaining.73 More recently, it has been 
argued this approach could be used alongside an EU minimum wage policy 
agreed between the social partners within the framework of the European 
Social Dialogue.74 A European social partner agreement could detail the aims 
of an EU minimum wage policy and refer to procedures for implementation, 
monitoring, and adjustment. However, the popularity of these proposals 
appears to have been affected by the current bias towards the introduction of 
statutory minimum wages in Members States (of which Germany was the latest 
in 2015). As such, methods that prioritise collective bargaining and its 
coordination, and promote social partner involvement are being ignored. 
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Recent movements by the Junker presidency towards the introduction of the 
European Pillar of Social Rights also raise important questions for the idea of 
an EU minimum wage policy, which have not yet been explored in any 
significant detail. The Pillar is a response to criticism that European integration 
has often progressed to the detriment of social considerations (in favour of 
closer economic cooperation).75 The Pillar has been conceived as a reference 
point, against which to measure the employment and social performance of 
Member States, to encourage convergence towards better living and working 
conditions (and is said to be aimed specifically at members of the Eurozone, 
although other states are invited to participate).76 
 
In terms of substance, it sets out 20 rights and principles based around 3 
categories: 
 
1. Equal opportunities and access to the labour market; 
2. Fair working conditions; and 
3. Social protection and inclusion. 
 
The Pillar reaffirms a number of rights found in European and international 
documents in an attempt to make them more visible, explicit, and easier to 
understand for citizens. As such, it does not create any new rights rather it 
codifies those that exist elsewhere.77 Given the limited competence the Union 
                                                        
75 This is reinforced by Jean-Claude Junker’s ‘State of the Union’ speech in September 
2015, where alongside introducing the Pillar, Junker spoke of the need for a ‘more 
social’ Europe. See European Commission, ‘State of the Union 2015: Time for honest, 
unity and solidarity’ <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5614_en.htm> 
accessed 1 July 2017. 
76 European Commission, ‘The European Pillar of Social Rights – Questions and 
Answers’ <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1004_en.htm> accessed 
12 July 2017. 
77 Comparison can be drawn with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, which was said not to create any new rights per se but codify those that existed 
elsewhere. 
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enjoys, in the majority of the areas covered, the Pillar is targeted at national 
governments (along with local and regional bodies). For similar reasons, it is 
also expected that Member States will develop domestic policies to support 
implementation and enforcement efforts.78 
 
The Pillar is best understood as a declaration; drawing together in a single 
document current legislation underpinning the ‘social’ aquis.79 It has two 
distinct legal bases: 
 
1. A Commission Recommendation; and 
2. A proposal for an inter-institutional proclamation.80 
 
Interestingly, the use of an inter-institutional proclamation is modelled upon the 
approach adopted during the introduction of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(which was used to garner political support amongst heads of state and 
government and between the main institutions of the Union before work on its 
drafting began). However, the Pillar, unlike the eventual form of the Charter, is 
not intended to confer directly enforceable rights upon individuals.81 
 
In similarity with other high-profile social policy initiatives lunched in the last 
decade, the Pillar is aimed squarely at the Member States; they are 
encouraged to act in areas where they retain competence and the Union 
considers joint action desirable (in pursuit of centrally set aims and objectives). 
This method of governance can be traced to the Lisbon Strategy and early 
variants of the OMC. Importantly, this approach allows the Union to exert 
                                                        
78 European Commission (n 76). 
79 Which is said to include primary law, secondary law, the judgments of the Court of 
Justice, and guidelines found in the various, soft law, Open Method of Coordination 
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80 On behalf of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. 
81 This is made explicit in the Commission Staff Working document that accompanied 
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influence over issues that can only usually be dealt with by the Member States, 
without a requirement for the transfer of further decision-making power. 
 
The Pillar makes explicit reference to minimum wages and prevailing wage 
rates in Member States. Under the category of fair working conditions, key 
principle 6 on wages provides for: 
 
1. Fair wages that allow for a decent standard of living; 
2. Adequate minimum wages in a way that provide for the satisfaction of 
the needs of the worker and his/her family; and 
3. A commitment to prevent in-work poverty.82 
 
These points are interesting as they a present a different view of minimum 
wages in comparison to that usually forwarded by the Union. Although copied 
verbatim from the European Social Charter and Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights, there is great deal to be said about the 
Commission endorsing minimum wages as a way of achieving goals like 
ending in-work poverty. 
 
At EU-level, a supply-side view of wages as cost factors has dominated 
discourse and has served as the basis of calls for Member States to reduce 
minimum wages in order to improve their competiveness (with high rates 
considered impediments).83 The Pillar mentions two distinct types of wage: 
 
1. A fair wage linked to living standards; and 
2. An adequate wage linked to the needs of a worker and his/her family. 
                                                        
82 European Commission, ‘The European Pillar of Social Rights in 20 principles’ 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/deeper-and-fairer-economic-and-
monetary-union/european-pillar-social-rights/european-pillar-social-rights-20-
principles_en> accessed 2 November 2017. 
83 This logic is visible in Country Specific Recommendations issued in 2015, 16 and 17 
by the Commission under the European Semester (which are discussed in detail in 
chapter 4). 
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Not since the original Commission Opinion on an equitable wages in 1993 has 
there has been such explicit consideration, although perhaps only cursory in 
this instance, of the different roles that can be, and should be, performed by 
minimum wages. Indeed, the idea of a fair wage in Member States appears 
particularly ambitious and no doubt draws inspiration from the success of 
recent national campaigns.84 Whereas the idea of a sustenance based minima 
is a far more expansive concept, taking into account the needs not only of 
workers but also of their families. 
 
Is, therefore, the Pillar evidence the Union has changed its view of minimum 
wages and now believe that intervention is desirable? Certainly their 
employment in pursuit of social objectives is a welcome development but the 
proof of the pudding is often in the eating, and it will be interesting to see 
whether recommendations for the adoption of fair and/or adequate minimum 
wages find their way into the coming year’s European Semester for policy 
coordination. Here, the Pillar could be viewed as providing a basis for closer 
wage coordination, with implementation achieved through exiting methods for 
policy coordination like the European Semester. 
 
3.6 Towards a more comprehensive EU minimum wage policy 
 
Contemporary suggestions for an EU minimum wage policy are incomplete. In 
comparison to systems for setting minimum wages in Member States, analysis 
of features including the method used for adjustment, form, coverage, and 
enforcement is often performed only partially or not undertaken at all. With 
regard to those features considered above, questions still remain. In outlining 
the contours of a more comprehensive EU minimum wage policy, each is 
briefly considered below. 
 
                                                        
84 The ETUC also made similar calls in a 2017 resolution on low pay and minimum 
wages. See ETUC (n 8). 
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There appears to be broad agreement on the extent to which minimum wages 
should be coordinated in Member States. During the 2014 European 
Parliamentary elections, the main parties focussed almost exclusively on 
proposals for relative rather than nominal coordination.85 What remains unclear 
is the reference value or norm around which an EU minimum wage policy 
would coordinate minimum wages in Member States. A proportion of the 
median or average wage is a common suggestion, whereas other measures of 
national economic performance, such as GDP per capita, are becoming 
increasingly popular. When choosing a reference value, close attention should 
be paid to the objectives that an EU minimum wage policy seeks to give effect 
to. As discussed above, if attempting to reduce inequality, it would be advisable 
to choose a measure of the average, not the media wage. 
 
Of fundamental importance for any EU minimum wage policy would be method 
chosen for its implementation. Placing responsibility with the institutions of the 
EU or with trade unions, implies a specific understanding of what is considered 
possible and desirable at European level; whether that be uniform regulation 
for all Member States or agreements between representative of management 
and labour. A thorough analysis of all feasible methods of implementation 
should be undertaken. This should be conducted from perspectives other than 
political science, with attention being paid to the possibility of different 
instruments being used together. Methods of implementation should respect 
national industrial relations systems, allowing for statutory legislation and 
collective bargaining to be used in Member States. 
 
The method of how an EU minimum wage policy would be implemented also 
determines those responsible for its adjustment. Whether implemented by the 
institutions of the EU or by trade unions, a choice must be made between 
whether an EU minimum wage policy is adjusted via indexation, bipartite or 
tripartite negotiation, consultation, or unilaterally. Of course, different methods 
appeal to different actors. The Commission may favour a tripartite body similar 
to the UK Low Pay Commission (given its history of co-regulation with the 
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social partners), whereas the ETUC may favour a combination of indexation 
and negotiation (given its use of wage norm rules and negotiation committees 
in transnational collective bargaining). In each instance, adjustment criteria 
should be set in advance (e.g. a target value). By way of example, in Hungary, 
unplanned, extreme increases in the minimum wage were found to have no 
lasting effects on wage inequality, unlike planned, moderate increases in 
Lithuania.86 Not only the frequency and amount but also the sequence of 
minimum wage adjustments should be taken into account. For an EU minimum 
wage policy implemented by the institutions of the EU, adjustment should take 
place before wage bargaining rounds in Member States, in order to multiply 
any potential spillover effects. 
 
Minimum wages in Member States take different forms, being fixed on an 
hourly, weekly or monthly basis. In many Member States, a combination of all 
three is used. Conversion between each is achieved by multiplying or dividing 
rates by the maximum working hours defined by Member States or in collective 
agreements. Since the most common way of paying wages below the minimum 
wage is the non-payment of overtime, an hourly and a monthly minimum wage 
should be set (with the latter fixed as a multiple of the former). To maximise the 
impact of an EU minimum wage policy, ‘reference compensation’ should be 
defined. In France, reference compensation includes only the basic wage, 
whereas in the Netherlands, all regular payments, such as bonuses and premia 
of different kinds, are included.87 The taxation of minimum wages varies 
significantly between Member States and is a related factor that should also be 
borne in mind when determining minimum wage rates. 
 
Whether an EU minimum wage policy is extended to all workers without 
exception, or whether certain categories of worker are excluded or subject to 
different minimum wage rates, should also be investigated. As trade unions 
traditionally represent the collective interests of their members, the use of sub-
minima is a issue more relevant to the idea of policy introduced by the Union. 
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In Belgium, public sector workers are not entitled to the minimum wage,88 
whereas in the UK, all categories of worker qualify, with different rates applying 
to apprentices, those aged under 18, 18 to 20, and 21 to 24, and 25 and over. 
Criteria other than education and age are also used as bases for sub-minima. 
In the Czech Republic, France and Portugal, different minimum wage rates for 
disabled people are justified as helping a marginal group into employment.89 
The growing problem of contingent work in the EU means many are not 
covered by minimum wages, for example, those who are forced into bogus 
self-employment. As such, inclusivity should be prioritised, with sub-minima 
used only when absolutely necessary. Whether an EU minimum wage policy 
should apply at cross-industry or sectoral level is a question that has so far not 
been asked. The experiences of European Industry Federations and the ETUC 
with sectoral and cross-industry transnational collective bargaining, 
respectively, should be used to explore the positives and negatives of an EU 
minimum wage policy established at each level. 
 
The effective coverage of minimum wages differs from their legal coverage (if 
compliance is required by law, which it is not in the Netherlands).90 Making an 
EU minimum wage policy legal binding would be a first step towards tackling 
non-compliance. In Germany, employers found not paying the minimum wage 
are liable for fines of up to €500,000.91 As with similar systems in other 
Member States, enforcement is a major problem, with monitoring often 
hindered by understaffed labour inspectorates (as is the case in France).92 
Information should be collected on the number and types of workers paid 
below the minimum wage. Of particular relevance to the idea of an EU 
minimum wage policy implemented by trade unions is how such information 
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could be used to improve enforcement, given that any agreement with 
employers’ associations would not be legally binding. The use of governance 
instruments, in particular, peer-review and naming and shaming, should be 
considered. In the context of the EES, similar instruments have been shown to 
be as effective at eliciting positive behaviour as more punitive measures such 
as fines. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
Over the last two decades, the idea of an EU minimum wage policy has been 
debated widely. During this time, broad agreement has been reached between 
those involved in its development, on the key elements that would form the 
basis of any future initiative. First, minimum wages in Member States should be 
coordinated around a relative value of national economic performance, so as to 
avoid distortions resulting from significant economic differences between 
Member States. Second, any method chosen for implementation should 
consider statutory and collectively agreed minimum wages in Member States 
as functional equivalents. Third, and as a consequence, measures to improve 
collective bargaining coverage in Member States may be necessary to ensure 
adequate coverage. 
 
These insights will be taken forwards in the following chapters and used as the 
basis for the articulation of a workable proposal. In other words, the form of 
policy suggested should allow for the coordination of wages, should not 
undermine statutory wage setting mechanisms i.e. it should act as a 
complement to wages set or extended by the state and should be grounded in 
the current reality of collective industrial relations in Member States (that of the 
necessity of state support to ensure the effectiveness of its outputs). 
 
Beyond these issues, a choice has to be made about who should be 
responsible for developing an EU minimum wage policy. Should it be the 
institutions of the Union or the social partners? This choice has important 
consequences for what type of method could be used for its implementation 
and how it would be adjusted and monitored. From the preceding debate, it is 
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clear there is little evidence of support amongst the Member States for the 
introduction of such a policy. Indeed, as is evident from a recent response from 
the European Commission to a question posed in the European Parliament 
(discussed above),93 the Union is keen to emphasis that it does not have 
competence to act in the area of pay and that the introduction of an EU 
minimum wage policy is a question for the Member States. 
 
However, discussion of recent EU-level governance developments suggests 
the Union already intervenes in the area of pay, irrespective of its limited 
competence. Recommendations on minimum wages were previously made 
under the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and have been made since 2011 
under the European Semester. Moreover, the adoption of the European Pillar 
of Social Rights, with its focus on ensuring fair and adequate wages, suggests 
more direct intervention could be justified in the future. These developments 
are somewhat underplayed in current debates and, as such, the next chapter 
considers the extend to which the Union intervenes in the area of pay, what 
impact this has had upon wages and minimum wages in Member States and 
whether methods of policy coordination like the European Semester could be 
used to set targets for national minimum wages. 
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4. European economic governance 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the impact of EU law and policy on wages and wage-
setting mechanisms in Member States and charts how Union-led intervention in 
this area has developed over the course of European integration. This is 
undertaken with a view to providing a more comprehensive understanding of 
how wages are regulated by the Union (versus that assumed by current 
debates on the idea of an EU minimum wage policy). It is only against this 
more complete picture that a workable alternative can be presented in the 
second part of this thesis. 
 
As briefly discussed in the last chapter, the new models of economic 
governance developed by the Union over the last two decades – often 
characterised as ‘soft’ modes of governance – are increasingly being used to 
issue recommendations to Member States concerning prevailing wage rates 
and how they are set. This chapter places these developments within the 
context of the history of EU-level wage governance and suggests that, contrary 
to some proposals, such methods would not be an appropriate basis for setting 
an EU minima. Rather, as discussed in this chapter and developed in the next, 
there is a need for an alternative method – which is not under the sole control 
of the Commission – to address the negative consequence such initiatives are 
having on wages in Member States. 
 
The main challenge for the introduction of an EU minimum wage policy is the 
lack of competence for the EU to act in the area of pay (as per Article 153(5) 
TFEU). However, this exemption has not prevented the Union from indirectly 
regulating wages and wage-setting mechanisms in Member States, both in the 
past and at the present. Current debates on the idea of an EU minimum wage 
policy understate the influence of the Union on wages. Indeed, given this 
history, suggestions for the formalisation of a process for wage coordination 
are not that revolutionary. For example, indirect pressure was exerted during 
the run-up to monetary union for the convergence of wages across Member 
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States in order to prevent the development of macroeconomic imbalances. 
Here, it appears Member States may be more comfortable with the illusion of 
wage sovereignty than agreeing to a formal process that delivers similar 
results. 
 
Economic and social policies have effected wages and wage-setting 
mechanisms in Member States since the inception of the Union, however, the 
methods adopted during the financial crisis have proven to be exceptional; not 
only have they been far more interventionist, for example, stipulating the 
moderation of statutory minimum wages but they have also made innovative 
use of non-binding recommendations backed by the threat of financial 
sanctions in order to foster compliance. The focus of this ‘new’ mode of 
European economic governance on the pursuit of austerity and the damaging 
effect it is having on real wages and industrial relations systems highlights the 
need for an alternative policy. Such a policy could involve coordinating wages 
in Member States around the aims of fighting falling real wages and promoting 
solidarity between workers. Moreover, the possibility of its foundation on a 
process initiated by the social partners themselves – like the European social 
dialogue – would serve as a counterpoint to the predominance of Union-led 
interventions. 
 
In what follows, first, old(er) methods of EU wage governance are assessed, 
initially focussing on legislation and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, 
before turning to consider Economic and Monetary Union and the beginnings 
of economic governance. Second, what has been referred to as ‘new’ 
European economic governance and its effects upon wages and wage-setting 
mechanisms in Member States are discussed (with specific focus on the 
European Semester). Finally, the financial assistance programmes 
administered at the hands the IMF-led ‘Troika’ to indebted Member States after 
the financial crisis are explored. 
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4.2 Old(er) methods of EU wage governance 
 
Since the inception of the internal market, the institutions of the Union have 
passed legislation and the Court of Justice has decided cases that have had 
wide-ranging implications for wages and wage-setting mechanisms in Member 
States. Examples of this ‘older’ form governance – through ‘hard’ law 
measures and court adjudication – and its implications for wages in the areas 
of equal pay, atypical work, the posting of workers and public procurement are 
explored below. 
 
4.2.1 Legislation 
 
Equal pay 
 
The principle of equal pay has been a fundamental value of the Union since the 
Rome Treaty of 1957. The Treaty prohibited unequal pay for men and women, 
and has given rise to legislation intended to eliminate the gender pay gap. The 
Recast Equal Treatment Directive establishes two important reference points 
with regard to wages and collective bargaining: (1) it refers to the prohibition of 
direct and indirect discrimination based upon gender; and (2) calls on Member 
States to promote social dialogue between social partners in order to foster 
equal treatment.1 The Court of Justice has developed the first point further, 
both in the past and more recently. 
 
In Enderby,2 the Court held that differences in pay, in seemingly equivalent 
jobs, undertaken by groups comprised almost entirely of the opposite sex, were 
justified on the basis that each group had signed different collective 
agreements. In Cadman,3 the Court argued that in the context of length of 
                                                        
1 Council Directive 2006/54/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal 
opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and 
occupation (recast) (OJ [2006] L204/23). 
2 Case C-127/92 Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority [1993] ECR I-5535, [20] – [23]. 
3 Case C-17/05 Cadman v Health & Safety Executive [2006] ECR I-9585. 
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service, criteria used to determine pay must genuinely reward greater 
experience and better job performance, in order to prevent, as is often the 
case, indirect discrimination against women based upon prolonged absences 
from the labour market. Here, an interesting justification for a legally binding 
EU minima is that it would help tackle the gender pay gap (as with statutory 
minimum wages in Member States). Such a minima could be based upon 
Article 157 TFEU and would go part way to ensuring respect for the principle of 
equal pay for work of equal value. 
 
Atypical work 
 
The atypical work directives – the Part-Time Work Directive, the Fixed-Term 
Work Directive and the Temporary Work Directive – regulate certain aspects of 
wages.4 The Part-Time Work Directive provides that “in respect of employment 
conditions, part-time workers shall not be treated in a less favourable manner 
than comparable full-time workers” but “different treatment [may be] justified on 
objective grounds”.5 Thus employers may pay part-time and full-time workers 
differently but this must be in line with the proportionality test established in 
Cadman.6 
 
Unlike the Part-Time Work Directive, the Fixed-Term Work Directive excludes 
the possibility for derogation from its aim of ensuring equal treatment for fixed-
term workers. In Gavieiro Gavieiro,7 the Court of Justice held that precluding 
fixed-term workers from pay rises for length of service, that were extended to 
permanent workers, was not permissible. 
                                                        
4 Directive 97/81/EC concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work 
concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC (OJ [1998] L14/9); Directive 1999/70/EC 
concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNCIE 
and CEEP (OJ [1999] L175/43) and Directive 2008/104/EC on temporary agency work 
(OJ [2008] L327/9). 
5 Clause 4(1) of the Part-Time Work Directive. 
6 ibid (n 3). 
7 Case C-444/09 Gavieiro Gavieiro v Consellería de Educación e Ordenación 
Universitaria de la Xunta de Galicia [2010] ECR I-0000. 
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The Temporary Agency Workers Directive refers to equal pay when outlining 
the working and employment conditions it covers. Article 5 of the Directive 
allows for derogation in two situations. First, Article 5(3) provides Member 
States with the option of implementing its provisions by collective bargaining. 
National social partners are permitted to “establish arrangements concerning 
the working and employment conditions of temporary agency workers…”. Such 
arrangements can be different to those of permanent workers. Second, Article 
5(4) allows for Member States who do not provide for the extension of 
collective agreements the ability to regulate temporary agency work based 
upon an agreement between national social partners. This practice has been 
used by Member States to restrict equal pay for temporary agency workers 
until they have worked for a pre-determined ‘qualifying period’ e.g. the twelve 
week period stipulated in the UK Agency Workers Regulations. 
 
Posting of workers 
 
Posting occurs when a company established in one Member State provides 
services in another Member State, sending its own workers. The Posting of 
Workers Directive covers the substantive terms and conditions of employment 
for such contracts.8 Article 3(1) of the Directive requires that ‘host’ Member 
States ensure that posted workers benefit from its own “minimum rates of pay”. 
Article 3(1) further stipulates that minimum rates of pay can be drawn from the 
“law[s], regulation[s] and provision[s]” of the host Member State. As stipulated 
in the Annex to the Directive, when a posted worker is employed in the building 
industry, minimum rates of pay held in collective agreements may be used. 
However, collective agreements must have been extended by the state to the 
sector in question or be “generally applicable to all similar undertakings in the 
geographical area and in the profession or industry concerned” with the 
employers association and trade union concluding the agreement being 
representative. 
                                                        
8 Council Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the context in the 
framework of the provision of services (OJ [1996] L18/1). 
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In the now infamous string of cases beginning with Laval,9 the Court of Justice 
further developed EU law on the posting of workers. It held that minimum 
wages must be set by legislation or extended collective agreements in order to 
be relied upon for the purpose of the Directive. In Rüffert and Commission v 
Luxembourg,10 the Court found that less favourable wages cannot be set for 
posted workers based upon expansive interpretations of Articles 3(7) and 3(10) 
of the Directive, respectively. These cases have stirred much controversy, the 
fallout from which has led to calls in Member States without statutory minimum 
wages for their introduction (in order to prevent the undercutting of ‘home’ 
workers wages when mechanisms for the extension of collective agreements 
are not generally binding on an industry). 
 
Public procurement 
 
More recently, controversy has surrounded the Union’s approach towards 
wages in the context of its public procurement rules. 
 
Whilst the Procurement Directive aims to foster market integration and to 
prevent discrimination between domestic and non-domestic contractors and 
subcontractors when public authorities procure good, works or services, it also 
acknowledges that procurement can serve a number of other objectives.11 
 
Article 70 of the Directive provides that: 
 
                                                        
9 Case C-341/05 Laval v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767, 
[71]. 
10 Case C-346/06 Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen [2008] ECR I-1167; and Case 319/06 
Commission v Luxembourg [2008] ECR I-4323. 
11 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (Text with EEA 
relevance) (OJ [2014] L94). 
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Contracting authorities may lay down special conditions relating to the 
performance of a contract… which may include economic, innovation-
related, environmental, social or employment-related considerations. 
  
As the preamble to the Directive suggests, such conditions can be drawn 
widely, including in order to give effect to the Europe 2020 Strategy and in 
support of SMEs. However, as the cross-border dimension of procurement 
continues to develop, its interface with the Union’s rules on the posting of 
workers must also be considered. 
 
As discussed above, the Posted Workers Directive defines a series of 
mandatory rules concerning the terms and conditions of employment for 
employees who are sent by their employer to undertake work in another 
Member State. These include minimum rates of pay. As such, when posting 
occurs, the Directive governs the conditions regulating pay that public 
authorities can impose during procurement; acting to restrict the scope of 
Article 70 of the Procurement Directive, specifically, as a basis for minimum 
wages. The tension between both Directives has been the subject of string of 
recent cases. 
 
The first test of this conflict was heard in Rüffert (briefly discussed above). 
Within, the Court of Justice considered whether a ‘first generation’ German 
‘Tariftreuegesetze’, setting a regional procurement wage stipulating that posted 
workers be paid in line with the local collectively agreed wage, was valid under 
the Posted Workers Directive. The Court decided that as the wage had not 
been declared universally applicable, it did not fall within the ambit of any of the 
models envisaged by the Directive and, consequently, could not be relied 
upon. In response, the Tariftreuegesetze was amended to include collective 
agreements declared universally applicable by regulation i.e. by state 
extension mechanisms.12 
                                                        
12 In Bundesdruckerei, the legality of the amended Tariftreuegesetze, requiring 
procurement wages based upon collective agreements to be declared universally 
applicable, was considered in detail. However, it was decided that posting had not 
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More recently, in the case of RegioPost,13 a cross-border procurement contract 
stipulating that a Tariftreuegesetze should be paid to contractors and 
subcontractors, that referred to a sectoral minimum wage set by state 
legislation, was challenged. With reference to the Procurement Directive, the 
Court decided that the wage in question amounted to a performance condition, 
and providing that it conformed with certain procedural conditions, including 
that of transparency,14 was valid. 
 
Importantly, as performance conditions must be compatible with Union law, the 
wage was also scrutinised in light of the Posted Workers Directive and Article 
56 TFEU. With regard to the former, RegioPost can be interpreted as 
endorsing the view that under the Procurement Directive, differentiated 
minimum wages are permissible. As the Court emphasised both in Laval and 
Rüffert: 
 
Member States cannot require the observance of terms and conditions 
of employment which go beyond the mandatory rules for minimum 
protection.15 
 
In the context of procurement, performance conditions that set wage floors 
specific to certain industries or sectors must be applied equally to home and 
                                                                                                                                                                 
occurred and, separately, that the minimum wage in question was an unjustifiable 
restriction of Article 56 TFEU, as it proscribed a higher rate than in the Member State 
where the work was to be undertaken. See Case C-549/13 Bundesdruckerei 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2235. 
13 Case C-115/14 RegioPost GmbH & Co. KG v Stadt Landau in der Pfalz 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:760. 
14 For example, Article 26 requires conditions be “indicated in the contract notice or in 
the specifications”. 
15 (n 9). 
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posted workers (and conform to one of the models detailed under the Posted 
Workers Directive).16 
However, it remains unclear where the dividing line sits in terms of 
differentiation. For example, could minimum wages specific to certain 
professions be justified?17 
 
Interestingly, RegioPost can be distinguished from Rüffert in terms of the so-
called ‘selective applicability’ of procurement law; in that it does not, by its 
nature, apply to the general workforce, only to those employed to fulfil public 
contracts. Although acknowledged in Rüffert, in RegioPost the Court clarified 
this point with reference to the Posted Workers Directive, namely, the 
interpretation of Article 3(8); that if Member States do not have systems for 
declaring collective agreements universally applicable by regulation, for the 
purposes of procurement, they cannot rely upon either of the listed exemptions 
(generally applicable collective agreements and those agreed by national 
representative organisations at cross-industry level). 
 
With regard to the latter, as originally held in Rüffert, procurement contracts 
stipulating that minimum wages should be paid to contractors and 
subcontractors, are a restriction of the freedom to provide services (if workers 
are established in a Member States where a lower rate applies). In RegioPost, 
such measures were considered legitimate in light of the regulatory objective of 
protecting workers. Furthermore, in supporting this finding, the Court affirmed 
what was described above as the selective applicability of procurement law, 
                                                        
16 It remains unclear whether this extends to setting the nominal level or rate of 
minimum wages. However, it has been suggested that justifications for high (or low) 
minima are not required, providing that they are applied equally to home and posted 
workers. 
17 In Sähköalojen Ammattiliitto, it was held that under the Posted Workers Directive, 
minimum wages structured on the basis of wage groups were valid when based upon 
‘the nature of work performed’, along with other criteria including professional 
qualifications, training and relevant experience. See Case C-396/13 Sähköalojen 
ammattiliitto ry v Elektrobudowa Spolka Akcyjna ECLI:EU:C:2015:86. 
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arguing that not doing so would strip Article 70 of the Procurement Directive of 
its intended protective function.18 
 
The Court is likely to hear a number of other cases concerning minimum wages 
in 2018.19 The European Commission has recently initiated infringement 
proceedings against Germany, France and Austria based upon the application 
of their own systems. Investigations are centred around the issue of minimum 
wages being applied to international transport operations loading and 
unloading in the respective territories, who are not established in the Member 
State or do not have significant links there. The Commission argues that such 
measures have the potential to prevent the proper functioning of the internal 
market by constituting an unfair administrative barrier to the freedom to provide 
goods and services. The Commission has initially suggested that it is willing to 
compromise on this issue and that it will publish the details of a ‘Mobility 
Package’ for the transport sector in 2017, with the intention of addressing the 
concerns raised by Member States (against which they have justified the 
territorial application of minimum wages).20 These include the issue of wage 
dumping, which is a considerable problem in the sector. If compromise cannot 
be reached and the Commission refers a case to the Court, it would likely turn 
                                                        
18 n (13). 
19 Although courting media attention, the case of Tyco has not been discussed here as 
it did not directly relate to minimum wages but concerned what could be considered 
working time for the purposes of the Working Time Directive, specifically, whether for 
peripatetic or mobile workers this includes time spent travelling between home and the 
first scheduled appointment of a shift. Importantly, the Directive does not stipulate 
whether this time should be paid, rather was said to be a consideration for national 
employment law systems. See Case C-266/14 Federación de Servicios Privados del 
sindicato Comisiones obreras (CC.OO.) v Tyco Integrated Security SL and Tyco 
Integrated Fire & Security Corporation Servicios SA ECLI:EU:C:2015:578. 
20 This point, concerning the territorial application of minimum wages, is 
unprecedented and there appears to be no know examples of the adoption of such a 
policy in any of the relevant literature. Given the context of posting, this is perhaps a 
development that could not have been expected in the absence of an internal market 
for goods and services. 
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on the priority given to the freedom to provide goods and services (and 
whether this is to be given primacy). 
 
These older forms of governance, irrespective of Union’s Article 153(5) TFEU 
exemption on regulating pay, have altered established practices relating to the 
determination of wages in Member States. Although the jurisprudence of the 
Court in the Laval quartet is perhaps best known, its decisions with regard to 
equal pay, atypical work, and public procurement must not be overlooked. 
These very specific interventions stand in contrast to more direct attempts to 
regulate wages and wage-setting mechanisms made under EMU and 
economic governance including, for example, calls to reduce real wages. 
Although, as will be discussed below, as the Union has become more 
interventionist, its newer methods of regulating wages and wage-setting 
mechanisms are not of the same legal form as these early forms of wage 
governance. 
 
4.2.2 Economic and Monetary Union 
 
The start of the 1990s saw the beginning of Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). Through three separate stages, participating Member States committed 
to the convergence of their economies. Member States that have complied with 
the third stage of EMU adopt the Euro as their currency and are commonly 
referred to as members of the ‘Eurozone’. The legal framework of EMU 
combines a fully-centralised monetary policy with a model of economic policy-
making that shares competence for fiscal policy between the EU and Member 
States. Whilst the main objective of the European Central Bank (ECB) has 
been the maintenance of price stability, Member States are free to set their 
own fiscal and wage policies with minimal intervention from the EU. 
 
This institutional asymmetry at the heart of EMU – a unified monetary policy 
with fiscal policy distorted through an excessive emphasis on price stability 
alongside the limited coordination of economic and social policy – has placed 
pressure on wages and wage-setting mechanisms in Member States. At the 
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onset of the third stage of EMU, this was predicted to manifest itself in one of 
three ways. 
 
First, the adoption of the Euro and the completion of the single market would 
increase competition between Member States.21 Without the possibility for 
Member States to devalue their national currencies, wage moderation would be 
pursued as a way of improving national competitiveness. Second, with the 
ability of monetary policy to discipline national wage developments limited by 
its transfer to EU-level, coordination of wage policies across the EU would be 
required in order to prevent the development of macroeconomic imbalances 
(this issue has played out during the crisis with regard to German wage 
restraint).22 Third, EMU was likened to globalisation in the effect that it would 
have upon collective bargaining and collectively agreed wages; specifically 
decentralisation towards company level and lower wages.23 
 
Over the course of the introduction of EMU, the adoption of a general policy of 
wage moderation across Member States was visible. This included a strong 
trend of declining nominal wage growth and average increases in real wages 
clearly below increases in labour productivity. Member States sought to limit 
wage increases to improve competitiveness and prevent inflationary pressures 
(often with a view to matching unit labour cost developments of trading 
partners). This was achieved by introducing new laws (e.g. the competitiveness 
law in Belgium) or concluding bipartite or tripartite agreements know as ‘social 
pacts’ (e.g. Finland and the Netherlands). However, these arrangements were 
dismantled in many Member States after the introduction of the Euro, at the 
behest of employers, who argued they were too centralised and ill-suited to the 
single market i.e. they were overly rigid and stifled competition. 
 
                                                        
21 Ronald Janssen and Emmanuel Mermet, ‘Wage Policy under EMU’ (2003) 9(4) 
Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 666, 667 
22 ibid 668. 
23 ibid 668. 
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The introduction of EMU signals the first real attempt by unions to coordinate 
wages across the EU (targeting the sum of inflation and labour productivity). 
These attempts will be discussed in detail in chapter 5 but serve to highlight 
two important issues: (1) specific economic justifications for the introduction of 
an EU minimum wage policy can be traced to the inception of EMU; and (2) 
whether these attempts at coordination, in and of themselves, contributed to 
the convergence of wages across Member States. With regard to the first 
issue, wage coordination was viewed by unions as a way of preventing wage 
competition and protecting wages from possible ECB retaliation against wage-
push inflation. With regard to the second issue, wage convergence is almost 
exclusively attributable to the wage moderation policies described above. This 
has been described as a situation of ‘competitive wage benchmarking’,24 
whereby convergence is caused by wages in one Member State being copied 
in another (as played out with Germany at the helm). 
 
The effect of EMU on wage-setting mechanisms in Member States, in 
particular collective bargaining, was somewhat mixed. Western and northern 
Member States pursued the recentralisation of collective bargaining in order to 
improve the effectiveness of wage moderation policies. Where decentralisation 
did occur, qualitative issues, such as working time, were discussed at company 
and plant level. This change in bargaining structure raised the ceiling imposed 
by wage moderation, allowing for productivity related increases, such as the 
more efficient use of working time. This stands in contrast to southern Member 
States who abandoned the central coordination of wages in favour of 
decentralisation with the adoption of the Euro. 
 
Rather than directly intervening in wages and wage-setting mechanisms in 
Member States, EMU exerted indirect pressure for reform. With some 
exceptions, whether Member States chose to pursue wage moderation policies 
or the recentralisation of collective bargaining was ultimately their choice. 
Given the institutional asymmetry at the heart of the legal framework of EMU, 
                                                        
24 Bob Hancké, Unions, Central Banks and EMU: Labour Market Institutions and 
Monetary Integration in Europe (OUP 2013) 41. 
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however, this choice was illusionary, as Member States had no real alternative. 
Importantly, the Union has establish a more direct system within the context of 
EMU – of setting recommendations, agreements and providing fora for 
discussion – that concern wages. 
 
4.2.3 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
 
In an effort to coordinate economic policies, the authors of the Maastricht 
Treaty included the Broad Economic Policy Guideline process (now held under 
Article 121 TFEU). Since 1994 (the start of the second stage of EMU), the 
Commission and the Council have adopted annual Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines (BEPG) on macroeconomic, microeconomic (the ‘Cardiff Process’) 
and structural policies. The BEPGs are intended to serve as a common frame 
of reference for Member States when reviewing their national economic 
policies. As part of the Europe 2020 strategy, the BEPGs are accompanied by 
guidelines on employment, poverty and education (together forming the 
‘integrated guidelines’). Although the BEPGs have never been used for the 
coordination of wages, with some change in focus, they have addressed wage 
developments for each period they have been adopted. 
 
By way of example, the fourth BEPG adopted for the period 2005-2008, called 
on Member States to ensure that wage developments contributed towards 
growth and stability, complemented structural reforms, and that wage-setting 
mechanisms facilitated the development of nominal wages and unit labour 
costs in line with price stability and productivity developments. The non-binding 
nature of these recommendations mean they are dependent upon Member 
States for their effect. This situation, and the voluntary character of the BEPGs, 
should not be underplayed. The Commission can issue ‘warnings’ to Member 
States whose national economic policies do not take sufficient account of the 
BEPGs, which may lead to further recommendations being made public. Since 
2011, reforms to the Stability and Growth Pact have meant that financial 
sanctions may be levied for macroeconomic imbalances as well as excessive 
deficits (which will be discussed in detail below). 
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The reform of the Stability and Growth Pact signalled the beginning of a 
change in direction for the EU with regard to wages; recommendations as to 
their level and the means by which they were set began to take on a less 
voluntary and more obligatory nature. Naming and shaming and fines make 
ignoring the BEPGs more difficult. What amounts to a trend towards more 
direct intervention developed further with the advent of new European 
economic governance. However, the EU has also retained more indirect or 
cooperative means of governance via the Macroeconomic Dialogue. 
 
4.2.4 Macroeconomic Dialogue 
 
Established by a resolution on the European Employment Pact of 3-4 June 
1999 (also know as the ‘Cologne Process’), the Macroeconomic Dialogue 
serves as a forum for the Council, the Commission, the ECB, the Member 
States and the social partners to meet to discuss the coordination of national 
economic policies. Specific focus is directed towards the:  
 
[Improvement] of mutually supportive interaction between wage 
developments and monetary, budgetary and fiscal policy through macro-
economic dialogue aimed at preserving a non-inflationary growth 
dynamic”.25 
 
The Dialogue takes place twice a year before European Council meetings. In 
providing a forum where those responsible for wages and wage-setting can 
meet, the Dialogue aims to create a better understanding of each actors 
priorities e.g. the ETUC has used the Dialogue to present its demand for a 
more expansive wage policy that would combat current deflationary trends by 
reversing decreases in real wages and stabilising aggregate demand. 
 
A serious concern is that the Dialogue may be little more than window 
dressing; in that it gives the illusion of cooperation between EU institutions and 
                                                        
25 European Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions: Cologne European Council – 3 and 4 
June 1999 (Brussels). 
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both sides of industry, whereas in reality agreements of any real consequence 
are rarely reached. Previous attempts by the ETUC to promote its ‘framework 
formula’ for collective bargaining (targeting the sum of inflation and labour 
productivity) have been met with little interest from the Commission, the ECB 
and the representatives of management. 
The BEPGs and the Macroeconomic Dialogue have been retained as part of 
the Union’s new system of European economic governance. 
 
4.3 New European economic governance 
 
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008 and the economic crisis that followed, 
Member States, in particular those belonging to the Eurozone, were faced with 
levels of public debt unprecedented in modern times. The bailout programmes 
Member States extended to the financial industry have created huge budgetary 
deficits, placing pressure on Member States to find ways of refinancing their 
sovereign debt. With a view to the system of economic governance under 
EMU, these troubles were not foreseen (if, indeed, they could have been). As a 
response, the Union has put in place a new set of regulations, procedures and 
institutions commonly referred to as ‘new’ European economic governance.26 
This new system aims to stabilise the current situation in the Eurozone through 
updated coordination, monitoring and sanctions. 
 
A common theme running through early appraisals of this system is how it is 
more interventionist with regard to wages and wage-setting mechanisms than 
under EMU.27 This narrative portrays such intervention as being almost 
exclusively negative; minimum wages are reduced and wage-setting 
mechanisms reformed or dismantled. The exceptional nature of the financial 
                                                        
26 Christophe Degryse, ‘The New European Economic Governance’ (2012) ETUI 
Working Paper 14. 
27 Thorsten Schulten and Torsten Müller, ‘European Economic Governance and its 
intervention in national wage development and collective bargaining’ in Steffen 
Lehndorff (ed), Divisive integration. The triumph of failed ideas in Europe – revisited 
(ETUI 2015). 
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crisis necessitated ad hoc measures to prevent contagion in the Eurozone, as 
such, new European economic governance has developed in a piecemeal 
fashion rather than through planned EU initiatives. Consequently, in what 
follows, this system is analysed chronologically, detailing its major features 
before its affect upon wages and wage-setting mechanisms in a select number 
of Member States are outlined. 
 
4.3.1 The Stability and Growth Pact 
 
On 29 September 2010, the Commission formally proposed the strengthening 
of the Stability and Growth Pact through the adoption of the ‘Six Pack’. The Six 
Pack consists of one directive and five regulations, of which, four texts are 
focussed on the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and two the 
correction of macroeconomic imbalances. This new ‘macroeconomic pillar’ 
provides for the regular evaluation of potential imbalances through an alert 
mechanism based on a scoreboard of economic indicators. Members States 
with serious imbalances are issued recommendations by the Council, with 
sanctions for non-compliance. 
 
The scoreboard of economic indicators includes the development of prices and 
costs, non-price competitiveness and various components of productivity. Thus 
wages are an implicit adjustment variable. Sanctions for excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances are automatic under the Six Pack for Member 
States who have persistently failed to comply with recommendations issued by 
the Council. Sanctions are deemed adopted by the Council unless rejected by 
a qualified majority vote. They include an interest bearing deposit of 0.1% of 
GDP if a Member State has not taken corrective measures as recommended 
by the Council and an additional annual fine of 0.1% of GDP if it persistently 
fails to comply with recommendations. This has been used as an example of 
the growing influence of new European economic governance on national 
wage policies, since recommendations have become more binding as Member 
States that ignore them face significant financial sanctions.28 Moreover, this 
                                                        
28 ibid 334. 
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approach presents itself as a development of the naming and shaming policy 
employed under the BEPGs. 
 
On 23 November 2011, the Commission proposed to add two new regulations 
to the Six Pack. The ‘Two Pack’ complements the European Semester 
(discussed below) by requiring Member States to submit their draft budgetary 
plans for the following year to the Eurogroup and the Commission. If draft 
budgetary plans breach the obligations of the SGP, the Commission can 
publically demand their revision within two weeks. This new budgetary 
calendar is strengthened by the further intensification of monitoring processes. 
Depending upon the seriousness of a Member State’s financial difficulties, the 
Commission and the ECB can increase surveillance by requesting reports, 
undertaking in-country evaluation missions and altering the terms, if in receipt, 
of macroeconomic adjustment programmes. 
 
4.3.2 The Euro Plus Pact 
 
After the reform of the SGP, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy presented their own version of economic 
governance, based upon the idea of a ‘competitiveness pact’. Reports from 
Berlin suggested that Angela Merkel was keen on institutionalising the 
assessment of Member States’ wage policies, in particular, automatic wage 
indexation. However, Belgium and Luxembourg, along with the ETUC, were 
concerned that doing so would result in the German policy of wage restraint 
being exported to the rest of the Eurozone. Proposals for the comparison of 
unit labour costs were seen as placing further pressure on Member States to 
cut wages. 
 
On 11 March 2011, heads of state and government approved the Euro Plus 
Pact. The Pact was eventually singed by the EU28 minus Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Sweden and the UK (hence ‘Euro Plus’). Signatory 
Member States commit themselves to take enhanced measures in the areas of 
competitiveness, employment, the viability of public finances and financial 
stability. The general aim of the Pact is to reinforce the economic side of EMU. 
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Signatory commitments are reviewed each year by Member States on the 
basis of a report by the Commission. Whereas the reforms of the SGP 
reinforce fiscal discipline and macroeconomic surveillance, the Euro Plus Pact 
focuses upon competitiveness and convergence. Commitments in the areas of 
competitiveness and employment specifically effect wages and wage-setting 
mechanisms. Unit labour costs are to be kept low by limiting public sector wage 
increases and evaluating wage-setting mechanisms, whilst employment is to 
be promoted through labour market reforms that favour ‘flexicurity’. 
 
Although the Pact states that each member state is responsible for its own 
policies in pursuit of its goals, certain measures are given special attention, 
including those: 
 
[T]hat… ensure cost developments in line with productivity, such as… 
review[ing] the wage setting arrangements, and, where necessary, the 
degree of centralisation in the bargaining process, and the indexation 
mechanisms, while maintain the autonomy of the social partners in the 
collective bargaining process, [and ensuring] that wage settlements in 
the public sector support the competitiveness efforts in the private sector 
(bearing in mind the important signalling effect of public sector wages).29 
 
Wages and wage-setting mechanism appear as the main adjustment variables 
for fostering competitiveness under the Pact.30 The guidance given to Member 
States is far more specific than with regard to macroeconomic imbalances 
under the SGP. The scoreboard of economic indicators introduced under the 
reforms of the SGP is co-opted by the Pact for the purpose of monitoring unit 
labour cost developments. Eurozone Member States are currently permitted a 
maximum 9% increase in unit labour costs over a period of three years (or 12% 
for those outside of the Eurozone).31 Although the reform of the SGP has 
                                                        
29 European Commission, Towards a Job Rich Recovery COM(2012) 173 final. 
30 Eurofound, Pay in Europe in the 21st Century (Eurofound 2014). 
31 European Commission, ‘Scoreboard for the surveillance of macroeconomic 
imbalances’ (2012) Occasional Paper 12. 
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placed added pressure on wages and wage-setting mechanisms in Member 
States, the Euro Plus Pact is an exceptional development in their regulation, 
that for the first time, seeks to ensure a favourable microeconomic environment 
for business. 
 
4.3.3 The European Semester 
 
These new regulations, procedures and institutions are brought together by the 
‘European Semester’ for policy coordination. The Semester was established in 
2010 with the adoption of the ‘Europe 2020’ (EU2020) strategy and brings 
together economic and social policies with the aim of improving the 
consistency of their coordination. In addition to fiscal and macroeconomic 
surveillance, the Semester mainstreams the EU2020 growth strategy. The 
Semester is viewed as means of “ensur[ing] that collective discussion on key 
priorities takes place at EU-level, before and not after national decisions are 
taken”.32 This is crucial if the reform of wages and wage-setting mechanisms is 
to be effective. 
 
The Semester begins each year in November with the adoption of the Annual 
Growth Survey (AGS), which identifies priorities and objectives for the EU and 
Member States and ensures they align with the EU2020 strategy and the SGP. 
At the same time the Commission identifies Member States for ‘In-Depth 
Reviews’ under the ‘Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure’ (as part of the SGP 
discussed above). These findings are published in March, when the Council 
outlines annual EU and Member State priorities, provides guidelines for action 
and reflects upon the previous cycle of the Semester. As part of the 
‘preventative arm’ of the SGP, Member States draft ‘Stability and Convergence 
Programmes’. These are presented alongside country-specific ‘National 
Reform Programmes’ that Member States draft taking into account the 
objectives of the EU2020 strategy, the AGS and the Euro Plus Pact. Both 
programmes are submitted to the Commission in April, with the Commission 
                                                        
32 European Commission, Concluding the first European semester of economic policy 
coordination: Guidelines for national policies in 2011-2012 COM(2014) 400 final. 
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assessing each and presenting Member States with an integrated set of 
County-Specific Recommendations (CSRs). The CSRs are formally adopted by 
the Council and endorsed by the European Council in June. 
 
The CSRs can be understood as the practical manifestation of the effect that 
new European economic governance is having on wages and wage-setting 
mechanisms. The CSRs distil the multiple recommendations made under the 
SGP and the Euro Plus Pact down to very specific calls for change. What is 
surprising is that such intervention, bearing in mind the contested nature of its 
voluntariness, can be pursued by the EU in spite of Article 153(5) TEFU. For all 
intends and purposes, new European economic governance acts to coordinate 
wages across Member States. This has lead to suggestions that an EU 
minimum wage policy could be established within the auspices of the European 
Semester (of course a fundamental change of direction in terms of the 
objectives it pursues would be required).33 
 
4.3.4 Country-Specific Recommendations 
 
Recommendations were first issued under the European Semester in 2011 and 
Member States have received CSRs on a yearly basis since. 
 
The CSRs cover wages broadly, calling for Member States to moderate 
developments and ensure increase in line with real productivity (including 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, Italy, Slovenia and Spain). The CSRs have 
also called for the moderate development of minimum wages (including 
France, Portugal and Slovenia). With regard to France, in particular, requests 
have consistently been made for its minimum wage to support job creation and 
competitiveness. In a move unpopular with Sweden, a CSR for 2013/14 called 
for it to address the perceived problem of high wages at the bottom of its wage 
distribution (de facto asking it to increase its low pay sector). However, 
                                                        
33 Torsten Müller, Stefan Clauwaert, Isabelle Schömann and Kurt Vandaele, ‘More of 
the same: wages and collective bargaining still under pressure’ in ETUI, 
Benchmarking working Europe 2015 (ETUI 2015). 
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recommendations made under the Semester have not been entirely negative. 
The Commission has commented on weak wage growth in the UK and its 
effect upon private consumption and investment but has gone further with 
regard to Germany. Here, CSRs have called for wage developments in line 
with real productivity, which would cause a general increase in wages (the 
CSRs can thus be understood as supporting the introduction of Germany’s 
national minimum wage in 2015).34 
 
The CRSs have made more specific calls with regard to wage-setting 
mechanisms (this is arguably a result of the important influence they have on 
unit labour costs). Recommendations have focussed upon the reform of wage 
indexation systems. Belgium, Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg have faced 
criticism of their wage-setting practices as they remain the only Member States 
with automatic indexation systems (although recommendations have 
encouraged the adoption of more flexible forms of indexation as opposed to 
their abandonment). With regard to collective bargaining, CSRs have promoted 
decentralisation, in particular, to company and enterprise level. In the pursuit of 
competitiveness improvements, CSRs for Italy and Spain have called for the 
prioritisation of collective agreements at company level and the ability for 
companies to opt-out or derogate from higher level, multi-employer 
agreements. 
 
It is difficult to distinguish the impact of the CSRs on national wage policies and 
thus whether changes in wages and wage-setting mechanisms in Member 
States are a result of pressure from the European Semester or domestic 
political considerations. However, since the introduction of the European 
Semester, the levels of wages and the strength of collective bargaining have 
continued to worsen in Member States. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
34 Schulten and Müller (n 27). 
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4.3.5 Trends in wages 
 
Minimum wages in Member States have developed in a somewhat uneven 
fashion. In those Member States in receipt of IMF-led financial assistance 
programmes, minimum wages have faced significant cuts. Given their 
‘signalling’ function for wages in the bottom half of the wage distribution, it is 
perhaps not surprising they have been singled out for closer attention. Aside 
from cuts in minimum wages imposed at the hands of the Troika (which will be 
discussed in the next section), decreases have been recorded in only 9 out of 
21 Member States with universal systems. Tax reforms in Hungary and 
attempts to reduce poverty in Slovenia saw modest increase in minimum 
wages, respectively. Even during times of austerity, the flexibility of minimum 
wages, as public policy tools, appears to have prevented a general trend of 
devaluation from developing. 
 
This stands in contrast to the picture with regard to public sector wage 
developments. Public sector wage reforms have been pursued in 18 Member 
States, including those left relatively unaffected by the crisis. This has lead to 
suggestions that Member States have used the crisis as a pretext to introduce 
austerity measures. Pay cuts, freezes and the abolition of benefits have been 
commonplace. As an example, pay cuts of 5-10% were introduced in Italy in 
2010, followed by pay freezes and the reduction of productivity bonuses and 
the suspension of automatic pay increases for certain groups of worker (armed 
forces, police, magistrates etc.). As with the signalling function of minimum 
wages, public sector pay plays an important role in the wage distribution. 
Higher wages in the public sector are often a result of higher skill levels and 
seniority. Public sector premia of up to 45% relative to the private sector have 
been inverted during the crisis e.g. to -15% in Romania, squeezing the wage 
distribution from above. 
 
4.3.6 Trends in collective bargaining 
 
Visible trends with regard to collective barraging include: its continuing 
decentralisation; the spread of opt-out clauses from higher level agreements, 
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enabling companies to derogate from wage standards under specific 
circumstances; the inversion of the favourability principle, allowing company 
level agreements to take precedence over sectoral agreements, even if wage 
standards are less favourable; and changes restricting the use of government 
extension mechanisms.35 
 
The predominant tendency towards the decentralisation of collective 
bargaining, visible from the early 1980s, has continued. Member States have 
enacted legislation that favours wage negotiations at company level, however 
‘recentralisation’ to cross-sectoral level has also occurred e.g. in Belgium (but 
the possibility for wage increases above those provided for by automatic 
indexation has been limited). 
 
Coordination has thus become an issue, with trade unions reaching 
agreements with employers associations to ensure horizontal links remain 
between bargaining units. In terms of mechanisms for ensuring vertical 
coordination between bargaining levels, opt-out and opening clauses along 
with the inversion of the favourability principle, for example, the passing of the 
Fillion law in France, have become increasingly common. Whereas opt-out 
clauses have been regularly included in collective agreements, opening 
clauses still appear to be reserved for exceptional circumstances such as 
financial difficulties resulting from the crisis. 
 
Changes to the government extension of collective agreements have been 
recorded in Member States with single and multi-employer systems of 
industrial relations. These changes have though cut both ways, whereas in 
Germany minimum wages have been extended to low pay sectors (under the 
old minimum wage system), the ‘quasi-legal’ extension of collective 
                                                        
35 Paul Marginson and Christian Welz, ‘Changes to wage-setting mechanisms in the 
context of the crisis and the EU’s new economic governance regime’ (Eurofound 
2014) <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative- 2015 
information/changes-to-wage-setting-mechanisms-in-the-context-of-the- crisis-and-
the-eus-new-economic-governance> accessed 9 October 2017. 
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agreements in Italy has been called into question by recent court decisions that 
endorse new plant level agreements imposed by the government during 2011. 
In a similar vein, legislation has been altered or introduced in a number of 
Member States to limit the time for which collective agreements remain valid 
after their expiration e.g. Estonia and Slovakia. 
However, those Member States in receipt of IMF-led financial assistance 
programmes have feared significantly worse. 
 
4.4 Financial assistance programmes 
 
The most direct form of intervention in wages and wage-setting mechanisms in 
Member States has been made by the coalition of the Commission, ECB, and 
IMF. As the so-called ‘Troika’, during the financial crisis, they offered 
assistance to Member States upon the condition that wide-ranging social 
reforms were made; which were intended to secure fiscal stability and to 
increase competitiveness. 
 
This form of intervention is unlike that under new European economic 
governance; Member States were given what can be characterised as a 
Hobsian choice between default and exit from the Union and accepting a loan 
and continued membership.  
 
Conditions for the receipt of financial assistance are contained in ‘Memoranda 
of Understanding’ (MoUs) or ‘Stand-By Agreements’. Member States currently 
with MoUs include Cyprus, Greece, Ireland and Portugal, whereas Hungary, 
Latvia and Romania have signed Stan-By Agreements with the IMF 
independently of the Troika (Spain has a slightly different arrangement, which 
may be telling as to the future of EU intervention in the context of the crisis). 
International financial aid has been contingent upon the implementation of 
CSRs under the European Semester but, before this, the ECB practiced what 
has been referred to as ‘unofficial’ intervention, were the purchase of state 
bonds were made conditional upon policy reforms. This policy was made 
official with the launch of its bond buyback programme in 2012. 
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4.4.1 Memoranda of Understanding and Stand-By Agreements 
 
Minimum wages were immediately singled out for cuts and reform by the 
Troika. Ireland was the first country affected, with its minimum wage being cut 
by €1 from €8.65 to €7.56 per hour in February 2001. However, this cut was 
later reversed when a new government agreed to cut social security 
contributions for employers instead. 
 
More radical cuts have been seen in Greece, in 2010, the first of three bailouts 
were agreed. These were financed by the Greek Loan Facility (managed by the 
Commission and including a contribution from the IMF), the European Financial 
Stability Facility and later the European Stability Mechanism. To date, over 
€320 billion has been made available through these various funds, contingent 
upon reforms being undertaken. These have explicitly targeted minimum 
wages and collectively agreed pay. 
 
Initially, the Troika suggested Greece adopt a policy of internal devaluation in 
order to boost competitiveness, versus their neighbours, and foster economic 
growth. Later, these proposals saw fruition as a lower minimum wage for those 
under 25 and legislation removing the favourability principle in the collectively 
regulation of pay. During 2012, a second Memoranda of Understanding was 
agreed containing more extensive changes to minimum wages in exchange for 
further financial assistance; these included a 22% reduction in the adult rate 
and a reduction in the under 25 rate. Furthermore, the automatic indexation of 
collectively agreed wages was suspended and the period for which they were 
valid limited (after which wages were paid in line with the basic terms of 
previous agreements). 
 
The latest ‘supplemental’ Memoranda of Understanding takes a slightly 
different tact; suggesting the establishment of a guaranteed basic income for 
the most vulnerable. However, this is perhaps more a response to criticism 
than an act of benevolence; recent measures show poverty has increased 
significantly during the past 5 years. Overall, the Troika’s approach has been 
adopted in other states in financial difficulty. 
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In late May 2011, Portugal was extended a total of €78 billion in financial 
assistance. The conditions of its Memoranda of Understanding required the 
adoption of policies pursuing wage moderation in the public sector and greater 
labour market flexibility. Between 2011-12, salaries in the public sector were 
reduced by almost 25%. Furthermore, entitlements such as holiday and 
Christmas bonus pay were removed. These changes were made by legislation 
without the involvement of social partners, in violation of in force collective 
agreements (contributing to a significant reduction in the number of workers 
covered in the economy). Figures from the ETUC show that a similar trend is 
also visible in the private sector, with collective bargaining coverage dropping 
from 1.5 million in 2010 to 300,000 in 2012. 
 
However, as illustrated by Portugal, improvements in a states budgetary 
position does not holt further calls for reform. Indeed, whilst in ‘post-programme 
surveillance’, the Troika has criticised Portugal for not decentralising wage 
setting quickly enough and has expressed concern that company level 
bargaining is not being promoted. 
 
At the same time, collective bargaining has not fared much better, with Troika 
reforms leading to the almost complete breakdown of multi-employer 
bargaining in Ireland and Romania. The de-collectivisation of industrial 
relations is especially worrying given that higher collective agreement coverage 
is positively associated with multi-employer systems. Greece, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain have made it easier for employers to derogate from higher level 
agreements, to the company level, at the request of the Troika. Hungary also 
presents an interesting case where its financial assistance programme appears 
to have been used as an excuse for limiting rights such as those to strike. The 
position of trade unions has been further undermined in these Member States 
by reforms making it easier for non-union employees to conclude collective 
agreements e.g. in small and non-unionised companies. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
From the advent of EMU onwards the policies and legislation of the EU have 
regulated wages and wage-setting mechanisms in Member States more 
directly. EMU exerted indirect pressure for Member States to moderate wage 
developments, which became more direct with the introduction of non-binding 
recommendations under the BEPGs and later all but mandatory under the 
European Semester. The height of this trend was reached with the IMF-led 
financial assistance programmes, where receipt of help is conditional upon 
wide-ranging reforms. 
 
With each of these developments, older methods of regulation are not replaced 
but continue to be used. This point is currently underappreciated; new 
European economic governance is but one part of what amounts to a system 
of multi-level governance of wages and wage-setting mechanisms in Europe. 
Although used for very specific purposes, the EU retains the ability to regulate 
aspects of wages via legislation as it has done in the past for issues such as 
equal pay. 
 
Such actions draw attention to the current rationale for EU wage intervention. 
Instead of regulating for social considerations, as it has done using older 
methods of governance, new European economic governance has internalised 
austerity, with wage moderation and the decentralisation of collective 
bargaining being fiercely pursued. However, CSRs such as those for Germany 
to increase wages in line with real productivity illustrate how this system could 
be used for different ends, specifically, to increase real wages. An EU minimum 
wage policy could adopt this more expansive economic rational in combination 
with a complementary social one, targeting the areas damaged by austerity 
policies in pursuit of their rehabilitation. 
 
This approach would, of course, be dependent upon the Commission changing 
course and utilising economic governance tools in a different, more socially 
advantageous, way. To date, there is little evidence that the Commission would 
be willing to do this. Indeed, its calls for Germany to increase real wages were 
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driven by a desire to improve aggregate demand, not to alleviate the social 
hardship caused, in part, by austerity policies. From a policy perspective, for an 
EU minima, it appears that such methods of implementation are unrealistic, if 
for no reason other than the purposes for which they are currently employed. 
As a consequence, an alternative is required, that sits sufficiently far outside of 
the Commission’s influence to allow a more socially-minded policy to be 
pursued but is close enough to benefit from the Union’s institutional and policy 
framework. This endeavour is turned to in chapter 6 on the legal and normative 
foundations for an EU minimum wage policy. 
 
On the other hand, there is a clear requirement for the creation of a 
counterbalance to address the negative social consequences that the Union’s 
economic governance policies are having in Member States. Barring a change 
in direction by the Commission, it appears the only realistic way forwards for 
such a policy is at the hands of the social partners (as a group who can set 
their own agenda whilst at the same time having the capacity to effect change 
at EU-level). The goal of reversing the negative consequences of economic 
governance for wages in Member States fits well with the idea of an EU 
minima, in particular, as a uniform response from social society (or interest 
representation groups such as trade unions). Moreover, the guiding rational for 
this intervention – to address falling wages in Europe – can be understood as a 
way of fostering solidarity between workers. The next chapter explores this 
idea further, charting the contours of what a solidarity enhancing EU minimum 
wage policy would look like. 
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5. Exploring the idea of a solidarity enhancing wage policy 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out the normative justification for an EU minimum wage 
policy. Building upon the discussion in the previous chapter – of the Union’s 
regressive approach towards wages – it argues that an EU minima could serve 
as a appropriate counterbalance and would, as a consequence, be similar in 
form to the solardistic wage policies promoted in Europe during the latter half of 
the twentieth century. However, such a solardistic policy would be more 
expansive than merely seeking to address the regression in prevailing wage 
rates caused by the Union’s policies, rather it would attempt to recoup part of 
the losses in wage share of labour to capital over the last half century. In more 
recent literature, this has been explored in terms of wage inequality and 
ensuring workers are paid fairly for their labour. 
 
The phrase 'European social model' is commonly associated with the idea of a 
socially regulated form of capitalism, which is politically and institutionally 
structured to create a relatively high degree of social equality through 
redistributional policies.1 Although Member States have pursued their own 
specific national development paths, in the period of Fordist post-war 
capitalism, most western European states created social models characterised 
by close links between economic prosperity and the continuous reduction of 
social inequality. 
 
Supported by a world economy regulated within the Bretton Woods system, the 
institutions of the Keynesian welfare state developed based upon national 
class compromises, that enabled a broad redistribution of income and wealth. 
This included, in particular, the emergence of a highly progressive tax system, 
the appearance of comprehensive collective social insurance systems and the 
                                                        
1 Colin Crouch, Social Change in Western Europe (OUP 1999) 3. 
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development of solidaristic wage policies in the context of multi-employer 
collective agreements at sectoral and national levels.2 
 
The historical roots of the concept of a solidaristic wage policy, as a key 
element of the European social model, can be traced to the European labour 
movement of the 1920s and 1930s. The idea of a 'solidaristic wage policy' 
originated in Sweden, where in the 1950s it became the foundation for a 
comprehensive social and economic policy concept adopted by Swedish trade 
unions, which later became well-known as the Rehn-Meidner model.3 
 
In what follows, first, the foundations of the policy are traced to the work of 
Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner and their work on creating a redistributional 
wage policy. Second, the evolution of wages and wage dispersion in Europe is 
analysed, illustrating how with the development of European economies from 
the 1980s onwards, positive wage gains and reductions in wage dispersion 
have been lost (this is especially clear in Member States that followed and 
departed from solidaristic wage policies). Third, critiques of solardistic wages – 
from the right of the political spectrum – are discussed. These are 
subsequently set against early suggestions by European Trade Union 
Congress for the adoption of solardistic wages in Europe. 
 
5.2 The idea of a solardistic wage policy 
 
According to Rudolf Meidner, the concept of a solidaristic wage policy 
essentially pursues two aims. The first is to achieve ‘fair wages’ in accordance 
with the principle equal pay for work of equal value. Consequently, wages 
should be set not as a function of either broader economic considerations or a 
the balance of power between management and labour in the companies but 
instead within the framework of multi-employer agreements based on a 
                                                        
2 John Grahl and Paul Teague, ‘Is the European Social Model Fragmenting?’ New 
Political Economy 3 (2009) 405, 425. 
3 See LO, Trade Unions and Full Employment (LO 1953). 
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"comprehensive system of job evaluation".4 To underpin a ‘rational wage 
structure’ negotiated in this way, periodic pay rises must, likewise, not be linked 
to the profitability of individual enterprises but instead be geared towards 
productivity gains in the economy as a whole. This approach should also 
simultaneously ensure at that all workers participate in economic development 
on an equal footing and that the distribution of national income does not 
change to the disadvantage of workers' incomes. 
 
Secondly, besides achieving ‘fair wages’, a solidaristic wage policy works to 
develop a ‘balanced wage structure’.5 Whilst wage differentials in the case of 
different work requirements are accepted in principle, at the same time, 
individual pay scales should not drift too far apart and excessive wage 
differences should be curbed. Orientation towards the most egalitarian wage 
structure possible applies both within and between different wage levels. 
Consequently, besides the distributional conflict between capital and labour, a 
solidaristic wage policy also strives for redistribution within the workforce: a 
wage policy oriented towards the average productivity of the economy, as a 
whole, limits both upward wage trends in higher pay brackets and wage 
increases that outstrip productivity gains. At the same time, the leeway for 
added income distribution this creates for disproportionate wage hikes, in lower 
pay brackets, and in wage levels with below-average productivity, should also 
to be exploited. 
 
Overall, the concept of a solidaristic wage policy is based on a form of wage 
regulation which "uses a deliberate, centrally controlled force to counteract the 
centrifugal force of the market i.e. its tendency towards wage differentiation".6 
 
The realisation of this concept is tied to the existence of collective bargaining 
institutions which allow for the national, cross-sectoral coordination of wage 
                                                        
4 Bruno Amoroso and Jesper Jespersen, Macroeconomic Theories and Policies for the 
1990s: A Scandinavian Perspective (1992 Palgrave MacMillan) 42. 
5 ibid. 
6 ibid. 
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policy. The most extensive form of wage policy coordination is found in 
countries with cross-industry wage bargaining at national level, as was 
customary in, for example, Sweden or Denmark into the 1980s and, indeed, 
still exists today in European countries such as Belgium, Norway and Finland. 
 
In addition, however, countries with primarily sectoral wage bargaining 
structures also frequently have forms of cross-sectoral wage coordination 
which entail either wage policy recommendations made by the national peak 
organisations of trade unions and/or employers associations or as a result of 
wage leadership taken by a prominent sector.7 In Germany, for example, IG 
Metall has mostly assumed the role of the "single union secretly covering the 
economy as a whole”,8 in that it has geared its own wage demands to the 
productivity of the overall economy – rather than merely that of the metal 
industry – and the pay settlements in the metal industry served as the 
benchmark for other wage levels. 
 
Lastly, even in countries with fragmented wage bargaining structures, 
mechanisms for the coordination of wage policy – sometimes exercised via the 
government – can be identified. This is true, for example, in France, where 
minimum wage increases extended by the government constitute an important 
reference point for the development of the entire wage structure. In Europe, in 
the round, collective bargaining institutions are mostly based on multi-employer 
wage bargaining at sectoral or cross-sectoral level, with government 
mechanisms for the extension of collectively agreements (see chapter 2). 
Consequently, these institutional variations account for differences pay 
developments amongst trade unions in Member States who have pursued 
solardistic wage policies. 
  
                                                        
7 Franz Traxler, ‘National Pacts and Wage Regulation in Europe’ in G. Fajertag and P. 
Pochet (eds), Social Pacts in Europe - New Dynamics (ETUI 2000) 415. 
8 Woflgang Streek, ‘Competitive Solidarity: Rethinking the ‘European Social Model’’ 
MPIfG Working Paper No. 8/99. 
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Ultimately, the achievement of a solidaristic wage policy has far-reaching 
macroeconomic consequences, reflected most visibly in trade union economic 
policy based on the Rehn-Meidner model.9 The underlying hypothesis of this 
model is that a solidaristic wage policy exerts strong pressure for innovation in 
the economy. As wages are not subject to competition due to multi-employer 
agreements, rivalry between companies is focused exclusively on the 
productivity of the manufacturing process and on product quality. Individual 
companies are forced to constantly introduce innovations designed to boost 
productivity, since an externally predetermined wage structure has deprived 
them of the opportunity to offset possible competitive disadvantages by paying 
lower wages. 
 
A solidaristic wage policy is said to: 
 
[Reduce] the risk of 'wage-dumping' which tends to preserve non-
rational production methods and concerns. Wage pressure exerted on 
low-wage enterprises may therefore speed up their rationalisation and/or 
the transfer of manpower from inefficient to efficient firms.10 
 
Accordingly, the innovative function of a solidaristic wage policy also works at 
the level of the economy as a whole, in a similar way to how it works at the 
company level. By engineering wage trends to average productivity 
developments, a solidaristic wage policy speeds up the transition from less 
productive to more productive sectors, thereby promoting structural change 
throughout the economy. 
 
Rehn and Meidner also hypothesised that the concept of a solidaristic wage 
policy would not only generate a special innovation model but could also – as 
part of a national coordinated economic strategy – be developed into a 
                                                        
9 L. Erixon, ‘A Swedish Economic Policy -The Theory, Application and Validity of the 
Rehn- Meidner-Model’ (2002) Working Paper of the Departments of Economics, 
Stockholm University. 
10 LO (n 3) 55. 
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macroeconomic stability model with full employment and simultaneous price 
stability. Their economic concept of ‘modified Keynesianism’ was based on a 
flexible, cyclical combination of supply and demand policies.11 Rehn and 
Meidner assumed that the classical Keynesian ideas of macroeconomic 
demand management were designed for cyclical depression phases but were 
not suitable for overheated cyclical trends.12 They criticised the idea of an 
incomes policy subject to government control, since the corporatist integration 
of trade unions contradicts the idea of freedom of collective bargaining, and the 
wage restraint demanded by the government, especially in times of economic 
prosperity: 
 
[Demands] too much of unions as representatives of their members' 
interests. A restrained, defensive wage policy in a situation of high 
profits and high demand for labour is hard to explain to the members 
and undermines confidence in union management.13 
 
In contrast, the Rehn-Meidner model puts forward an alternative economic 
approach, based on a solidaristic wage policy which pursues the goal of 
guaranteeing full employment and inflation-free growth. Initially, Rehn and 
Meidner felt that a solidaristic wage policy would, itself, have an inflation-
dampening effect, since its orientation towards average productivity levels 
places it in a position to prevent the most productive sectors from pushing each 
other upwards through inflationary wage leapfrogging. On the other hand, 
company-level wage drift, in which companies in high-productivity sectors use 
some of the ‘excess profits’ they have earned under the solidaristic wage policy 
for supplementary wage payments at company level, was identified as a 
possible problem liable to boost inflation. As a result, Rehn and Meidner called 
for limits to be placed on excessive rises in profits by implementing an 
appropriate tax policy. 
 
                                                        
11 Amoroso Jespersen (n 4). 
12 Erixon (n 9). 
13 Amoroso Jespersen (n 4) 70. 
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The guarantee of full employment results above all from the innovation function 
on which the concept of the solidaristic wage policy is based. Whilst it may be 
true that jobs in low productivity sectors can be lost as a result of wage 
pressure, at the same time, new jobs emerge in high-productivity sectors owing 
to the increased pace of structural change. However, since the transition from 
a low-productivity to a high-productivity sector does not normally run smoothly 
or without generating friction, an economic core concept of the Rehn-Meidner 
model entails linking a solidaristic wage policy with an active labour market 
policy. In the Swedish context, such a policy covers not just job promotion 
measures in the narrow sense of the term 'labour market policy', but also the 
full range of regional, structural and industrial policy issues.14 Accordingly, the 
responsibility for employment lies with the government, but through the added 
profits generated in high-productivity sectors as a result of the solidaristic wage 
policy, the government is in a favourable position to obtain the necessary 
resources for an active labour market policy by implementing appropriate fiscal 
measures. 
 
Although the Swedish model is seen as the prototype when implementing a 
solidaristic wage policy, comparable arrangements emerged in other Member 
States in Northern and Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. Collective 
bargaining institutions with specific national features arose which helped the 
concept of a solidaristic wage policy become established (in a more or less 
developed way). At the same time, governments complemented solidaristic 
wage policies through economic and employment policies based on 
redistribution. The overall result was the development of a specific economic 
model whose strengths derived from advantages associated with productivity 
and innovation, not from labour costs, and formed the basis for a 'European 
social model' aimed at achieving economic dynamism and social equality. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
14 ibid. 
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5.3 The crisis of solardistic wage policies 
 
With the post-war crisis of the Fordist economic and social model, the concept 
of the solidaristic wage policy took centre stage in debates on economic 
reform.15 On the one hand, questions were being asked of the concept’s 
normative goal of achieving the highest possible level of social equality. On the 
other, it was argued that the structure of the economy had changed so much 
that the former functional prerequisites of economic concepts like the Rehn-
Meidner model no longer applied. 
 
5.3.1 The evolution of wages and wage dispersion in the EU 
 
Whether and how far it was actually possible to implement the concept of a 
solidaristic wage policy in practice can be examined using two basic indicators. 
The first step is to look at the extent to which the real wage trend is consistent 
with the development of the economy as a whole. This focuses initially on the 
net distribution between capital and labour. In addition, a second step is to 
analyse the distance or ‘spread’ between individual wage brackets (this step 
analyses the net distribution of wages within the workforce). 
 
For the Member States of the Union, long-term wage trends have been well 
documented. Both a comparison between the trends of real wages and 
productivity, and the development of 'wage share' (as a share of worker income 
versus total national income) can be used to analyse the net distribution 
between capital and labour. Taken together, these two indicators show that 
since the early 1980s there has been a fundamental U-turn in wage policy in 
Europe, which can be described as a transition from productivity-oriented wage 
policies to competition-oriented policies. 
 
Until the late 1960s, the trend of real wages largely paralleled the rise in labour 
productivity in Member States. Consequently, the implementation of a 
                                                        
15 A. Lipietz, Towards a New Economic Order: Postfordism, Ecology and Democracy 
(Polity Press 1992). 
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productivity-oriented wage policy enabled trade unions in western European to 
ensure that workers participated equally in greater economic prosperity. 
Consequently, in a short period in the early 1970s, trade unions managed to 
gain acceptance of an expansive wage policy which resulted in pay settlements 
well above productivity trends. Since the mid-1970s, however, real wage 
increases have almost continually lagged behind productivity growth. 
 
The move away from productivity-oriented wage policies initially reflected the 
weakened political power of unions in an environment of mass unemployment. 
However, this movement was also accompanied by a broader reassessment of 
wage policies, in which wage trends were considered to be the most important 
component of international competition between production sites and should, 
therefore, assume prime responsibility for growth and employment. As this 
view became more common, a policy of permanent wage restraint was 
promoted, whereby pay increases below productivity gains were said to 
improve the competitiveness of companies or even entire national economies. 
However, as competition-oriented wage policies became established, an 
important function of solidaristic wage policies, namely of removing wages from 
market competition, was gradually undermined. 
 
In terms of the distribution of wages, the shift away from productivity-oriented 
wage policies also led to a massive redistribution of income from workers to 
capital. As competition-oriented wage policies became established, from the 
1980s onwards, wage shares have more or less continuously declined in the 
EU (see Chart 1), thus setting in train a downward distributive spiral. 
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Chart 1: Labour income share in the EU-15 and EU-27 
 
Source: European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social 
Affairs and Equal Opportunities (2017) 
<ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=539&langId=en> 
 
Compared with the net distribution between capital and labour – which is very 
clear and, within Europe, is largely convergent – the net distribution of wages 
within the workforce is much more difficult to categorise. Based on available 
OECD data on the trend of income deciles, wage spread within the EU varies 
considerably.16 The most egalitarian wage structures exist in those countries 
which, like in Scandinavia, have a strong tradition of a solidaristic wage 
policies. By contrast, wage differentials are most pronounced in the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Spain and Portugal. In most countries, the wage spread 
upwards – towards top earners – is more pronounced than the wage spread 
downwards, towards low-wage earners. 
 
                                                        
16 See OECD, ‘Online income distribution database’ 
<www.oecd.org/social/inequality.htm> accessed 25 February 2018.  
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In general, data on the long-term trend of wage differentiation is incomplete. 
However, it is almost universally accepted that the wage spread fell sharply 
between 1950 and 1975. Since this time, in most Member States, the wage 
spread has risen again more or less as steeply (see Chart 2). The greatest rise 
in wage inequality is clearly visible in the UK but, since the 1980s, a slight 
increase is also visible in the wage spread of traditionally egalitarian Member 
States like Sweden (albeit starting from a much lower initial level). By contrast, 
in Germany, the wage spread fell quickly until the late 1980s, not rising again 
until the early 1990s. Overall, in most Member States, the trend towards a 
reduction in wage disparities came to a standstill in the 1980s and in some 
countries it has since regressed. 
 
Chart 2: Evolution of wage dispersion (select countries) 
 
 
Source: OECD ‘Inequality in historical perspective’ (2011) 
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5.4 Critiques of solardistic wages 
 
Since the 1980s, not only has it become more difficult for European trade 
unions to translate the concept of a solidaristic wage policy into action but, at 
the same time, they have been faced with broad criticism of its normative 
objectives. 
 
The core of this criticism draws on the work of Friedrich August von Hayek and 
focuses on the traditional social democratic equation of ‘equality’ with ‘justice’ 
and the political correction of market results which this legitimates. For scholars 
in the tradition of Hayek, this correction essentially results in greater 
inefficiency and thereby ensures that: 
 
[It] is precisely the distribution mechanism instituted on grounds to do 
with justice that ends up undermining the interests of all citizens in 
prosperity and growth.17 
 
Neo-liberal critics ultimately even view the distributive justice sought by a 
solidaristic wage policy as ‘less fair’, since by setting non-market wages it is 
said to result in the emergence of unemployment, thereby generating a new 
inequality in the labour market between those 'inside' and those left 'out’. This 
perspective corresponds with the now-widespread view that too little wage 
differentiation – especially downward – is one of the basic causes of 
unemployment.18 
 
As a consequence, neo-liberal criticisms of solidaristic wage policies have lead 
to demands for an ‘end to equality’.19 Moreover, the redefinition of social 
equality is said to be "the Archimedes point in the social democratic policy 
                                                        
17 R. Hank, Das Ende der Gleichheit oder Warum der Kapitalismus mehr Wettbewerb 
braucht (2000 Frankfurt A.M.) 155. 
18 Streek (n 8). 
19 Hank (n 17). 
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debate in Europe".20 Here, there is notable resistance to what is perceived to 
be ‘prescribed equality’, with it described as the death of justice and freedom.21 
Consequently, ideas about justice are increasingly reduced to the concept of 
‘equal opportunities’. In this regard, the job of policy is to ensure that all 
individuals can hold their own equally in the market, in the sense of ‘supply-
side egalitarianism’. In contrast to this, a policy of active correction and 
redistribution of market results, such as the one underlying the concept of a 
solidaristic wage policy, has largely taken a back seat. 
 
5.5 A solidarity enhancing EU minimum wage policy? 
 
If the basic normative objective of a just and egalitarian wage trend is to be 
preserved, the concept of a solidaristic wage policy has to be reformulated 
against the background of the current political and economic environment in 
Europe. Along these lines, the European Trade Union Confederation has 
previously called for a fundamental debate on a European solidaristic wage 
policy.22 These calls included the articulation of a policy that: 
 
• guarantees workers a fair share of income 
• counters the danger of social dumping 
• counters growing income inequality in some countries 
• contributes to a reduction in disparities in living conditions’ and 
• contributes to effective implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment of the sexes 
  
This broad programme for reformulating a solidaristic wage policy in Europe 
must fulfil two basic conditions. First, it must present a political concept for the 
‘Europeanisation’ of wage policy and, second, it must ensure that this is 
                                                        
20 ibid. 
21 ibid. 
22 ETUC, ‘Towards a European System of Industrial Relations’, Resolution adopted by 
the IX ETUC Statutory Congress, 26 June - 2 July 1999 (Helsinki) 
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embedded in an overall European economic policy concept.23 On the first 
count, a EU minimum wage could contribute towards this aim. In the next 
chapter, the potential basis for such a policy is investigated. 
                                                        
23 ibid. 
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6. Legal and normative foundations for an EU minimum wage policy 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In the pursuit of a more comprehensive EU minimum wage policy an important 
question to ask is on what legal or other normative basis could it be 
established? The aim for an EU minima to aid social cohesion and reduce 
wage inequality is of little value without a serious proposal for how it could be 
achieved in practice. Moreover, this area of debate has, surprisingly, received 
very little attention. As such, this chapter aims to fill this gap in academic 
knowledge and provide a workable foundation for the realisation of an EU 
minimum wage policy. 
 
As discussed in chapter 3, this gap in knowledge exists as a serious 
impediment to the articulation of a more comprehensive policy and thus its 
future realisation. Consequently, this chapter explores a wide range of legal 
and normative bases, identifying those that warrant further examination. 
Literature on this topic has tended to focus on action the Union could 
undertake, at the expense of investigating the potential of alternative modes of 
governance; specifically those that involve actors such as trade unions and 
employers’ associations. This blind spot is not unique to debates on the idea of 
an EU minimum wage policy and can be found in scholarship on European 
labour law more generally (especially issues like health and safety that are 
considered to require strong state involvement in order to ensure compliance). 
Subscribing to this orthodox approach, however, risks missing the potential 
benefits of alternative modes of governance, for example, the improved 
compliance with rules that is associated with involving those subject to their 
terms in their development. Here, a link can be made to the design of laws and 
regulations, which will be explored in chapter 8 on the potential design of an 
EU minimum wage policy. 
 
Although overly simplistic, this division, between Union-based action and that 
which is premised upon the independent governance regimes developed by 
societal actors, is used as a way of ordering discussion of potential legal and 
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normative bases. Below, the legislative competences of the Union are 
considered, including recent innovations in law-making such as Enhanced 
Cooperation and the turn to international law-based agreements (during the 
financial and sovereign debt crisis). In the second half of this chapter, the 
governance procedures and practices of actors such as trade union are 
investigated, including formalised social dialogue and initiatives aimed at the 
transnational coordination of collective bargaining. 
 
In light of the Union’s limited ability to regulate in the area of pay it is perhaps 
not surprising this chapter suggests the only way forward for an EU minima is 
at the hands of trade unions and employers’ associations, whether through 
social dialogue or initiatives aimed at wage coordination, however, this would 
not necessarily lead to the side-lining of the Union and its institutions. Rather 
the following discussion sheds light upon the important role of the Union and its 
institutional and policy framework in underpinning alternative modes of 
governance, including those that are described as occurring autonomously of 
such involvement (e.g. certain forms of social dialogue). The next chapter on 
transnational labour law builds on this insight and explores what it means for 
regulating in an increasingly fragmented European legal space, specifically as 
a foundation for the design of a workable EU minimum wage policy (the topic of 
the final substantive chapter of this thesis). 
 
6.2 Legislative competences 
 
In accordance with the principle of conferral, action can only be taken by the 
Union within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member 
States.1 Usually these competences are employed to pass legislative acts such 
as Regulations, Directives and Decisions. For a Union-initiated minimum wage 
policy, it must be determined whether the Union has competence to act in the 
area of pay, and if such action is justified in the pursuit of an objective provided 
                                                        
1 Article 13(2) TEFU reads that each institution is to “act within the limits of the powers 
conferred on it in the Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and 
objectives set out in them”. 
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for in the Treaties. Understood in a slightly different way, proposals for 
legislative action must have a legal basis and be founded upon objective 
factors. Undoubtedly the greatest challenge for a Union-initiated minimum 
wage policy is whether the Union has competence to act in the area of pay i.e. 
whether direct intervention is possible. Creative Treaty interpretation is not 
ruled out, and is explored below, but must be exercised with established 
practice and political constraints in mind. 
 
Action based upon the legal bases discussed below can, crudely, be divided 
between those that are ‘institutional’ in form and those that are more ‘societal’. 
At EU-level, institutional lawmaking processes can be characterised by the role 
of the European Commission in developing proposals for legislation; qualified 
majority voting in the Council; the involvement of the European Parliament; and 
the oversight of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).2 Whereas 
for more societal processes, actors such as trade unions and employers’ 
associations rely upon their own forms of ordering, having varying degrees of 
involvement with the Union’s institutions and its regulatory architecture. For 
example, as discussed in detail below, societal lawmaking processes can be 
defined to encompass modes of governance including the European Social 
Dialogue – with trade unions and employers’ associations utilising the Union’s 
institutional and policy framework to give effect to their own autonomous 
agreements – to strictly independent processes such as trade union attempts 
at the transnational coordination of collective bargaining. 
 
With regard to institutional lawmaking processes, the adoption of more socially 
oriented legislation has proven difficult at EU-level (especially for hard issues 
such as pay). Consequently, Title IX TFEU (Articles 145-150), specifically the 
Open Method of Coordination (OMC), has been used with increasing frequency 
to by-pass legislative inertia. Over the last two decades, considerable amounts 
                                                        
2 Article 17(2) TEU; Article 16(3) TEU; Articles 289 and 294 TFEU; and Article 19(1) 
TEU. 
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has been written on this issue,3 arguably to the detriment of discussions on the 
future of the Community method and, importantly, the direction of EU social 
policy. What follows, although limited, outlines the difficulties of regulating on 
issues such as pay, with reference to the employment of specific and more 
general legal bases and also via newer developments such as Enhanced 
Cooperation and the post-crisis turn to international law-based agreements. 
 
6.2.1 Specific legal bases 
 
The Union ordinarily acts based upon ‘specific powers’ outlined in the Treaties. 
In accordance with Article 153(1) TFEU the Union has competence to legislate 
on a range of issues in the social policy field. These include: 
 
(a) improvement in particular of the working environment to protect 
workers’ health and safety; 
(b) working conditions; 
(c) social security and social protection of workers; 
(d) protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated; 
(e) the information and consultation of workers; 
(f) representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and 
employers; including co-determination, subject to paragraph 5; 
(g) conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing 
in Union territory; 
(h) the integration of persons excluded from the labour market, without 
prejudice to Article 166; 
(i) equality between men and women with regard to labour market 
opportunities and treatment at work; 
(j) the combatting of social exclusion; 
                                                        
3 Illustrative examples include Kenneth Armstrong, Governing Social Inclusion: 
Europeanization through Policy Coordination (OUP 2010); and Mark Dawson, New 
Governance and the Transformation of European Law: Coordinating EU Social Law 
and Policy (CUP 2011). 
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(k) the modernisation of social protection systems without prejudice to… 
(c). 
 
Importantly, issues considered to be of national sensitivity are excluded from 
the Union’s competence and include lock-outs, strikes and pay (as detailed 
under Article 153(5) TFEU). However, as was discussed in chapter 4 on 
economic governance, this restriction has not prevented the Union from 
regulating on issues relating to pay, for example, with regard to equal pay for 
equal work. Although it must be remembered that the Gender Equality 
Directive does not cover levels or constituent elements of pay.4 Indeed, in the 
case of Bruno & Pettini,5 the CJEU decided that Article 153(5) TFEU should be 
construed narrowly due to its function as a derogation from Article 153; 
excluding more direct intervention on minimum or collectively agreed wages. 
 
6.2.2 General legal bases 
 
The Union may also act based upon ‘general powers’ outlined in the Treaties. 
General legal bases under Articles 114, 115 and 352 TFEU allow the Union to 
act in the absence of specific powers (for example Article 153(1) TFEU). Article 
114(1) TFEU allows the Union to adopt: 
 
[M]easures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their 
object the establishment and functioning of the internal market. 
 
Article 115 TFEU allows the Union to adopt Council Directives towards this end 
but because action under Article 114 and 115 TFEU must have as its objective 
the ‘establishment or functioning of the internal market’, the use of either 
provision as a basis for regulatory action in the social policy field is significantly 
                                                        
4 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 
on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of 
men and women in matters of employment occupation (recast) (OJ [2006] L204/23). 
5 Joined Cases C-395/08 and C-396/08 Bruno and Others [2010] ECR I-5119 [37]. 
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constrained. Moreover, and of specific relevance to social policy, action under 
Article 114 TFEU cannot cover the rights and interests of workers.6 With regard 
to the issue of pay, neither provision can be used as a legal basis to 
circumvent the exclusion of harmonisation in a specific Treaty article e.g. 
Article 153(5) TFEU and pay.7 
 
In the absence of specific powers, the Union may also legislate based upon 
Article 352 TFEU. Under Article 352, the Union may adopt measures in order 
to attain a Treaty objective if an appropriate competence does not exist for its 
achievement.8 The Council has broad discretion to determined whether action 
is necessary, however, this is subject to two caveats. First, action is only 
justified under Article 352 where no other Treaty article either expressly or 
impliedly gives the Union the power to adopt such measures.9 Second, this 
power must be exercised in accordance with the principle of conferral and not 
exceed the scope of the Treaties (as illustrated by the CJEU’s opinion on the 
Union’s proposed use of Article 352 as a basis for its accession to the 
European Convention on Human Rights).10 
 
Article 352 TFEU cannot be used to supplement a specific Treaty provision that 
limits Union competence by excluding certain policy areas or instruments. 
Furthermore, action cannot entail the harmonisation of Member States’ laws 
where this has been excluded by the Treaties e.g. Article 153(5) TFEU and 
pay.11 Importantly, after the CJEU’s judgments in Viking and Laval,12 the 
                                                        
6 Article 114(2) TFEU. 
7 See Case C-380/03 Germany v Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-11572 [80]. 
8 Article 352(1) TFEU. 
9 Joined Cases C-51/89, C-90/89 and C-94/89 United Kingdom, France and Germany 
v Council [1991] ECR I-2757 [6]; and Opinion 2/92 Competence of the Community or 
one of its institutions to participate in the Third Revised Decision of the OECD on 
national treatment [1995] ECR I-521 [36]. 
10 Opinion 2/94 Accession by the Communities to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1996] ECR I-1759 [25]. 
11 Article 352(3) TFEU. 
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Commission sought to use Article 352 as the basis for its proposal for the so-
called ‘Monti II Regulation’.13 The proposal concerned the establishment of a 
warning system for Member States to inform one another of industrial relations 
problems or situations of social unrest. Member States’ and the social partners 
successfully argued that Article 352 could not be used as a basis for the Monti 
II Regulation as it would allow the Union to circumvent its lack of competence 
in the area of strikes (under Article 153(5) TFEU). 
 
Consequently, the future likelihood of social policy measures being adopted 
under Article 352 TFEU appears to be rather slim. This is not to say that social 
issues will be overlooked during the drafting and implementation of policies in 
other areas. Article 9 TFEU, the so-called ‘horizontal clause’, requires the 
Union to take into account social issues, including employment and social 
protection, in all of its activities. However, Article 9 does not constitute a new 
competence rather it serves to mainstream social issues into actions in other 
policy areas e.g. those concerned with EMU. 
 
Interestingly, if Article 9 TFEU is read strictly against the Union’s 
recommendations under the European Semester, it would appear advice could 
not be given for Member States to reduce minimum or collectively agreed 
wages that would lead to a worsening of social conditions. For more direct 
intervention, as would be required for a Union-initiated minimum wage policy, 
Treaty change would be necessary. Although Treaty change and the conferral 
of further competences to the Union is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future, 
this does not preclude Member States from undertaking complementary action 
in policy areas which remain under their control. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
12 Cases C-438/05 Viking [2007] ECR I-10779; and C-341/05 Laval un Partneri [2007] 
ECR I-11767. 
13 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the 
right to take collective action within the context of the freedom to establishment and 
the freedom to provide services COM(2012) 130 final (‘Monti II Regulation’). 
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6.2.3 Enhanced Cooperation 
 
One method for facilitating such complementary action is Enhanced 
Coordination. Enhanced Cooperation allows Member States to group together 
and establish advanced integration in an area within the institutional structures 
of the Union, without the participation of all Member States. Enhanced 
Cooperation is enshrined in Title IV of the TEU (Article 20) and Title III of Part 
Six of the TFEU (Articles 326-334). To date, Enhanced Cooperation has been 
used to facilitated action in three areas: common rules for cross-broader 
divorces; the establishment of a European patent; and the property of 
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international couples (in relation to divorces and separations).14 Discussions 
regarding its use for a financial transaction tax are currently ongoing.15 
 
Of specific interest to proponents of ‘Social Europe’, is that Enhanced 
Cooperation was initially used to facilitate action on divorce and was only later 
adopted for the establishment of a unitary patent and proposals for a financial 
transaction tax. Indeed, its use for the first time in 2010, on common rules for 
cross-border divorces, suggests that it may have been viewed by Member 
States’ as a way of overcoming political blockages in the social policy field. 
Advocate General Bot in Unitary Patent endorsed this suggestion when he held 
that “only those situations in which it is impossible to adopt such legislation in 
                                                        
14 Council Decision 2010/405/EU of 12 July 2010 authorising enhanced cooperation in 
the area of law applicable to divorce and legal separation (OJ [2010] L189/12), leading 
to Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 implementing 
enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation 
(OJ [2010] L343/10); Council Decision 2011/167/EU of 10 March 2011 authorising 
enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection (OJ 
[2011] L76/53), leading to Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the 
area of the creation of unitary patent protection (OJ [2012] L361/1) and Council 
Regulation (EU) No 1260/2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the 
creation of unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable translation 
agreements (OJ [2012] L361/89); and Council Decision (EU) 2016/954 of 9 June 2016 
authorising enhanced coordination in the area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the 
recognition and enforcement of decisions on the property regimes of international 
couples, covering matters of both matrimonial property regimes and the property 
consequences of registered partnerships (OJ [2016] L159/16) leading to Council 
Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in 
the area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes (OJ [2016] L183/1) and Council 
Decision (EU) 2016/1104 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the 
area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in 
matters of the property consequences of registered partnerships (OJ [2016] L183/30). 
15 Council Decision 2013/52/EU of 22 January 2013 authorising enhanced cooperation 
in the area of financial transaction tax (OJ [2013] L22/11). 
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the foreseeable future may give rise to a decision authorising enhanced 
cooperation”.16 
 
The establishment of a Union-initiated minimum wage policy is certainly such 
an impossibility. Whereas Eurozone Member States have expressed an 
interest in the idea of an EU minima, many outside of the monetary union have 
consistently voiced their opposition. Enhanced Cooperation is only possible 
with respect to existing Union competences; excluding the development of a 
minimum wage policy by a group of interested Member States. In Pringle, the 
CJEU held that it was clear from Article 20(1) TEU that “enhanced cooperation 
may be established only where the Union itself is competent to act in the area 
concerned by the cooperation”.17 
 
6.2.4 International agreements 
 
The main focus in Pringle was the legality of the European Stability 
Mechanism; a treaty concluded under international law that established 
financial assistance programmes for Eurozone member states in financial 
difficulty. In Pringle consideration was given to whether Member States should 
first make recourse to Enhanced Cooperation before concluding an agreement 
under international law. This raises the idea of Member States cooperating 
outside of the Union’s institutions and questions whether an international 
agreement could be used as the basis for establishing an ‘independent’ or 
‘international’ minimum wage policy (understood as being restricted to the 
geographical boundaries of the Union). 
 
As the Union is excluded from regulating over pay under Article 153(5) TFEU, 
competence remains with the Member States under Articles 4(1) and 5(2) TEU. 
However, in circumstances where the Union has regulated on issues relating to 
pay e.g. as with the Gender Equality Directive, Member States are not 
                                                        
16 Joined Cases C-274/11 and C-295/11 Spain and Italy v Council EU:C:2013:782 [48] 
– [50]. 
17 Case C-370/12 Pringle EU:C:2012:756 [167]. 
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prevented from introducing more stringent measures providing they are 
compatible with the Treaties. In this situation, Member States would be best 
advised to frame what would be a higher common standard as a lower 
standard, in order to avoid a potential infringement of the Union’s competence 
to conclude international agreements that may alter common rules or affect 
their scope.18 
 
It is highly unlikely that an agreement outlining an international minimum wage 
policy would affect existing EU rules in this area due to its explicit focus upon 
wages. Importantly, recourse to international law and, as a consequence of this 
approach, regulating outside of the Union’s institutions, questions the focus of 
this thesis. Exploring the idea of an EU minimum wage policy necessitates 
Union involvement, whether this be with the Union at the helm or in the 
provision of institutional support. Whereas the former route has been ruled out 
on the grounds of limited competence, the latter is considered in the following 
section on the European social dialogue. 
 
6.3 European Social Dialogue 
 
The European Social Dialogue is a fundamental element of Europe’s social 
model.19 The representatives of management and labour that are recognised 
within the social dialogue are know as the ‘social partners’.20 With regard to EU 
social law and policy, the social partners perform information and consultation 
roles within multiple fora, including now under the European Semester, and are 
recognised as co-legislators. EU-level social dialogue takes place at both 
cross-industry and sectoral levels and can lead to agreements implemented by 
                                                        
18 See Opinion 2/91 ILO Convention No 170 [1993] ECR I-1061 [18]; and Opinion 1/03 
Competence of the Community to conclude the new Lugano Convention on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial 
matters [2006] ECR I-1145 [123] – [127]. 
19 Brian Bercusson, European Labour Law (2nd edn, CUP 2009) 521. 
20 In accordance with its own criteria (last updated in 1993), the Commission currently 
recognises the ETUC, BusinessEurope, UEAPME and Ceep as social partners 
organised at cross-industry level. 
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Council Directive or in accordance with the procedures and practices specific 
to management and labour in the Member States. 
 
Below, the history of the social dialogue is briefly told, from its roots in the 
European Coal and Steel Community to the formal recognition of the role of the 
social partners as co-legislators with the passage of the Maastricht Treaty. 
Following this, the outputs of the social dialogue are considered – in terms of 
their type, the number of agreements reached and trends in their development 
– before those that cover pay are explored in detail. 
 
6.3.1 History 
 
EU-level social dialogue has a long and varied history; its origins can be traced 
to the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community of 1952.21 
Representatives of management and labour (along with consumers’ 
organisations), were appointed to consultative committees covering economic 
and social activities. Later, the Treaty Establishing the European Economic 
Community of 1958 established the Economic and Social Committee, which 
regularly consulted stakeholders such as the social partners on social and 
employment issues. However, it was a further 30 years before these informal 
procedures and processes were given a constitutional basis in the Treaties. 
 
The Single European Act of 1986 and, later, the Community Charter of the 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers of 1989 laid the foundation for the 
formalisation of European social dialogue. These instruments placed a duty on 
the Commission to promote social dialogue and to acknowledged that the 
social partners could enter into contractual relations based upon their own 
special agreements. During this time, what became known as the ‘Val 
Duchesse dialogue’, served as a cross-industry forum for the Commission to 
discuss with the social partners their potential consultative and co-legislative 
                                                        
21 For a detailed history see Christian Welz, The European Social Dialogue under 
Articles 138 and 139 of the EC Treaty: Process, Actors, Outcomes (Wolters Kluwer 
2008). 
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role. In 1991, an agreement was reached between the Commission and the 
social partners and later enacted as ex Articles 138 and 139 of the Treaty on 
European Union. 
 
As current Articles 154 and 155 TFEU, these provisions provide for the formal 
consultation of the social partners on any proposed action in the social policy 
field,22 and that dialogue between management and labour may lead to 
contractual relations based upon their own special agreements.23 Article 155 
TFEU also provides for agreements to be implemented voluntarily in 
accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management and 
labour and their affiliates in Member States or by way of Council Decision 
(which, to date, has taken the form of a Directive).24 
 
In practice, the social partners may inform the Commission of their intention to 
negotiate an agreement between themselves on an issue suggested for 
regulation.25 The resulting ‘European collective agreement’ (ECA) can be 
implemented either voluntarily by the social partners or presented to the 
Commission to be considered for implementation by Council Directive.26 
Conversely, the social partners can present an agreement that is not the result 
of a specific Commission consultation.27 Experience with the operation of the 
social dialogue has led the social partners to experiment with ‘autonomous’ 
                                                        
22 Article 154(2) TFEU. 
23 Article 155(1) TFEU. 
24 Article 155(2) TFEU. 
25 Article 154(4) TFEU. 
26 Article 155(2) TFEU. 
27 Article 155(2) TFEU. 
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ECAs.28 These agreements are the product of similar independent social 
partner initiatives but are implemented voluntary. 
 
Last year celebrated the 30th anniversary of the first meeting between Jacques 
Delors and the social partners at Val Duchesse.29 In the time that has since 
passed, social dialogue has undergone considerable change. The joint actions 
of the representatives of management and labour organised at EU-level have 
evolved, progressively developing from information exchange and consultation 
to concertation and the negotiation of agreements.30 This development is often 
read against a background comprised of three phases: from informal to formal 
social dialogue; the implementation of agreements by Council Directive under 
former Article 138 EC (now Article 154 TFEU); and the greater autonomy and 
independence of the social partners vis-à-vis the EU’s institutions e.g. the 
implementation of agreements in accordance with the procedures and 
practices specific to national affiliates.31 
 
                                                        
28 See Ann Branch, ‘The evolution of the European social dialogue towards greater 
autonomy: challenges and potential benefits’ (2005) 21(2) International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 321; and Christophe Degryse, 
‘Historical and Institutional Background to the Cross-industry Social Dialogue’ in Anne 
Dunfresne, Christophe Degryse and Philippe Pochet (eds), The European Sectoral 
Social Dialogue: Actors, Developments and Challenges (Peter Lang 2006) 31. 
29 For a history of the European social dialogue see Christian Welz, The European 
Social Dialogue under Articles 138 and 139 of the EC Treaty: Actors, Processes, 
Outcomes (Wolters Kluwer 2008). 
30 Christophe Degryse, ‘Historical and Institutional Background to the Cross-industry 
Social Dialogue’ in Anne Dunfresne, Christophe Degryse and Philippe Pochet (eds), 
The European Sectoral Social Dialogue: Actors, Developments and Challenges (Peter 
Lang 2006) 31; and see Ann Branch, ‘The evolution of the European social dialogue 
towards greater autonomy: challenges and potential benefits’ (2005) 21(2) 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 321. 
31 Christophe Degryse, ‘European Social Dialogue: State of Play and Prospects’ 
(2011) ETUI/OSE Final Report 26 – 39. 
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To these three phases a fourth can be added. The negative social 
consequences of EU measures to contain the financial crisis have undermined 
its popular legitimacy.32 The Commission has consequently sought to 
strengthen Europe’s social dimension, with the social dialogue well placed to 
fulfil this function without the need for reform. President Jean-Claude Juncker’s 
‘new start’ for the social dialogue focuses heavily upon involving the social 
partners in economic governance and policymaking areas outside the purview 
of traditional industrial relations; the role of the social partners in the European 
Semester is to be expanded and their input sought on initiatives such as the 
Digital Single Market and Energy Union.33 
 
This new phase of European tripartism is being advanced at the expense of the 
traditional role of social dialogue: as an alternative route to regulation in the 
EU.34 Social partner agreements implemented by Council Directive and 
autonomously by the social partners have received limited support since the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. The Commission is now tasked with ‘facilitating’ social 
dialogue under Article 154 TFEU rather than ‘developing’ social dialogue under 
previous Article 118b SEA. Indeed, it has been argued the Commission 
considers itself less of a ‘guardian’ and more of a ‘partner’ in European social 
dialogue.35 A consequence has been fewer social partner agreements and poor 
results with those implemented autonomously. Recent Commission initiatives, 
including the new start, fail to present a sufficient range of measures to 
address this situation. 
                                                        
32 See Daniel Vaughn-Whitehead, ‘The European Social Model in times of crisis: An 
overview’ in Daniel Vaughn-Whitehead (ed), The European Social Mode in Crisis: Is 
Europe Losing its Soul? (Edward Elgar 2015) 1. 
33 European Commission, ‘A new start for social dialogue’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=329&eventsId=1028&furtherEv
ents=yes> accessed 3 February 2018. 
34 On the European social dialogue and tripartism see Thomas Prosser and 
Emmanuelle Perrin, ‘European tripartism: chimera or reality? The ‘new’ phase of the 
European social dialogue in the light of tripartite theory and practice’ (2015) 57(3) 
Business History 376. 
35 Degryse (n 31) 34. 
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6.3.2 Outputs 
 
In a political climate favourable to social policy, the post-Maastricht period saw 
cross-industry ECAs concluded and subsequently implemented by Council 
Directive on parental leave (1995), part-time work (1997) and fixed-term work 
(1999).36 However, following the launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2001 and the 
introduction of ‘soft’ modes of governance, such as the Open Method of 
Coordination, the Commission’s interest in regulating through the social 
dialogue appeared to wane. Indeed, the ECA on fixed-term work was the last, 
original, cross-industry agreement to be implemented by Council Directive (that 
on parental leave was revised in 2009).37 The important role of the Commission 
in encouraging representatives of management to the negotiating table is also 
cited as a reason for this stalled output (curtly expressed as “you negotiate or 
we legislate”).38 
 
This apparent stasis in social dialogue at cross-industry level stands in contrast 
to its more progressive development at sectoral level; ten ECAs have been 
concluded and implemented, or there are currently plans for their implantation, 
by Council Directive. These agreements have been reached during roughly 
even intervals throughout the operation of the sectoral social dialogue. 
Recently, agreements have been reached on the consultation rights of civil 
                                                        
36 Council Directive 96/34/EC on the framework agreement on parental leave 
concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the EUTC (OJ [1996] L145); Council Directive 
97/81/EC concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work concluded by 
UNICE, CEEP and the EUTC (OJ [1997] L14/9); and Council Directive 1999/70/EC 
concerning the Framework Agreement on Fixed-term Work concluded by ETUC, 
UNICE and CEEP (OJ [1999] L175/43). 
37 Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised Framework 
Agreement on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP 
and ETUC and repealing Directive 96/34/EC (Text with EEA relevance) (OJ [2010] 
L68/13). 
38 See Brian Bercusson, ‘The Dynamic of European Labour Law After Maastricht’ 
(1994) 23(1) Industrial Law Journal 1; and Stijn Smismans, ‘The European Social 
Dialogue in the Shadow of Hierarchy’ (2008) 28(1) Journal of Public Policy 161. 
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servants (2015) and on improving occupational safety and health in the 
hairdressing sector.39 One reason for the greater number of agreements 
reached at sectoral level is the logistics of industry specific negotiations; it is 
easier for agreements to be reached across a single rather than multiple 
sectors. Additionally, Commission support for sectoral Social Dialogue 
Committees (SDCs) has encouraged social partners to organise at EU-level 
and meet with one another; facilitating the negotiation of agreements later 
implemented by Council Directive.40 
 
The so-called ‘autonomous’ route of the social dialogue has seen a number of 
ECAs implemented voluntarily by the social partners (in accordance with the 
procedures and practices specific to management and labour). However, this 
label is somewhat confusing as it is often used to refer to agreements that are 
both the result of a Commission consultation for legislation and of the social 
partner’s own initiative. Here, the label ‘autonomous’ is used to refer to 
agreements that are the result of independent negotiations between social 
partners and are implemented voluntarily. To date, the telework agreement is 
the only agreement to have been implemented voluntarily by the social 
partners having originated from a Commission consultation. 
 
Autonomous ECAs have been reached at both cross-industry and sectoral 
levels (eight are currently listed in the Commission’s online social dialogue 
database).41 These agreements have all been reached after the last cross-
                                                        
39 EUPAI and TUNED (EPSU and CESI), ‘General framework for informing and 
consulting civil servants and employees of central government administrations’ (2015); 
on the ‘Hairdressing Agreement’ see Krzysztof Bandasz, ‘A framework agreement in 
the hairdressing sector: the European social dialogue at a crossroads’ (2014) 20(4) 
Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 1. 
40 An important innovation was the creation of ‘Sectoral Social Dialogue Committees’ 
by Commission Decision 98/500/EC of 20 May 1998 on the establishment of Sectoral 
Dialogue Committees Promoting the Dialogue between the Social Partners at 
European Level (OJ [1998] L225). 
41 See European Commission, ‘Social dialogue texts database’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=521> accessed 23 October 2017. 
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industry social partner agreement implemented by Council Directive (that on 
fixed-term work in 1999). Consequently, it has been suggested that the social 
dialogue has moved towards greater autonomy from the Commission, in terms 
of the topics negotiated and the methods used for their implementation i.e. 
those other than Council Directive.42 However, the ‘autonomy’ of autonomous 
agreements is somewhat of an illusion as implementation is heavily dependent 
upon arrangements with national affiliates.43 
 
Without the involvement of the EU’s institutions, the content of autonomous 
ECAs is not restricted to those areas in which the EU has competence to 
regulate. Importantly, the social partners are not bound by the same exclusion 
on regulating over matters of pay under Article 153(5) TFEU as the institutions 
of the Union. (although the Commission could, technically, present a proposal 
covering elements of remuneration to the social partners, for implementation 
using their own methods, this would be highly unlikely given the politically 
sensitive nature of pay at EU-level). As such, the autonomous route of the 
social dialogue allows the social partners to reach agreements setting wages 
and thus could, in theory, serve as a foundation for a cross-industry or sectoral 
EU wage norm. 
 
Another theme, complementary to that of greater autonomy, is the 
development of ‘new generation texts’ by the social partners. As a response to 
the Lisbon Strategy, at the Laeken European Council in 2001, the social 
partners made a joint declaration on their intention to develop their own policy 
instruments based upon the OMC.44 This proposal was later endorsed by the 
Commission who considered the use of “machinery based upon the OMC as 
                                                        
42 See Branch (n 30) and Degryse (n 30). 
43 This point is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter on transnational labour 
law. 
44 ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, ‘Joint contribution by the social partners to the Laeken 
European Council’ <http://erc-online.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/2007-01093-
EN.pdf> accessed 23 October 2017. 
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an extremely promising way forward”.45 Moreover, later in the same 
communication, the social partners were directed to “adapt the open method of 
coordination to their relations in all appropriate areas”.46 
 
In similarity with institution variants of the OMC, new generations texts are 
used for benchmarking and target setting, peer review, and the exchange of 
best practice. The Commission has distinguished between three types of new 
generation text: ‘process-oriented texts’ that contain provisions mandating 
separate processes to monitor implementation, including frameworks of action, 
codes of conduct, guidelines, and policy orientations; ‘joint opinions and tools’, 
including policy opinions, declarations, and training materials; and ‘procedural 
texts’ that detail the procedural rules to be followed for cross-industry and 
sectoral social dialogue.47 Furthermore, the Commission also differentiates 
between policy instruments that set ‘reciprocal commitments’ and ‘common 
positions’.48 
 
There are currently 790 new generation texts listed in the Commission’s 
database. This development, along with the increasing number of autonomous 
ECAs, has been characterised as signalling a movement towards soft law 
within the social dialogue (and away from hard law Council Directives).49 
Consideration of the legal pedigree of these instruments, both autonomous 
agreements and new generation texts, will be made in chapter 8 on the 
potential regulatory design of an EU minimum wage policy. However, for 
present purposes, it is important to raise the idea that these instruments could 
                                                        
45 European Commission, The European social dialogue, a force for innovation and 
change COM(2002) 341 final 19. 
46 ibid. 
47 European Commission, Partnership for change in an enlarged Europe – Enhancing 
the contribution of the European social dialogue COM(2004) 557 final 15 – 19. 
48 ibid. 
49 Thomas Prosser, ‘The implementation of the Telework and Work-related Stress 
Agreements: European social dialogue through ‘soft’ law?’ (2011) 17(3) European 
Journal of Industrial Relations 245. 
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be used in combination e.g. with an autonomous agreement detailing the rate 
of a minima and guidelines monitoring its implementation.  
 
6.3.3 Pay 
 
First, the inclusive labour markets agreement (2010) makes reference to pay in 
relation to Council Decision 2005/600/EC.50 The agreement details the main 
challenges low skilled workers face in the labour market and sets out a range 
of actions the social partners can take to aid their entry, retention and 
development. Furthermore, in an annex to the agreement, the social partners 
address a list of recommendations to public authorities.51 The annex calls 
attention to the above Council Decision on employment policy guidelines and 
that in order for its realisation “work must be made to pay for job-seekers, 
including disadvantaged people…”.52 Although only a cursory mention of pay, 
debates during the drafting of the agreement considered the importance of 
‘decent’ pay in achieving inclusive labour markets. 
 
Second, the sectoral agreement on minimum requirements for standard player 
contracts in the professional football sector (2011) deals more explicitly with 
pay.53 The agreement aims to ensure that players in the EU and UFEA 
territories are employed on standard contracts, in particular, focus is directed 
towards clubs in Central and Eastern Member States. Although somewhat 
                                                        
50 BusinessEurope, Ceep, UEAPME and ETUC, ‘Framework Agreement on Inclusive 
Labour Markets’ (2010) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?mode=dsw&docId=8850&langId=en> 
accessed 23 October 2017; Council Decision of 18 July 2006 on guidelines for the 
employment policies of the Member States (2006/544/EC) (OJ [2006] L215/26). 
51 Annex 2. 
52 ibid. 
53 EPFL, ECA and FIFPro, ‘Agreement regarding the minimum requirements for 
standard player contracts in the professional football sector in the European Union 
and in the rest of the UEFA territory’ (2012) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?mode=dsw&docId=9053&langId=en> 
accessed 23 October 2017. 
  
154 
unusual given the high wages associated with professional football, pay is 
often an issue in lower leagues. Article 14 of the agreement states that “The 
Club has to respect minimum wages for the Player if they are agreed in [a] 
national collective bargaining agreement”. Furthermore, in relation to pay more 
generally, Article 6 (first indent) provides that a “Player [contract‘s] [must 
define] all [of] the Club’s financial obligations”, specifically, with regard to salary 
calculation, other benefits and the manner of payment. 
 
Third, the agreement on work in fishing (2012) also covers elements of pay but 
was concluded in cooperation with the Council as an alternative method for 
giving effect to the 2007 ILO Work in Fishing Convention.54 After a long delay, 
the agreement was presented to the Commission for implementation by 
Council Directive in early 2016.55 The agreement provides that, where not 
regulated by national laws, a fisherman’s work agreement is to detail “the 
amount of wages and any agreed minimum wage”, which, furthermore, are to 
be paid on a “monthly or other regular payment [date]”.56 The agreement also 
endorses ILO Recommendation No. 199 which provides that on vessels over 
24 meters long “all fishers should be entitled to minimum payment”.57 
 
                                                        
54 Europeche Cogeca and EFT, ‘Agreement between the social partners in the 
European Union’s sea-fisheries sector of 21 May 2012 concerning the implementation 
of the Work in Fishing Convention, 2007 of the International Labour Organization’ 
(2012) <http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?mode=dsw&docId=9089&langId=en> 
accessed 24 October 2017. 
55 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive implementing the 
Agreement concluded between the General Confederation of Agricultural 
Cooperatives in the European Union (COGECA), the European Transport Workers’ 
Federation (ETF) and the Association of National Organisations of Fishing Enterprises 
(EUROPÊCHE) of 21 May 2012 as amended on 8 May 2013 concerning the 
implementation of the Work in Fishing Convention, 2007 of the International Labour 
Organisation COM(2016) 235 final. 
56 Annex II (i) 
57 ibid. 
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However, common to each of these agreements is the ancillary nature of pay 
e.g. mention of making work pay or of respect for minimum wages are made 
with the aim of facilitating more inclusive labour markets or of employment 
security in football. Although the work in fishing agreement requires a fisher’s 
work contract to specify the amount and time of payment, as with the other two 
agreements considered, wage rates or wage-setting mechanisms are not the 
subject of regulation. Importantly, this may be more telling of the current stage 
of development of the autonomous route of the social dialogue, and of how it is 
used by the social partners, rather than of its potential as a foundation for an 
EU minimum wage policy. 
 
The autonomous route of the social dialogue is based upon a complex 
relationship between public and private forms of power. When negotiating 
autonomous ECAs, the social partners utilise an institutional and policy 
framework that is supported by Commission. For example, the social partners 
receive significant financial and technical support during the establishment of 
SDCs. Just as voluntary implementation is dependent upon national affiliates 
for success, the autonomous negotiation of agreements requires institutional 
involvement (whether this be providing the fora, legal expertise or technical 
assistance etc.). 
 
Importantly, this situation makes the characterisation of the autonomous route 
of the social dialogue, as either an institution or societal lawmaking process, 
difficult. Initially, one can suggest that it sits somewhere in-between, however 
insights from research on normative and legal pluralism provide a more 
sophisticated account (and will be explored in detail in the next chapter). This 
stands in contrast to the transnational coordination of collective bargaining, 
which is an informal process, developed in response to closer economic 
integration discussed in chapter 4. 
 
6.4 Transnational coordination of collective bargaining 
 
Unlike experience with the European social dialogue, hard issues such as 
wages and working conditions have been the subject of transnational 
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coordination. Coordination initiatives are union-driven and initially developed as 
a response to closer economic integration during the 1990s.58 Employers have 
little interest in developing processes for coordinating wages and working 
conditions across borders rather they seek to take advantage of the differences 
that exist between countries. Multinational companies operating across borders 
enjoy a bargaining advantage due to the greater mobility of capital versus 
labour and often threaten to relocate production to other countries, whether 
sincere or not, if their demands are not met.59 The transnational coordination of 
collective bargaining can be viewed as an attempt by unions to address this 
structural inequality. 
 
There is no legal framework at EU-level for the coordination of collective 
bargaining, instead unions have developed their own autonomous governance 
regimes. Although developing outside of the institutional and policy framework 
of the EU, coordination initiatives have had an important influence upon social 
dialogue and are considered with regard to company level agreements in the 
next section. Coordination aims to strengthen cross-border cooperation in 
bargaining policy by facilitating the exchange of information on national 
bargaining developments and developing rules and guidelines for the 
negotiation of collective agreements. Coordination is procedural and seeks to 
achieve similar results in different countries e.g. wage rises in line with a 
specific formula, not of a predetermined nominal value. Consequently, it is 
dependent upon the continued existence of national systems and does not 
seek to establish a supranational level of collective bargaining in Europe. 
Although coordination initiatives have focussed almost exclusively upon wages, 
bargaining guidelines have recently been introduced that cover qualitative 
issues. 
 
Below, three coordination initiatives are considered. These examples have 
been chosen as a consequence of their influence upon wage coordination in 
                                                        
58 See Keith Sisson and Paul Marginson, The Impact of Economic and Monetary 
Union on Industrial Relations: A Sectoral and Company View (Eurofound 2000). 
59 See Colin Crouch, Postdemocracy (Themes for the 21st Century) (Polity 2004). 
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Europe. Variously, they have been organised at regional, sectoral and cross-
industry levels. 
 
6.4.1 Initiatives 
 
The first and perhaps the most well known coordination initiative was ‘Doorn’.60 
Doorn took its name from the Dutch town where in 1998 trade union 
representatives from the Benelux countries and Germany met to discuss closer 
regional cooperation. These meetings were initiated by Belgian unions, in 
response to the introduction of a ‘statutory wage norm’ by the Belgian 
government.61 According to this wage norm, collectively agreed wages were to 
be limited to expected average wage increases in Belgium’s major trading 
partners (i.e. France, the Netherlands and Germany). Initially, unions 
exchanged information on collective bargaining developments, with the 
intention of providing context for one another’s future national negotiations. 
 
A year later, unions agreed upon the aims and principles of the ‘Doorn 
Declaration’.62 The main aim of the declaration was to prevent further 
downward wage competition, specifically, that had arisen in the context of EMU 
(as discussed in chapter 4). However, the declaration also recognised the 
negative distributional trends in wages, with a falling wage share going to 
labour, beginning to take hold across Europe. Importantly, the aim of using 
wage coordination to holt negative capital redistribution is similar to the rational 
for the solidaristic wage policy discussed in the last chapter. The three 
principles that formed the basis of the declaration required unions to: 
                                                        
60 Information on the Doorn Initiative is somewhat scarce, however, see Thorsten 
Schulten, ‘Europeanisation of Collective Bargaining: An Overview of Trade Union 
Initiatives for a Transnational Coordination of Collective Bargaining Policy’ (2002) WSI 
Discussion Paper No. 101. 
61 See Jürgen Osten, Jacques Vilrokx and Jan de Schampheleire ‘Collective 
bargaining in Belgium metalworking under EMU’ in Thorsten Schulten and Reinhard 
Bispinck (eds), Collective Bargaining under the Euro: Experiences from the European 
metal Industry (ETUI 2001) 61-94. 
62 Schulten (n 60) 7. 
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(1) Aim to achieve collective bargaining settlements that correspond to 
the sum total of the evolution of prices and the increase in labour 
productivity; 
(2) Aim to achieve both the strengthening of mass purchasing power 
and employment-creating measures (e.g. shorter work times) [and] 
(3) Inform and consult each other on developments in bargaining 
policy.63 
 
Principle 1 is often cited as the first union-initiated coordination guideline at EU-
level. This ‘inflation plus productivity’ rule has served as a reference for other 
initiatives. Such guidelines are not legally binding and are dependent for their 
success upon the political and moral commitment of national unions. 
 
The Doorn group met regularly until 2006 and introduced qualitative guidelines 
on issues such as on life-long learning. However, meetings became less 
regular and are now held on an infrequent basis. Doorn is example of the 
difficulties of coordination at inter-sectoral level, where due to a multiplicity of 
competing interests, it is especially hard to reach the agreement required for 
collective action.64 
 
The most successful coordination initiatives have been organised at sectoral 
level. Wage coordination is especially relevant to export-oriented 
manufacturing sectors, where exposure to international trade is greatest.65 In 
anticipation of the effects that EMU would have upon intensifying these 
pressures in the metalworking industry, German trade union IG Metall 
developed its own regional coordination policy; individual districts created 
networks for collective bargaining cooperation with metalworkers’ unions in 
                                                        
63 ibid. 
64 Vera Glassner and Philippe Pochet, ‘Why trade unions seek to coordinate wages 
and collective bargaining in the Eurozone: past developments and future prospects’ 
(2011) ETUI Working Paper 2011.03. 7. 
65 ibid 13. 
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neighbouring countries. These networks now form the backbone of the 
European Metalworkers’ Federation’s (EMF) sectoral initiative. 
 
The EMF had embarked upon transnational wage coordination as early as 
1993. Indeed, its “Statement of Principle on Collective Bargaining Policy’ 
predates Doorn.66 In similarity with Doorn, it provided for “regular annual 
compensation for price increases in order to protect real wages” and a “fair 
share in productivity gains”.67 These goals were formalised in the EMF’s 
‘European Coordination Rule’ of 1998.68 The EMF rule has been described as a 
‘Magna Carta against wage dumping’ as it defines a common framework for 
non-competitive collective bargaining whilst at the same time allowing national 
unions to follow their own political bargaining priorities.69 
 
The policies of the EMF are decided centrally and implemented through trade 
union networks such as those of IG Metall (this has been described as a 
situation where so-called ‘top-down’ (the EMF) and ‘bottom-up’ (IG Metall) 
processes meet in the Europeanisation of collective bargaining).70 The EMF 
has also developed a system for the exchange of information. Its ‘European 
Collective Bargaining Network’ (‘Eucob@n’) is an electronic system that allows 
unions to share information on national bargaining developments and to submit 
reports on their progress towards achieving targets set by its guidelines. The 
EMF has also adopted guidelines on the coordination of non-wage issues, 
such as training and precarious employment.71 
                                                        
66 European Metalworkers’ Federation, ‘Collective Bargaining Policy in a Changing 
Europe: Statement of Principle on Collective Bargaining’ (Resolution adopted at the 
1st EMF Collective Bargaining Conference, Luxembourg, 11 – 13 March 1993). 
67 ibid. 
68 European Metalworkers’ Federation, ‘Collective Bargaining with the Euro’ 
(Resolution adopted at the 3rd EMF Collective Bargaining Conference, Frankfurt am 
Main, 9 – 10 December 1998). 
69 IG Metall quoted in Schulten (n 60) 
70 Glassner and Pochet (n 64) 16. 
71 See the first and second common demands of the EMF (cited in Glassner and 
Pochet (n 64) 17). 
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At cross-industry level, for a considerable time, coordination was poorly 
developed. During the 1990s, the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC) focussed almost exclusively upon the social dialogue. However, the 
introduction of EMU and the experiences of European industry federations with 
transnational coordination, promoted the ETUC to explore developing its own 
initiative at cross-industry level. Initially, this was to follow the idea of a 
‘European solidaristic wage policy’ which, along with other considerations, 
would aim to “counter growing income inequality”.72 
 
Here, further parallels can be drawn with the normative orientation of this 
thesis; when in December 2000 the ETUC adopted its own guideline for wage 
coordination, trade unions were directed to ensure that nominal wage 
increases exceeded inflation “whilst maximising the proportion of productivity 
allocated to the rise in gross wages”, hinting at a more progressive 
redistributional policy than under Doorn or the EMF.73 The following year, the 
ETUC endorsed a resolution calling on national unions to:  
 
Include a quantifiable object regarding a reduction, in stages, in the 
number of low paid workers (i.e. those with 60 [per cent] or less of the 
median salary).74 
 
The inclusion of a target for coordination, set at 60 per cent of the median 
wage, along with the aim to reduce the number of low wage workers in covered 
industries, illustrates the development of a reasonably sophisticated wage 
policy by the ETUC (although lacking in terms of institutional support). This 
should also be read against its prior aim of countering rising income inequality. 
                                                        
72 ETUC, ‘Towards a European System of Industrial Relations’ (Resolution adopted at 
the 9th Statutory Congress of the ETUC, Helsinki, 29 June – 2 July 1999). 
73 ETUC, ‘Recommendation on the coordination of collective bargaining (adopted by 
the ETUC Executive Committee, 13 – 14 December 2000). 
74 ETUC, ‘Resolution on the coordination of collective bargaining (adopted by the 
ETUC Executive Committee, 14 December 2001). 
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More recently, the ETUC has included coordination as part of its strategy for 
defence against so-called ‘new’ EU economic governance (discussed in detail 
in chapter 4).75 The now labelled ‘golden rule’ of inflation plus productivity is to 
be used to counter wage freezes and wages cuts, protect collective rights, and 
to fight against the decentralisation of collective bargaining (in support of these 
objectives the ETUC has established an electronic system for information 
exchange similar to Eucob@n).76 Reference is also made in more recent 
resolutions to non-crisis related issues, including tackling gender inequalities 
and ending all forms of discrimination.77 
 
This shift in focus appears to be the consequence of current political priorities. 
During the early development of coordination, the greatest threat labour faced 
was that EMU would adversely effect wages, hence the ETUC’s focus upon 
issues such as rising wage inequality and solidarity. However, the response of 
the EU and national governments to the economic crisis threatens more 
fundamental issues, such as social partner autonomy and institutional support 
for industrial relations. 
 
Importantly for the purpose of this research, at various points over the last 20 
years, a number of union coordination initiatives have developed European 
wage policies. These policies have found expression in guidelines and rules for 
national bargaining and have been supported by networks, and processes for 
information exchange. Furthermore, more sophisticated polices, such as those 
of the ETUC, have been outlined in pursuit of specific normative goals, 
including inequality and solidary. Despite the similarity in focus of some of 
these initiatives to that of this thesis, practical experiences with coordination 
                                                        
75 ETUC, ‘The ETUC Coordination of Collective Bargaining and Wages in the EU 
Economic Governance’ (Resolution adopted by the ETUC Executive Committee, 22 – 
23 October 2013). 
76 ibid. 
77 ETUC, ‘Collective Bargaining: The ETUC Priorities and Working Programme’ 
(Resolution adopted by the ETUC Executive Committee, 6 – 7 March 2012). 
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undermine its potential as a foundation for the wage policy that has so far been 
articulated (specifically in the previous chapter). 
 
6.4.2 Experiences 
 
The real test for the success of coordination initiatives is whether they have an 
impact upon the negotiations of national unions. To date, there have been few 
empirical studies exploring this issue in detail. However, early assessments 
showed that guidelines had almost no perceptible impact upon bargaining 
settlements.78 Indeed, analysis suggests that European industry federations 
often fail to meet the requirements of their own coordination rules.79 Moreover, 
as discussed in chapter 4, wage convergence in Europe during the 1990s was 
the result of political decisions taken by national unions rather than of their 
commitment to European guidelines.80  
 
More recently, the popularity of coordination has suffered at the hands of 
greater interest in transnational company agreements (discussed in the next 
section). Additionally, changing political allegiances within national unions, 
exemplified by the waning influence of the left-wing at IG Metall, have resulted 
in a reduction in support for policies that are overtly European in focus (such as 
cross-border coordination).81 Furthermore, structural factors, at national and 
European-level, can be identified that limit the effectiveness of wage 
coordination. 
 
                                                        
78 Thorsten Schulten, ‘The European Metalworkers’ Federation Approach to a 
European Coordination of Collective Bargaining: Experiences, Problems and 
Prospects’ in Schulten and Bispinck (n 61). 
79 ibid. 
80 See Roland Erne, European Unions: Labor’s Quest for a Transnational Democracy 
(Cornell University Press 2008). 
81 See Roland Erne, ‘Book Review: Le salaire, un enjeu pour l’euro-syndicalisme. 
Histoire de la coordination des négotiations collectives nationales’ (2013) 19(3) 
Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 433. 
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First, the decentralisation of bargaining and falling coverage of collective 
agreements in Member States limits the influence of unions over the process of 
wage formation. Second, the predominance of single-employer bargaining in 
some Member States is a significant impediment to the uniform implementation 
of bargaining guidelines. Third, harmonisation, in terms of an agreements 
length, the industries it covers and the level at which it is negotiated, would be 
required for more effective coordination. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, 
guidelines are not legally binding and are viewed by national unions as political 
declarations that do not require further action. 
 
Whereas guidelines are voluntary and do not involve employers’ associations, 
transnational company agreements are, at the very least, reciprocal 
undertakings; detailing commitments between trade unions and multinational 
companies. Coordination initiatives provide a foundation for the negotiation of 
these agreements, in terms of existing institutional arrangements such as 
bargaining networks and processes for the exchange of information. 
Transnational company agreements are considered the next stage in the 
development of industrial relations in Europe. 
 
6.5 Transnational company agreements 
 
Transnational company agreements are defined by the European Commission 
as: 
 
…[agreements] comprising reciprocal commitments the scope of which 
extends to the territory of several states and which has been concluded 
by one or more representatives of a company or group of companies on 
the one hand, and one or more workers’ organisations on the other 
hand, and which covers working and employment conditions and/or 
relations between employers and workers or their representatives.82 
                                                        
82 European Commission, The role of transnational company agreements in the 
context of increasing international integration SWC(2002) 2155 (see the text 
accompanying footnote 2). 
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The Commission’s definition is especially inclusive and takes account of the 
various different situations that can give rise to transnational collective 
agreements (TCAs). TCAs that result from negotiations between global union 
federations and multinational companies are also known as international 
framework agreements (IFAs or in some literature Global FAs), whereas 
agreements restricted in scope to Europe are generally referred to as 
European framework agreements (EFAs). However, this practice appears to 
have ended due to the potential for confusion with European collective 
agreements (ECAs) resulting from formalised social dialogue. 
 
Historically, TCAs developed as a union response to the growing 
internationalisation of companies during the late 1960s. 83 Initially, unions 
sought to establish global worker representation bodies for the purpose of 
exchanging information between multinational companies and workers (based 
upon so-called world works councils).84 Later, transnational negotiations led to 
the conclusion of a number of agreements (e.g. between the EMF and 
Thomson-CSF) but coordination remained the focus of global and European 
industry federations.85 Although now disputed by global unions, early initiatives 
focussed upon developing international collective bargaining.86 
 
However, a significant shift in approach occurred as a consequence of the 
growing importance of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to multinational 
                                                        
83 Volker Telljohann et. al., European and international framework agreements: 
Practical experiences and strategic approaches (Eurofound 2009) 5. 
84 Isabel da Costa and Udo Rehfeldt, ‘Transnational collective bargaining at company 
level: Historical developments’ in Konstantinos Papadakis (ed), Cross-Border Social 
Dialogue and Agreements: An Emerging Global Industrial Relations Framework? (ILO 
2008) 45. 
85 Isabelle Schömann, ‘Transnational company agreements: towards an 
internationalisation of industrial relations?’ in Isabelle Schömann et. al. (eds), 
Transnational collective bargaining at company level: A new component of European 
industrial relations? (ETUI 2012) 199. 
86 Telljohan et. al. (n 83) 17. 
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companies.87 Multinationals saw CSR policies as a way of responding to 
criticisms made by the general public of the negative social and environmental 
impact of their operations. Indeed, at the turn of the millennium, the ILO 
renewed its Tripartite Declaration and the United Nations launched its ‘Global 
Compact’.88 Multinationals introduced voluntary codes of conduct and 
declarations, before later turning to negotiated texts; which served as the basis 
for modern TCAs. 
 
The content of TCAs varies depending upon whether they have been 
concluded by international or European industry federations. Generally, 
internationally focussed agreements cover core ILO labour standards, such as 
on freedom of association, whereas those that concentrate on Europe deal with 
more specific issues. Importantly, at the European, and more recently, 
international level, these have included wages and wage-setting mechanisms. 
Here, the difference in content between European and internationally focussed 
TCAs appears to be narrowing. However, it was not until the establishment of 
European Works Councils that TCAs were concluded in any significant 
number. As a potential consequence of the crisis, the number of TCAs 
concluded has stalled, perhaps due to national trade unions focussing upon 
domestic issues that are considered to be of greater importance. 
  
The European Works Council Directive (EWC) provides information and 
consultation rights for employees in Community-scale undertakings and groups 
of undertakings.89 EWCs are important as they represent the first institutional 
                                                        
87 Schömann (n 85) 197. 
88 Telljohan et. al. (n 83) 178. 
89 Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 on the establishment of a 
European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and 
Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting 
employees (OJ [1994] L254), adapted by Council Directive 2006/109/EC of 20 
November 2006 adapting Directive 94/45/EC on the establishment of a European 
Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale 
groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees, by 
reason of the accession of Romania and Bulgaria (OJ [2006] L365). 
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attempt at EU-level to develop interest representation in companies. The 
Directive covers companies with “at least 1,000 employees within the Member 
States and at least 150 employees in each of at least two Member States”.90 
Additionally, Member States are left to decide upon the criteria for selecting 
representatives (in accordance with subsidiarity).91 Essentially, the Directive 
aims to promote the negotiation of voluntary agreements between 
management and workers on the establishment and operation of EWCs. 
During the introduction of the EWC Directive, these agreements were exempt 
from certain provisions of the Directive, however, later they were required to 
establish a special negotiating body and detail the specific form and function of 
the EWC.92 
 
The engagement of management and labour in these voluntary agreements is 
argued to have aided their identification and legitimation as bargaining parties 
and facilitated the future negotiation of TCAs.93 Indeed, research has 
suggested that EWCs are involved in the negotiation and conclusion of over 
two-thirds of TCAs.94 Moreover, half are signed with multinational companies 
headquartered in Europe.95 EWCs have developed from their legislated 
function of providing a space for informing and consulting workers to the 
negotiation of transnational agreements. Consequently, the EWC Directive is 
often cited in commentary on company-level arrangements for social dialogue 
in Europe. 
 
This last point raises the distinction drawn at the beginning of this chapter 
between institutional and societal lawmaking processes. Although TCAs 
originated from union-initiated attempts to develop an international level of 
collective bargaining, what amounts to the co-option of EWCs for the purpose 
                                                        
90 Article 1(5)(c). 
91 Article 6(3) and Article 7, respectively. 
92 Article 13. 
93 Schömann (n 85) 211. 
94 Telljohan et. al. (n 83) 2. 
95 Telljohan et. al. (n 83) 1. 
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of institutional support, challenges the characterisation of this process as an 
informal mode of governance. This situation has been likened to that where 
“…transnational social norms can emerge from a legal order and draw 
legitimacy from an institutional framework”.96 Moreover, one labour lawyer has 
suggested this amounts to “normative self-service”, where management and 
labour ‘forum shop’ for the greatest levels of support.97 
 
There is currently no legal framework for the conclusion of TCAs at EU-level, 
however discussions have been ongoing within the trade union movement 
regarding the introduction of an (optional) legal framework since the so-called 
‘Ales Report’.98 The introduction of such a framework has been likened to 
‘regulated self-regulation’, where, in accordance with one suggestion, the EU 
could provide legal certainty to TCAs by guaranteeing their effects through 
legislating by way of Council Directive (which will be discussed in more detail 
with regard to ‘reflexive law’ in chapter 8).99 As a result of this legal ‘no man’s 
land’, a number of procedures have developed for the negotiation and 
conclusion of TCAs. 
 
6.5.1 Procedures 
 
The centrality of EWCs in the negotiation of TCAs has led trade unions to 
develop procedures to ensure their own involvement. The negotiating 
                                                        
96 Marie-Ange Moreau, ‘The originality of transnational social norms as a response to 
globalisation’ in Brian Bercusson and Cynthia Estlund (eds), Regulating labour in the 
wake of globalisation: new challenges, new institutions (Hart 2008) 266. 
97 Alain Supiot, ‘Du nouveau au self-service normatif : la responsabilité sociale des 
entreprises’ in Etudes offertes à Jean Pélissier, Analyse juridique et valeurs en droit 
social (Dalloz 2004) 541 – 548. 
98 Edoardo Ales et. al., Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future 
(European Commission 2006). 
99 Hans-Wolfgang Platzer, ‘Europäisierung und Transnationalisierung der 
Arbeitsbeziehungen in der EU’ (2002) Internationale Politik und Gesellscha No. 2 103 
– 121. 
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procedure of the EMF is considered a ‘blueprint’ in this regard;100 it seeks to 
establish national unions as leading players in the negotiation of agreements, 
vs. works council representatives, and to respect their right to negotiate over 
issues that are European in focus.101 Consequently, the Secretariat of the EMF 
is prevented from acting unilaterally, with national unions having prerogative 
over which issues are suggested for negotiation. The EMF procedure sets out 
rules on how TCAs are negotiated and concluded. 
 
First, a resolution is required from national affiliates for the initiation of 
negotiations. As far as is reasonably practicable, this should be sought from all 
unions concerned. Affiliated unions in a specific country can block the 
commencement of negotiations, unless they represent less than five per cent 
of the workforce of the undertaking. Second, a resolution is required in order 
for the conferral of a bargaining mandate (and is subject to the five per cent 
rule). Third, a final resolution must be sought from unions on the text of the 
proposed agreement (before being signed by the EMF). These rules aim to 
ensure that national unions retain control of the procedure and TCAs have a 
wide scope of application, preventing their erosion by competitors. Additionally, 
the EMF is argued to demonstrate its legitimacy as a bargaining agent by 
securing a strong mandate from its affiliates. 
 
The form of this procedure is also dependent upon the involvement of EWCs. 
Whereas in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, works council 
representatives are assigned a central role in negotiations (providing they are 
trade union members) in southern Europe, Scandinavia and the UK, they are 
not involved in any way (German trade unions often provide advice to 
                                                        
100 Torsten Muller et. al., ‘Transnational company agreements and the role of 
European Works Councils in negotiations: A quantitative analysis in the metalworking 
sector’ (2013) ETUI Report 127 12. 
101 European Metalworkers’ Federation, ‘EMF procedure for negotiations at 
multinational company level’ (2006) <http://www.emf-fem.org/Areas-of-work/Company-
Policy/Adopted-documents- Position-papers-Publications/Position-papers2/Internal-
EMF-Procedure-for- negotiations-at-multinational-company-level> accessed 24 
October 2017. 
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members of national works councils). With regard to the first, EWC-led, 
scenario, the responsibility for negotiating and concluding agreements resides 
with the EWC (and the EMF procedure is rejected). Here, trade union 
representatives may still be invited to take part in negotiations. With regard to 
the second scenario, the EWC accepts the lead of the trade union and 
transfers responsibility for the negotiation of company level agreements. 
 
The results of a recent research projected, funded by the European Parliament, 
show that almost all TCAs singed with companies headquartered in the EU 
involve EWCs in some way shape or form e.g. negotiation, implementation or 
monitoring. However, from 2006, the number of TCAs signed independently by 
trade unions, following variants of the EMF procedure, has increased by almost 
15 per cent (although, as of 2013, they accounted for less than 20 per cent of 
all agreements). This increase has been attributed to more companies 
headquartered in France taking part in company level negotiations. Importantly, 
‘country of origin differences’ also explain the ancillary nature of pay as a topic 
of regulation at company level. 
 
6.5.2 Pay 
 
To date, as with autonomous ECAs, pay has not been the explicit focus of 
TCAs. The popularity of wages and working time as topics for transnational 
negotiation appears to have suffered as a consequence of the number of 
German-led EWCs; the German model of codetermination allows works 
councils to bargain over all issues apart from wages and working time, which 
are reserved for trade unions. However, the increasing number of French and 
southern European companies involved in transnational negotiations, and their 
tradition of single-track bargaining, has begun to challenge this situation 
(although it must be emphasised that TCAs covering pay have been signed by 
companies headquartered in both countries). 
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The most specific example is that on profit-sharing at the defence company 
EADS.102 The agreement aims to establish a link between the activities of 
workers and the financial success of the company in order to improve 
motivation and commitment. Importantly, pay has also been the subject of 
more informal agreements at EADS. These have covered profit-sharing 
bonuses, bonuses for employees in sales roles, standardisation of pay scales 
and payment of national minimum severance pay.103 Informal agreements are 
not usually made public or listed in trade union databases and have been 
described as an ‘overlooked phenomenon’ in literature on TCAs.104 Indeed, 
research suggests that a quarter of companies in the metalworking sector have 
concluded informal agreements with their management counterparts.105 
 
More generally, monetary issues, including wages, have been included in 
agreements on restructuring programmes. For example, Ford signed a series 
of TCAs between 2000-2010 guaranteeing the acquired rights of workers 
involved in the spinoff of car component producers, specifically regarding 
wages and salaries.106 A somewhat more defensive example is that of General 
Motors Europe (GME), where after Europe-wide industrial action initiated by 
the EMF against restructuring, management agreed to the terms of a TCA that 
included a limit to wage cuts.107 However, both of these examples also illustrate 
the strength of the EMF, who, because of their regional bargaining networks 
(discussed in the previous section), were able to exert significant pressure on 
management to enter into negotiations. 
 
                                                        
102 EADS, ‘Group Agreement for the Implementation of a Success-Sharing Plan within 
the EADS-NV Group’ (2011) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/PDFServlet?mode=tca&agreementId=53&langId=en> 
accessed 24 October 2017. 
103 Muller et. al. (n 100) 47. 
104 ibid 40. 
105 ibid 41. 
106 See Telljohan et. al. (n 83) 74 – 75. 
107 ibid. 
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Interestingly, the International Metalworkers’ Federation (IMF) has developed a 
model framework agreement for its affiliates to follow in transnational 
negotiations.108 This references statutory/state-extended minimum wages and 
informal benchmarks: 
 
Wages and benefits paid for a standard working week shall meet at 
least legal and industry minimum standards and always been sufficient 
to meet basic needs of workers and their families and provide some 
discretionary income.109 
 
Its aim of ensuring that workers’ and their families ‘basic needs’ are met and 
that wages provide ‘some discretionary income’ directs attention towards the 
criteria against which minimum wages are set (as outlined in chapter 2 on their 
history). Although not detailing how these aims are to be translated into 
quantifiable targets (e.g. 60 per cent of the national medium wage), the IMF 
model agreement provides the foundations for what could be a very 
sophisticated transnational wage policy; guidelines are offered on the 
negotiation, content, implementation and monitoring of agreements that are 
based upon its principles (this model is of particular interest with regard to the 
regulatory design of an EU wage norm discussed later in chapter 8).110 
Moreover, the inclusion of a wage clause serves to mainstream the issue of 
pay, requiring its consideration in all negotiations (and also warrants further 
investigation). Agreements following the IMF model have been concluded with 
large multinationals, including Bosch, Renault, EADS, BMW, Arcelor and PSA 
Peugeot Citroën.111 
 
                                                        
108 International Metalworkers’ Federation, ‘Background to the International 
Framework Agreements in the IMF’ (IFA World Conference, Frankfurt am Main, 26 – 
27 September 2006) <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/gurn/00251.pdf> accessed 24 
October 2017. 
109 ibid 4. 
110 ibid 5 – 14. 
111 ibid 5. 
  
172 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
In light of the Union’s limited ability to directly regulate in the area of pay it 
should not come as a surprise that this chapter points towards modes of 
governance instituted by representative of management and labour as the only 
realistic way forward for the establishment of an EU minimum wage policy. 
Modes of governance such as efforts to create a transnational level to 
collective bargaining and experiments with transnational collective agreements 
have produced a number of interesting outputs. Respectively, these range from 
setting targets for collectively agreed pay to outlining criteria for the 
determination of wages. 
 
However, these processes are often initiated almost exclusively by trade 
unions, with limited involvement from employers’ associations (unless they can 
be brought to the bargaining table by industrial action or the threat that strikes 
will be called). Conversely, addressing this structural imbalance in bargaining 
power was the guiding rationale behind the development of formalised 
European social dialogue. Although recent action has been somewhat limited, 
particularly in the last decade, this does not detract from the stability of the 
social dialogue as a law-making process provided for in EU law and, perhaps 
more importantly, which has a sizable budget that is used to support the social 
partners to reach their own agreements. 
 
Similar levels of support and structures are not present in trade union-led 
initiatives. Indeed, although those such are Doorn are highly developed, they 
have suffered problems associated with organising unions established across 
multiple sectors. Moreover, although the EMF have, for example, reached 
substantive agreements in a number of European Works Councils, they do not 
receive support for actions other than those relating to fulfilling their information 
and consultation function. 
 
It is the possibility of such institutional support, along with its position outside of 
the Article 153(5) TFEU restriction on pay, which makes an autonomous 
agreement the only realistic basis for an EU minimum wage. 
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However, it is clear from the preceding discussion that there is a great deal 
about the operation of the autonomous route of the social dialogue that is not 
fully understood. For example, the development of ‘new’ governance-style 
instruments and their adoption by the social partners raises questions about 
the impact they are having on the uptake of autonomous agreements. Are they 
seen as being interchangeable (and, as a consequence, in competition) or is it 
possible they could be used together i.e. alongside each other or in an 
arrangement designed to facilitate their interaction? The next chapter adopts 
work on transnational legal pluralism as an approach to understanding the 
operation of the autonomous social dialogue, with the resulting insights used to 
inform the design of an EU minima in final substantive chapter of this thesis. 
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7. Insights from transnational (labour) law 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In the last chapter, the search for a potential legal or, indeed, normative 
foundation for an EU minimum wage policy shed light upon how interlinked 
many of the methods of governance are that makeup the field of European 
industrial relations. This chapter seeks to more fully understand these ‘hidden 
dynamics’ with a view to suggesting an appropriate form for an EU minima – 
undertaken in the next chapter – which takes into account the reality of 
regulating labour and employment law issues at EU-level. In doing so, it adopts 
work on transnational legal pluralism as a framework for understanding how 
the autonomous route of the European social dialogue operates. To-date, this 
approach has been overlooked by scholarship on European industrial relations 
and this chapter constitutes a first exploration of the utility of this theory for 
better understanding the social dialogue. 
 
From the detailed investigation in the previous chapter of the law-making 
processes that are often very roughly described as being based upon either 
more public or more private forms of power, considerable overlap was 
observed, calling into question the utility of this distinction and whether the 
apparent collapse of this boundary has implications for the potential design of 
an EU minimum wage policy. 
 
Whereas the most promising foundation appears to be the so-called 
‘autonomous’ route of the European social dialogue (given it sits outside of the 
Article 153(5) TFEU restriction on regulating pay and a agreements have been 
reached covering constituent elements of remuneration), there appears to be 
far more going on under the surface than initially meets the eye. 
 
By way of example, the autonomous route is dependent for its success on the 
national procedures and practices of management and labour for 
implementation, and the ability of the social partners to organise at EU-level 
and reach agreements. Explained in another way, it appears less ‘autonomous’ 
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of public forms of power and more contingent on the existence of institutional 
structures and support for success. Furthermore, the development of ‘new’ 
governance-style instruments and their adoption by the social partners raises 
questions about the impact they are having on the uptake of autonomous 
agreements, for example, are they seen interchangeable (and, as a 
consequence, in competition) or is it possible they could be used together i.e. 
alongside each other or in an arrangement designed to facilitate their 
interaction? 
 
It is of imperative importance that these hidden dynamics are fully understood if 
an EU minimum wage policy is to be designed that could realistically stand a 
chance of being adopted by the social partners and of serving a solidarity 
enhancing function. Here, studying the autonomous route of the social dialogue 
through the lens of transnational legal pluralism sheds light upon the 
complexity involved in its operation. 
 
Moreover, the insights gained from this approach present the social dialogue 
as an alternative space for societal governance; where labour law’s main 
objectives of constraining market power/furthering concerns regarding 
economic/social justice can be achieved because of, not in spite of, the 
fragmentation of European law (especially with regard to the complexity of 
industrial relations at European level). This mode of governance is no longer 
viewed as occurring separately from the institutions of the Union and the 
Member States, rather its dependency is revealed. These insights have the 
potential to reach beyond the policy proposal under consideration to other 
areas, for example, the use of the social dialogue to regulate other ‘hard’ 
issues such as working hours. 
 
Any EU minimum wage policy based upon an autonomous social partner 
agreement, as alluded to in the previous chapter, would not operate away from 
public power but would be contingent upon institutional support at both 
European and national levels: in terms of the provision of negotiating fora for 
the conclusion of any agreement, funding and technical support for its drafting 
and the creation and maintenance of avenues for its implementation and 
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review (whether at European or national level). Put simply, a wage norm based 
on an autonomous social partner agreement would not be at the mercy of trade 
unions for its success but would be more closely tied to the institutional 
framework of the Union and Member States than current research on the idea 
of an EU minima acknowledges. 
 
As a consequence, the ideas appraised in chapter 3 – that a policy instituted by 
the social partners rather than the Member States would have little chance of 
success due to the limited support they would receive – is considered to be 
overly simplistic. Not only does this insight render the autonomous route of the 
social dialogue a more likely basis for an EU minimum wage policy but also 
questions prevailing thought about the potential of alternative modes of 
governance (such as the social dialogue) for regulating at a time of malaise in 
Europe (where the ‘social’ acquis has undergone very little development, 
specifically in terms of new ‘hard’ law legislation, since the post-Maastricht 
agreement on the original Atypical Workers Directives). 
 
As a consequence, the challenge appears to be alerting trade unions and 
employers’ associations to the possibilities for regulating offered by law-making 
fora like the social dialogue, whilst pressuring the Commission and Member 
States to do more to support the negotiation, conclusion, implementation, 
monitoring, and revision of their actions.  
 
At the same time, viewing the operation of the social dialogue through the lens 
of transnational legal pluralism alerts law-makers (including European social 
partners), to the potential for interaction to occur between different types of 
legal instruments. The contested legal pedigree of norms like autonomous 
social partner agreements and so-called ‘new’ generation texts, modelled on 
the open method of coordination, is set aside in favour of a purposive approach 
focussing on their practical effects. Traditional forms of ordering – like 
collective agreements – should not be considered superior to recent 
innovations like guidelines (usually because they are seen as binding and 
therefore somehow more effective), rather they should be considered different 
ways of achieving the same aims. 
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Taking this normativity more seriously opens up the possibility of using 
instruments like new generations texts, for example guidelines, for regulating 
issues that are commonly covered by collective agreements. Importantly, freed 
from the moorings of traditional legal thought, transnational legal pluralism, 
also directs attention towards the possibility of combining different norms (in 
order to improve their effectiveness). 
 
For the idea of an EU minimum wage, this could mean a target being set for 
collectively agreed wages to reach, for example, 60% of the sectoral median 
wage in incremental stages to be determined in guidelines set by workers 
themselves. Moreover, new generation texts like reporting forms could be used 
by workers to keep peak-level organisations – party to the agreement – 
informed of their progress. These forms of interaction are explored below and 
serve as a basis for more detailed discussion on regulatory design in the next 
chapter. 
 
This chapter proceeds through three main parts: 
 
(1) It discuss transnational law as a legal theory and contrasts it to 
earlier movements in normative and legal pluralism; 
(2) It analyses the European social dialogue and other elements of the 
so-called ‘European system of industrial relations’; and 
(3) Based upon this case study, links transnational law’s recognition of 
the interactions between actors, norms and processes inherent in 
globalisation to the operation of the social dialogue (e.g. European 
collective agreements). 
 
In conclusion, it is suggest that the exploration of the social dialogue from the 
vantage point of transnational legal pluralism also provides insights into those 
areas that are underplayed by the theory, for example, the relative autonomy of 
the state. These are outlined for consideration in the next chapter and 
conclusion of this thesis. 
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7.2 Transnational legal pluralism 
 
Initially, one may ask, what do we mean when we speak of transnational law? 
Academia is littered with words which appear to serve no other purpose than to 
attract the attention of leading journals, funding bodies and/or potential 
employers. With regard to EU-level social dialogue, research has fallen victim 
to this trap; European collective agreements are increasingly considered 
examples of transnational social partner activity but the reasons why are often 
not explained. Simplistically, the appeal of the transnational appears to lie in its 
utility as a descriptive frame for the geographical border crossing involved in 
such activities; European collective agreements operate beyond the territorial 
borders of states. However, in socio-legal theory, a more complex 
understanding has developed. 
 
A common starting point is Phillip Jessup’s seminal work on transnational law. 
Jessup proposed to use the term to include: 
 
All law which regulates actions or events that transcend national 
frontiers. Both public and private international law… and other rules 
which do not wholly fit into such standardised categories.1 
 
In doing so, firstly, the idea of transnational law acknowledges issues of place 
(specifically the terrain over which legal acts are concluded and have effect). 
Secondly, private sources of law are considered on an equal footing with public 
law. Jessup later described the extralegal or metajuridical arrangements 
possible when the perceived monopoly of the state on authoritative legal acts 
was questioned.2 Interestingly, similar points were raised by C. Wilfred Jenks, 
who envisaged an “emerging field” in which the “law governing relations 
between states is only one”.3 Indeed, Jessup considered a variety of 
                                                        
1 Phillip Jessup, Transnational Law (Yale University Press 1956) 2. 
2 ibid 6. 
3 C. Wilfred Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind (University of Michigan 1958) 2. 
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transnational arrangements involving “individuals, corporations, states, 
organizations of states, or other groups”.4 
 
Jessup’s work has been revisited by contemporary scholars investigating the 
evolution of state institutions and the development of the global political 
economy, particularly from perspectives related to theories of normative and 
legal pluralism (given its focus upon territoriality and the relationship between 
the state and law). Here, Peer Zumbansen’s work on transnational legal 
pluralism is instructive.5 Zumbansen’s approach is a radicalisation of both 
Jessup’s work and his own; transnational legal pluralism is cast as a 
methodological approach to the study of law (in light of the complexity of 
modern society).6 
 
For labour law, this includes the challenges of so-called ‘polycentric 
globalisation’,7 such as the informalisation of work, labour migration, and 
growing wage inequality. In the EU, with regard to the European single market, 
these problems are intensified, with the free movement of capital promoted to 
the detriment of social considerations. However, these observations are also 
manifestations of deeper structural changes. In reading Jessup’s work 
alongside insights from modern sociological theories, Zumbansen rejects the 
relativisation of society as the “other side of the state”.8 
 
This approach calls into question two assumptions commonly associated with 
law; namely, its connection with state authority and, as a consequence, its 
territoriality. 
 
                                                        
4 Jessup (n 1) 3 – 4. 
5 See Peer Zumbansen ‘Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, 
Global Governance & Legal Pluralism’ (2012) 21(2) Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems 305. 
6 ibid 323. 
7 ibid. 
8 ibid 307. 
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7.2.1 State/law nexus 
 
The transformation of political sovereignty in the ongoing process of 
globalisation renders the state/law nexus, long held within legal thought, 
increasingly untenable. Early work by sociologists alerted jurists to a panoply of 
non-state originating norms binding human and organisational behaviour.9 For 
past and present labour lawyers, situations of plurality are not unusual, indeed, 
they are a part of its disciplinary fabric. The history of labour law in Western 
and Northern Europe is a story of oscillation; between periods of state 
intervention on the one hand and abstention on the other. Wages and 
collective bargaining in twentieth century Britain are examples; paternalism 
gave rise to the first statutory minimum wages through trade boards, intended 
to protect workers in industries with poor collective bargaining coverage, before 
their alteration and later disbandment under collective laissez faire.10 
 
Such historical events gave rise to the coexistence of state and non-state 
norms; statutory and collectively agreed wages are considered functional 
equivalents and exist alongside one another in an increasing number of 
industrial relations systems. Importantly, the recognition of autochthonous 
forms of ordering is a challenge to understandings that restrict the moniker 
‘law’ to that which emanates from the state. The legal effect of collective 
agreements, e.g. normative/contractual/mandatory, have long been 
acknowledged by labour lawyers (ensuring a healthy scepticism of theories that 
are overtly state-centric in focus), but the development of alternatives capable 
of accounting for this normativity has been somewhat neglected.11 
 
                                                        
9 See Eugene Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (Transaction 
Press 1962). 
10 The Trades Boards Act 1909 was a paternalistic response to the problem of 
‘sweated labour’. However, more accurately, trade boards were an intervention into 
the system of collective laissez fair (distinct from that promoted by Thatcher in the 
1980s). 
11 The ongoing debates over hard vs. soft law are an example (discussed in more 
detail in section 4). 
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Although exploring its contested nature is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
transnational legal pluralism views law first and foremost as a ‘social 
phenomena’, inviting insights from sociological theories.12 A prominent example 
is systems theory; law is perceived from a functional perspective within a 
differentiated modern society (which is defined not in contrast to the state but 
rather as “without peak or centre”), operating according to its own rationality 
and through its own particular vocabulary.13 Recent research on reflexive law 
has applied these insights to labour law.14 Consequently, alerting labour 
lawyers to evolving forms of law, the importance of which are overlooked by 
traditional approaches (that seek to reconcile the assumption of a strong 
state/law nexus with the proliferation of non-state norms). Importantly, the 
‘decentering’ of the state also effects law’s perceived territoriality. 
 
7.2.2 Deterritorialisation 
 
Systems theoretical approaches suggests that the boundaries of society 
cannot accurately be drawn in relation to the state (or the regional, supra- or 
inter-national), rather they should be understood as extending to include 
society in its entirety. Within so-called ‘word society’, the study of regulatory 
governance refers to territory only in the acknowledgement of politico-
historically contingent legal frameworks. Importantly, this point signals a shift 
from Jessup’s focus upon place to that of space; the transnational dimension of 
legal pluralism is less about considerations of territory and more about the form 
and function of law within differentiated modern societies.15 For example, the 
supply chains of multinational enterprises are the loci of a growing number of 
corporate codes of conduct (not states or international organisations). 
                                                        
12 Zumbansen (n 5) 317. 
13 See Niklas Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law (2nd edn, Routledge: 
Glasshouse 2013). 
14 See Ralf Rogowski, Reflexive Labour Law in the World Society (Edward Elgar 
2013). 
15 Reinforcing the view that it is not a distinct field of study but rather a methodological 
approach. 
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Some labour lawyers view transnationalisation in this form as especially 
concerning. They ask how labour law can achieve its objectives without the 
‘shadow of the law’,16 whilst others contest that to serve as an effective 
countervailing force to capital, especially in light of ongoing globalisation, 
formal support is necessary. (unsurprisingly, for those who share these 
concerns, corporate codes of conduct are not held aloft as examples of how 
transnationalisation can benefit organised labour). Interestingly, these views 
align with certain political currents within legal pluralism. Specifically, 
suggestions for intervention are also matched with calls for abstention and the 
embrace of new forms of governance.17 
 
However, the replication, transnationally, of forms of support modelled upon 
the state (e.g. attempts in the early 1970s by trade unions to establish world 
works councils) or a turn towards those that are more epistemic (e.g. directly 
deliberative polyarchy) are not the only options for how to govern labour related 
issues in a changing world. Transnational legal pluralism charts a pathway 
between these opposite approaches. In this context, manifesting itself as state 
support for societal modes of governance; where the Union and Member 
States provide for the actions of the social partners (e.g. through capacity 
building initiatives, legal aid, and financing programmes). Consequently, 
promoting the facilitative, rather than directive, role of public power.18 
 
7.3 European social dialogue 
 
As explored in the previous chapter, at EU-level, the European social partners 
perform information and consultation roles within a number of different forums, 
including now under the European Semester, and are recognised as co-
                                                        
16 In particular, see Brian Bercusson, ‘The Dynamic of European Labour Law After 
Maastricht’ (1994) 23(1) Industrial Law Journal 1. 
17 For example, at the right of political spectrum, legal experimentalism and the idea of 
‘ratcheting’ labour standards. 
18 Understood in reflexive law terms as ‘steering’. 
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legislators. EU-level social dialogue takes place at both cross-industry and 
sectoral levels and can lead to agreements implemented by Council Directive 
or in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management 
and labour in the Member States (governed under Articles 154 and 155 TFEU, 
previously Articles 138 and 139 TEU). 
 
The second of these two routes is of particular interest to the focus of this 
chapter. Here, so-called ‘voluntary’ European collective agreements are 
implemented by the national affiliates of the social partners (rather than by way 
of Council Directive). From around the turn of the millennium, these 
agreements have resulted exclusively from the initiatives of the social partners, 
as opposed to from official consultations. (to date, the telework agreement 
(2002) is the only agreement to have been implemented by the social partners 
based upon a proposal from the Commission). As such, the social dialogue is 
argued to have moved towards greater autonomy, both in terms of the topics 
negotiated and the methods used for implementation. 
 
As a result of this greater independence vis-à-vis the institutions of the Union, 
various ‘autonomous’ European collective agreements have been reached that 
would not have been considered appropriate for regulation by the Commission. 
Examples include the furore over the hairdressing agreement after it was 
rejected for implementation by the Council based upon the regulatory fitness 
agenda.19 Moreover, without the involvement of the Union, autonomous 
agreements are not restricted in content to those areas in which it has specific 
competence to legislate (for example, the social partners are not bound by the 
same exclusion on regulating over matters of pay under Article 153(5) TFEU as 
the institutions of the Union).20 
                                                        
19 See Krzysztof Bandasz, ‘A framework agreement in the hairdressing sector: the 
European social dialogue at a crossroads (2014) 20(4) Transfer: European Review of 
Labour and Research 1. 
20 A number of agreements, including that on contracts in professional football, cover 
elements of pay (also see the inclusive labour markets agreement and the agreement 
on work in fishing). 
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Another theme, complementary to that of greater autonomy, is the 
development of ‘new generation texts’ by the social partners. As a response to 
the Lisbon Strategy, at the Laeken European Council in 2001, the social 
partners made a joint declaration outlining their intention to develop their own 
instruments modelled upon ‘the OMC’.21 In similarity with institutional variants 
of the OMC, new generation texts are used for benchmarking and target 
setting, peer review, and the exchange of best practice. There are currently 
790 new generation texts listed in the Commission’s database. These 
instruments are commonly considered examples of social partner ‘soft law’. 
 
Conventional readings of the social dialogue suggest the development of 
instruments such as new generation texts and autonomous agreements are the 
result of a political climate within the Union unfavourable to social legislation.22 
Indeed, its stalled output in terms of agreements implemented by Council 
Directive, the last of which was reached at cross-industry level on fixed-term 
work in 1999,23 has been cited as evidence of a change in approach on behalf 
of the Commission.24 Action in support of the conclusion of agreements, such 
as the threat of legislation,25 has not been forthcoming since the revision of the 
parental leave directive in 2009.26 Furthermore, the use of the social dialogue 
                                                        
21 ETUC, UNICE, CEEP, ‘Joint contribution by the social partners to the Laeken 
European Council’ <http://erc-online.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/2007-01093-
EN.pdf> accessed 28 November 2017. 
22 Christophe Degryse, ‘Historical and Institutional Background to the Cross-industry 
Social Dialogue’ in Anne Dunfresne et. al. (eds), The European Sectoral Social 
Dialogue (Peter Lang 2006). 
23 Although the parental leave directive was revised in 2009, it is not considered a new 
agreement; Council Directive 1999/70/EC concerning the Framework Agreement on 
Fixed-term Work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP (OJ [1999] L175/43). 
24 Degryse (n 22) 31. 
25 Also referred to by the maxim ‘you negotiate or we legislate’. 
26 Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised Framework 
Agreement on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP 
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as a alternative to the community method has been all but superseded by 
modes of governance modelled upon the OMC.27 
 
However, such readings lead to a somewhat fatalistic view of the social 
dialogue; whereby through regulating in accordance with their own procedures 
and practices, the representatives of labour, in particular, are making the most 
of a bad situation (i.e. the limited likelihood of their actions being transposed by 
Council Directive). Conversely, one can suggest this reality has been 
embraced by the social partners, as they have purposely chosen to utilise the 
framework of social dialogue to negotiate and conclude agreements 
independently of the institutions of the Union. Furthermore, forums such as the 
social dialogue committees also appear to have been repurposed towards 
these ends (e.g. a significant number of new generation texts and seven out of 
eight agreements have been reached within their auspices).  
 
7.3.1 Hidden Dynamics 
 
This alternative reading is neglected within scholarship on the social dialogue. 
Importantly to the detriment of a clearer understanding of its operation and thus 
its potential for the establishment of an EU minima. 
 
One the surface, this appears to be an act of opportunism by the social 
partners, locked out of a policy process post-99’ that has proven unfavourable 
to social issues, they have sought to repurpose the social dialogue to support 
their own actions. Importantly, a similar situation is visible with regard to 
European Works Councils. 
Multinational companies and trade unions have driven their development from 
forums for worker information and consultation to the conclusion of agreements 
                                                                                                                                                                 
and ETUC and repealing Directive 96/34/EC (Text with EEA relevance) (OJ [2010] 
L68/13). 
27 E.g. the European Employment Strategy and the OMC in Social Protection and 
Social Inclusion (both of which are now a part of the Europe 2020 strategy and the 
yearly European Semester). 
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(which was not the intention of legislators during the drafting of the directive).28 
Labour lawyers have suggested this is as example of ‘normative self-service’, 
“whereby social norms draw their legitimacy from an institutional framework”.29 
 
This view is reinforced by the ‘forum shopping’ of representatives of labour. 
Depending upon the issue under review, other routes inside and outside of the 
institutional and policy framework of the Union are also considered for 
regulation. Here, examples include informal modes of governance such as 
wage coordination. European industry federations have created networks of 
national affiliates with the intention of influencing the outcome of domestic 
collective bargaining rounds.30 Importantly, to aid their perceived legitimacy, 
rules such as inflation plus productivity are subject to monitoring processes 
similar to those employed under the OMC (although their normative force is a 
ultimately drawn from national legal systems). 
 
This complexity, in terms of processes, but also extending to the actors and 
norms, involved in the operation of industrial relations, is well known to experts 
in the field. However, research on each aspect is almost exclusively 
undertaken in isolation, without regard for the possibility for interaction 
(especially at the European level). Here, sociologists working on issues of legal 
pluralism have challenged lawyers to take situations of normativity more 
seriously.31 
 
 
 
                                                        
28 So-called ‘transnational company agreements’ have been concluded on a variety of 
issues (although they mainly cover corporate social responsibility). 
29 Alain Supiot, ‘Du nouveau au self-service normatif : la responsabilité sociale des 
entreprises’ in Etudes offertes à Jean Pélissier, Analyse juridique et valeurs en droit 
social (Dalloz 2004) 541 – 548. 
30 Examples include the initiatives of the Doorn Group and the European 
Metalworkers’ Federation discussed in the previous chapter. 
31 See Saskia Sassen, Territory – Authority – Rights: From Medieval to Global 
Assemblages (Princeton University Press 2006). 
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7.4 Transnational labour law 
 
Literature on legal pluralism has recently caught the attention of scholars 
investigating the emergence of transnational law and what it means for 
workers.32 This builds upon the research of Zumbansen, operationalising his 
approach towards the achievement of objectives related to the furtherance of 
social/economic justice.33 Drawing upon the work of De Sousa Santos, Blackett 
and Trebilcock frame their conceptualisation of transnational labour law in 
terms of its potential to provide “spaces for and strategies of counter-
hegemony wherever they may be found”.34 Importantly, they recognise this may 
“develop in startlingly unbound ways”, both in terms of the objectives pursued 
and methods used by representatives of labour.35 
 
Viewed in this way, the fragmentation of law provides labour with new 
opportunities “through opening up an included middle where multivalent 
options are available”.36 Whether between public/private power, formal/informal 
governance or hard/soft law, all arrangements are legitimate if capable of being 
employed counter-hegemonically; understood as prioritising the transnational 
interests of labour over those of capital.37 This includes diverse objectives 
related to the furtherance of social/economic justice. For example, inter- vs. 
intra-union solidarity or distributive vs. integrative bargaining.  
 
When read against the discussion above, on the development of the social 
dialogue, its potential as an alternative space for societal governance is 
brought to the fore. The popularity of autonomous agreements amongst the 
representatives of labour can be interpreted as a response to a market-based 
                                                        
32 See Adelle Blackett and Anne Trebilcock (eds), Research Handbook on 
Transnational Labour Law (Edward Elgar 2015) 
33 The descriptive nature of Zumbansen’s account allows for its combination with other 
approaches (including those with a specific normative orientation). 
34 Blackett and Trebilcock (n 32). 
35 ibid. 
36 H. Patrick Glenn, The Cosmopolitan State (OUP 2013) 275. 
37 Blackett and Trebilcock (n 32) 31. 
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form of integration that has prioritised economic over social issues, by 
facilitating the greater mobility of capital (parallels can be drawn with Karl 
Polanyi’s work on social counter-movements; whereby societal actors attempt 
to re-embed the economy within social relations).38 Of particular interest to this 
chapter is the approach of the representatives of labour, who in an attempt to 
address this asymmetry, have developed forms of regulation based upon the 
so-called ‘neo-liberal legal technologies’ favoured by management (of which, 
autonomous agreements and new generations texts are examples).39 
 
Here, descriptions draw parallels with soft law and new governance 
instruments; neither are legally binding or justiciable, and have been 
characterised in opposition to command and control regulation as: 
 
Less rigid, prescriptive, committed to uniform outcomes, and 
hierarchical… than older forms of governance (e.g. hard law Council 
Directives).40 
 
Furthermore, to ensure practical effect, they make use of strategies such as 
benchmarking and target setting, peer review, and the exchange of best 
practice. Multinational companies have been willing to commit to these 
instruments as they convey an intention to act but carry limited sanctions in the 
event of non-compliance. 
 
Conversely, trade unions have employed them in a more offensive manner, for 
regulating issues that have been, or would be, overlooked for legislation at EU-
level. An example, discussed in the next chapter, is the crystalline silica 
                                                        
38 E.g. through the development of the single market; see Karl Polanyi, The Great 
Transformation: The Political and Moral Origins of Our Time (2nd edn, Beacon 2002). 
39 This characterisation is arguably a result of their use towards the deregulation of the 
labour market (in particular, within organisations such as the OECD). 
40 Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott, ‘Introduction: New Governance, Law and 
Constitutionalism’ in Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott (eds), Law and New 
Governance in the EU and US (Hart 2006) 2. 
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agreement, that was initiated by representatives of labour as a response to the 
exclusion of an occupational exposure limit from the Carcinogens and 
Chemical Agents Directives.41 Also, it combines elements of soft law and new 
governance instruments in order to improve the effectiveness of its 
implementation. 
 
Importantly, such arrangements capture what it means to act counter-
hegemonically; in that all methods, irrespective of how they have been used 
previously, should be considered in the pursuit of labour’s and, more broadly, 
civic society’s objectives. However, the potential of any such strategy is 
dependent upon how it is received, requiring insights on transnationalisation to 
be read in light of practical experiences. 
 
7.4.1 Possibilities 
 
The decentering of the state, consequent of a pluralist approach, opens 
governance, specifically by way of traditional legal methods, to instruments 
previously overlooked. Moving away from defining law against politico-
historically contingent institutions, what has been described as the ‘pedigree’ of 
an instrument is no longer important.42 Distinctions between thick/thin, 
formal/informal, and hard/soft, are replaced with a purposive approach toward 
their study, which focuses upon their practical effects. For example, guidelines 
                                                        
41 Directive 2004/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to carcinogens or 
mutagens at work (Sixth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of 
Council Directive 89/391/EEC) (codified version) (Text with EEA relevance) (OJ [2004] 
L229/23); Council Directive 98/24/EC of 7 April 1998 on the protection of the health 
and safety of workers from the risks relating to chemical agents at work (fourteenth 
individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC). 
42 Which is, of course, an illusion to Lon Fuller, see The Morality of Law (Yale 
University Press 1964). 
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are not prima facie inferior to collective agreements, rather they may be the 
most effective form of regulation in a particular situation.43 
 
However, this view is often given short shrift within literature on the social 
dialogue. This is no doubt a consequence of how European industrial relations 
is studied. Here, there is a tendency to focus upon comparisons with national 
systems, rather than its development as a distinct field (in terms of actors, 
norms and processes).44 As such, autonomous agreements are compared to 
national collective agreements, with the former characterised, versus the latter, 
as soft law due to their legal effect (in that they are not viewed as contracts, nor 
is there provision for their extension). Seemingly due to such differences, 
research is quick to cast them as ineffectual. 
 
Within these debates, one can read the prefix ‘soft’ as code for ‘less than…’ 
law. Reflections on the implementation of autonomous agreements suggest 
poor results are attributable to the limited nature of sanctions in the event of 
non-compliance; strategies of naming and shaming are compared to those of 
financial penalties (which are commonly included as provisions in national 
collective agreements). However, these views are based more upon allegiance 
to the canon of labour law, and the protections won at the national level 
through state-based forms of legislation, than scientific investigation of the 
potential of alternative methods of governance. 
 
Neglecting this avenue of enquiry, based upon dogma, is unnecessarily 
limiting. Exploring how autonomous agreements and new generations texts 
could be used to further the objectives of organised labour should be a top 
priority for scholarship. Only by doing so, can the emancipatory potential of the 
                                                        
43 This was the case with the telework agreement in the UK, that was implemented via 
guidelines due to the predominance of enterprise level collective bargaining (and thus 
the difficulty of transposition by way of cross-industry or sectoral level collective 
agreements). 
44 Which has been presented in this chapter as an example of transnationalisation and 
legal pluralism. Conversely, see the rich literature on multi-level governance. 
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social dialogue be realised (i.e. in terms of its functioning as an alternative 
space for societal governance). 
 
Here, research on designing effective and, as a consequence, developing an 
workable proposal for an EU minima should be directed in three areas. 
 
Firstly, the relationship between autonomous agreements and new generation 
texts and the potential for their use together/in combination warrants further 
investigation. Research in this area has been undertaken from perspectives on 
legal hybridity,45 which focus upon the design of regulation and the interaction 
of policy instruments. For example, the aforementioned autonomous 
agreement on crystalline silica, serves as a framework for feedback processes, 
that provide information which is used to ensure that its objectives remain 
current.46 
 
Secondly, given positive experiences with such experimental forms of 
governance, would transposition by way of Council Directive be encouraged by 
the Commission or, in other words, could autonomous action lay the 
groundwork for legislation? Although, would this be desired by labour if their 
own methods were effective? Thirdly, how does transnationalisation effect the 
social dialogue more broadly? Based upon this approach, is it possible to view 
its operation in isolation from other modes of governance within a multi-level 
system of European industrial relations? What are the synergies between 
these and how could they be exploited to the advantage of the representatives 
of labour? 
 
 
 
                                                        
45 See George Wilson, ‘The View from Law and New Governance: A Critical Appraisal 
of Hybridity in Peace and Development Studies’ in Nicolas Lemay-Hebert and Rosa 
Freedman (eds) Hybridity: Law, Culture and Development (Routledge 2017). 
46 E.g. site-level experiences with monitoring protocols that are intended to reduce 
exposure to dust. 
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7.4.2 Dependencies 
 
Importantly, the decentering of the state does not disregard its facilitative role; 
meaning that although no longer a point of reference for understanding what 
law is, the success of autonomous forms of ordering are still dependent upon 
its support (whether directly through Member States or more indirectly through 
the Union). Indeed, the implementation of autonomous agreements under 
Article 154(4) TFEU relies upon national unions affiliated with peak-level 
European industry federations. 
 
Once reached at EU-level, autonomous agreements are not directly effective 
but require transposition by way of collective agreement in each Member State. 
However, the heterogeneity of industrial relations traditions within the Union 
challenges the effectiveness of this method. Systems of company level 
bargaining, coupled with poor articulation between levels, make transposition 
especially difficult. For example, with regard to central and eastern European 
Member States, significant replication would be required in order to ensure 
meaningful coverage. Moreover, this is without considering low, and declining, 
trade union density. 
 
With regard to EU-level industrial relations, a recurrent theme is the need for 
support (e.g. through capacity building initiatives, legal aid, and financing 
programmes). However, experience with the autonomous route of the social 
dialogue directs attention towards a different strategy; being the avoidance of 
the Member States. Recently, the implementation of agreements has been 
attempted by directly issuing multinational companies with guidelines, rather 
than pursuing transposition in “accordance with the procedures and practices 
specific to management and labour”. In effect, bypassing employers’ 
associations and trade unions in Member States. 
 
Importantly, such strategies reintroduce dependence but at the level of the 
Union. The Commission provides the fora, through the Social Dialogue 
Committee (SDCs), at both cross-industry and sectoral levels, in which 
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management and labour meet.47 Since their establishment, almost all 
agreements have been reached within SDCs. This popularity is no doubt a 
result of the role they play in facilitating negotiation but the official recognition 
of both sides of industry is dependent upon their participation. Which, in turn, is 
a perquisite for further technical, legal, and financial support.48 Without SDCs, it 
is likely agreements would be restricted to well organised sectors, with a 
tradition of transnational action e.g. in metalworking not hairdressing. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
Adopting transnational legal pluralism as approach to the study of the social 
dialogue sheds light upon the complexity, which is often overlooked, involved in 
its operation (in terms of actors, norms and processes). It recognises the 
myriad forms of regulatory innovation and interaction illustrative of the 
transformation of rule-making in the ongoing process of globalisation or ever 
closer political and economic union.49 Distinctions between thick/thin, 
formal/informal, and hard/soft, are replaced with a purposive approach towards 
the study of law, that focuses upon its practical effects; encouraging 
experimentation with previously overlooked forms of regulation. Importantly, 
this approach alerts law-makers to the potential for interaction to occur 
between different types of legal instruments which, to-date, has often been 
overlooked. 
 
For the idea of an EU minimum wage policy, this directs the social partners to 
take advantage of the full panoply of governance instruments they have 
developed in furtherance of outlining a workable policy; autonomous 
agreements must not be viewed as the only possible option nor as being siloed 
                                                        
47 Decision 98/500/EC of 20 May 1998 on the establishment of Sectoral Dialogue 
Committees Promoting the Dialogue between the Social Partners at European Level 
(OJ [1998] L225). 
48 Which can take the form of funding for research projects, financial programmes for 
joint actions, seconding staff to help with the drafting of agreements etc. 
49 With regard to the potential future direction of the Union. 
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from recent developments (i.e. new generation texts based upon open method 
of coordination-type processes). 
 
Importantly, this point is picked-up in the next chapter on design, which 
explores how new generation texts and autonomous agreements could be 
combined to improve the effectiveness of an EU minima (and to flesh out how it 
would operate in practice). This is vitally important when considered in light of 
the issues raised in this chapter. Here, the effective implementation of 
autonomous agreements under Article 154(4) TFEU relies upon national 
unions affiliated with peak-level European industry federations; with the 
success of joint actions dependent upon institutional forms of support (whether 
directly through Member States or more indirectly through the Union). 
 
Especially noteworthy for the development of transnational legal pluralism – as 
a theory – is how its application to the social dialogue illustrates its limitations, 
specifically, its underestimation of the continuing importance of the state. This 
point is not recognised in current literature and serves to illustrate the 
methodological value of using empirical evidence – by way of the case study of 
the social dialogue – to inform the development of (legal) theory. 
 
With regards to the social dialogue, although without a monopoly on 
normativity, the state still has significant powers of support. As work on 
commercial arbitration illustrates,50 such situations direct attention towards the 
relative autonomy of legal fields and their connections to the state; serving to 
facilitate industrial democracy rather than directing industrial action 
(interestingly, this casts legal pluralism, in particular, as a third way political 
theory, attempting to chart a pathway between strategies of intervention and 
abstention). 
 
                                                        
50 See Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial 
Arbitration and the Creation of a Transnational Legal Order (University of Chicago 
Press 1996). 
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This can manifest itself not only through technical, legal, and financial support 
etc. but also administrative law concerns e.g. regarding the representativeness 
of those involved in the conclusion of agreements, and whether they are 
undertaken in conformity with fundamental economic and social rights. 
Structures addressing these concerns have been developed by the 
Commission, however, they would require repurposing in order to more fully 
support the actions of the social partners. Although it is not possible to resolve 
these issues entirely, they can be partially mitigated against by designing a 
policy that takes into account the reality of regulating in a legal space that is 
fragmented and deeply contested. It is only by doing so that policy proposals in 
this area – like that of an EU minima – can be effective. It is to this endeavour 
that this thesis turns next. 
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8. Designing an EU minimum wage policy 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The real value of this thesis lies in creating a proposal that outlines how an EU 
minimum wage policy could work in practice. As the literature discussed in 
chapter 3 illustrates, this is a notable blind spot in current debates. 
 
As suggested in the previous chapter, it appears that basing a wage norm 
around an autonomous European social partner agreement, reached between 
the social partners within the auspices of the European social dialogue, is a 
promising way forward, however, in order to present a workable proposal, 
attention must be directed towards how it would operate in practice. What role, 
for example, would the EU-level social partners, their national affiliates and 
workers have in setting its value? How would they ensure it is kept up to date 
with wage developments within their industry and how would the effectiveness 
of its implementation be ensured? 
 
This chapter argues that the social partners have the ability to improve the 
effectiveness of their agreements, specifically those implemented 
autonomously, by combining the various policy instruments they have trialled 
since the launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000. This point builds on insights 
from the last chapter on transnational labour law, exploring how the full panoply 
of instruments available to the social partners can be exploited in furtherance 
of developing a workable proposal for an EU minima. 
 
A framework for understanding this combination is developed from literature on 
law and new governance and is used as a basis against which to suggest a 
hybrid regulatory design for an EU minimum wage based on an autonomous 
social partner agreement. This framework is unique and contributes a new 
perspective to the design of regulation, in particular, for European social 
partner agreements, that has not previously been explored. Moreover, this 
unique approach to the design of regulation has potential implications beyond 
suggestions for the design of an EU minima, as a strategy that could be 
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adopted for improving the effectiveness of other agreements (including national 
level collective agreements). 
 
This hybrid approach to the design of regulation is explored through the 
autonomous social partner agreement on crystalline silica, a novel agreement 
that itself has received very little attention from social dialogue scholars and 
regulationists. Its design – whether intentional or not – is subsequently used as 
a basis for outlining what a more comprehensive EU minimum wage policy 
could look like in practice. 
 
8.2 The context of implementation 
 
Of the negotiation, conclusion and implementation of agreements, 
implementation is the weakest aspect of the overall policy cycle. This is 
especially true of agreements implemented via the voluntary route of the 
European social dialogue, where the moral and political obligation for 
implementation by national affiliates is not as strong as the legally binding 
effect of agreements transposed by Council Directive.1 Assessments of the 
autonomous implementation of agreements have been mixed. Research 
conducted on the Telework Agreement shows that the procedures and 
practices used for implementation differed markedly between Member States, 
resulting in ‘gaps’ or uneven implementation.2 Issues including weak linkages 
between bargaining levels and undeveloped systems of industrial relations in 
central and eastern Member States have also been argued to hinder 
implementation.3 
                                                        
1 Stijn Smismans, ‘The European Social Dialogue in the Shadow of Hierarchy’ (2008) 
28(1) Journal of Public Policy 161, 174. 
2 Thomas Prosser, ‘The implementation of the Telework and Work-related Stress 
Agreements: European social dialogue through ‘soft’ law?’ (2011) 17(3) European 
Journal of Industrial Relations 245, 254. 
3 ibid; and more recently see Thomas Prosser, ‘Accounting for National and Sectoral 
Variance in the Implementation of European Social Partner ‘Soft’ Law: The Cases of 
the Implementation of the Telework and Work-Related Stress Agreements’ (2015) 
53(2) British Journal of Industrial Relations 254. 
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These issues were recognised by the Commission at a special conference held 
in March 2015 to mark the new start for the social dialogue. The Commission 
sought to facilitate discussion between itself and the social partners on how to 
strengthen the social dialogue. It committed to “[work] more closely with the 
social partners to improve the quality and effectiveness of the social dialogue 
at all levels”.4 These commitments are to be realised through future capacity 
building initiatives.5 Irrespective of the motivations of the Commission (e.g. 
facilitating the greater involvement of the social partners in policymaking), by 
improving links between bargaining levels and developing industrial relations in 
newer Member States, capacity building can have a positive (indirect) effect 
upon the implementation of autonomous agreements. The response of the 
social partners, though, highlights those areas neglected by the Commission. 
 
The employers’ and employees’ representatives raised concerns regarding the 
overt focus of the new start on procedural issues. The employers’ 
representative BusinessEurope suggested that this was to the detriment of 
having a clear vision of the substantive problems facing Europe (e.g. high 
levels of youth unemployment).6 In the context of the debate on better 
regulation, trade unions argued that insufficient value is attached to high quality 
regulation.7 This directs attention towards a perspective neglected by research 
on implementation: the design of agreements. Previous calls by the European 
Economic and Social Committee for the social partners to utilise all instruments 
available to ensure effective implementation and to “develop current 
                                                        
4 European Commission (n 6). 
5 ibid. 
6 BusinessEurope, ‘Introductory remarks’ (High Level Conference: A new start for 
social dialogue, Brussels, 5 March 2015) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=13590&langId=en> accessed 3 
February 2018. 
7 ETUC, ‘Introductory remarks’, (High Level Conference: A new start for social 
dialogue, Brussels, 5 March 2015) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=13609&langId=en> accessed 3 
February 2018. 
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arrangements further and define new rules for ensuring that their European 
agreements are effectively implemented” speak to this perspective.8 
 
Adopting a design perspective involves creating regulation that effectively 
achieves its policy goals with minimal economic costs and performs well in 
terms of other criteria such as equity and political acceptability.9 Regulationists 
also stress the importance of using multiple policy instruments in combination 
and involving a broad range of actors in developing effective regulation.10 This 
implies a micro rather than macro focus upon the operation of social dialogue, 
investigating the ways in which the functioning of agreements can be tailored to 
promote, amongst other concerns, effective implementation. With regard to the 
voluntary route of the social dialogue, specific considerations include the 
relationship between autonomous agreements and ‘new generation texts’ 
modelled upon the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), and between actors 
established at company, sector and cross-industry levels. 
 
Now is an appropriate time to develop a perspective on the design of regulation 
specific to the European social dialogue; not only in the pursuit of a more 
comprehensive EU minimum wage policy but also in order to improve 
effectiveness of existing agreements. The new start for the social dialogue 
appears to change little in respect of the Commission’s willingness to involve 
the social partners as co-regulators in the social policy field. The last genuine 
cross-industry agreement implemented by Council Directive was the 
Framework Agreement on Fixed-Term Work in 1999.11 The voluntary route of 
the social dialogue has suffered similar problems, with regulation on core 
labour law issues failing to materialise without pressure from the Commission 
                                                        
8 European Economic and Social Committee, Social dialogue in the context of EMU 
(2014) SOC/507 6. 
9 Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental 
Policy (OUP 1998) 4. 
10 ibid. 
11 Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1990 concerning the framework agreement on 
fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNCIE and CEEP (OJ [1999] L175/43). 
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for the representatives of management to negotiate with those of labour. The 
recent controversy over the transposition of the Hairdressing Agreement is 
perhaps illustrative of the future challenges agreements submitted to the 
Commission after voluntary negotiation will face in light of the better regulation 
agenda.12 
 
A better understanding of how to design agreements holds the promise of 
improving the ability of the social partners to reach their goals in light of these 
challenges. Agreements designed to take full advantage of the policy 
instruments and actors available to the social partners could overcome 
problems with implementation and contribute towards the development of the 
voluntary route of the social dialogue as an alternative space for societal 
governance (with implementation by the national affiliates of the social partners 
a viable alternative to that by Council Directive). Similar policy instruments and 
proposals for their combination have been explored in literature on law and 
new governance. 
 
8.3 Combining policy instruments 
 
With a view to the Laeken European Council in 2001, the social partners made 
a joint declaration outlining their intention to develop policy instruments 
modelled upon the OMC.13 This was later endorsed by the Commission who 
considered the “use of… machinery based upon the open method of 
coordination as an extremely promising way forward” for the European social 
dialogue and directed the social partners to “adapt the open method of 
coordination to their relations in all appropriate areas”.14 Developing policy 
                                                        
12 Krzysztof Bandasz, ‘A framework agreement in the hairdressing sector: the 
European social dialogue at a crossroads (2014) 20(4) Transfer: European Review of 
Labour and Research 1, 16. 
13 ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, ‘Joint contribution by the social partners to the Laeken 
European Council’ <http://erc-online.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/2007-01093-
EN.pdf> accessed 3 February 2018. 
14 European Commission, The European social dialogue, a force for innovation and 
change COM (2002) 341 final 19. 
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instruments based upon the OMC was seen as a way of managing some of the 
problems with implementation associated with enlargement.15 
 
Commonly known as ‘new generation texts’, these policy instruments share 
similarities with institutional variants of the OMC – such as the European 
Employment Strategy – and are characterised by the use of benchmarking and 
target setting, evaluation by way of peer review, and the exchange of best 
practice.16 The Commission broadly distinguishes between three types of new 
generation text: ‘process-oriented texts’ that contain provisions mandating 
separate processes to monitor implementation, including frameworks of action, 
codes of conduct, guidelines, and policy orientations; ‘joint opinions and tools’, 
including policy opinions, declarations, and training materials; and ‘procedural 
texts’ that detail the procedural rules to be followed for cross-industry and 
sectoral social dialogue.17 The Commission also differentiates between policy 
instruments that outline ‘reciprocal commitments’ (e.g. autonomous 
agreements and process-oriented texts) and ‘common positions’ (e.g. joint 
opinions).18 
 
In contrast to agreements implemented by Council Directive, autonomous 
agreements and new generation texts are considered examples of ‘soft’ law.19 
According to international relations literature, soft law is characterised as non-
legally binding but as capable of having practical effect.20 Conversely, ‘hard’ 
law is characterised as legally binding, precise and for which the power for 
                                                        
15 Degryse (n 4) 34. 
16 On the OMC and social policy see Mark Dawson, New Governance and the 
Transformation of European Law: Coordinating EU Social Law and Policy (CUP 
2011). 
17 European Commission, Partnership for change in an enlarged Europe – Enhancing 
the contribution of the European social dialogue COM (2004) 557 final 15 – 19. 
18 ibid. 
19 See Philippe Pochet, ‘European Social Dialogue between Hard and Soft Law’ 
(EUSA Tenth Biennial Conference, Montreal, May 2007). 
20 See Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance’ (2000) 54(3) International Organization 421 
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implementation and interpretation is delegated.21 New generation texts belong 
to the family of ‘new’ governance instruments developed by the EU in the early 
2000s. In addition to the description of soft law above, new governance 
instruments are said to be “less rigid, less prescriptive, less committed to 
uniform outcomes, and less hierarchical in nature” than old(er) forms of 
governance (e.g. hard law Council Directives).22 
 
8.3.1 Hybridity, law and new governance 
 
Research on hybridity and the relationship between law and new governance 
provides a starting point for understanding the proposed use of autonomous 
agreements and new generation texts together. De Búrca and Scott suggest 
that law may be blind to new governance (the ‘gap’ thesis), that law and new 
governance may coexist and engage with one another (the ‘hybridity’ thesis), 
or that new governance has demanded, and will increasingly demand, a 
reconceptualisation of our understanding of law (the ‘transformation’ thesis).23 
In relation to their hybridity thesis, de Búrca and Scott identify three types of 
hybridity: fundamental/baseline hybridity; instrumental/developmental hybridity; 
and default hybridity.24 However, descriptive and conceptual issues with this 
research must be resolved before it can serve as a basis for the design of an 
EU minimum wage policy. 
 
The implicit equation of law with hard law and new governance with soft law by 
this research is particularly problematic. Substituting hard law with autonomous 
agreements causes descriptive inaccuracies. As sources of norms, 
autonomous agreements are similar to collective agreements in Member 
States, in that they often serve a procedural function, but differ in that they very 
                                                        
21 ibid. 
22 Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott, ‘Introduction: New Governance, Law and 
Constitutionalism’ in Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott (eds), Law and New 
Governance in the EU and US (Hart 2006) 2. 
23 ibid 4 – 10. 
24 ibid 6 – 9. 
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rarely serve a normative or contractual function.25 Established practice 
amongst the social partners is for their use as non-legally binding reciprocal 
commitments. 
 
Suggesting that autonomous agreements and new generation texts exist along 
a continuum of legality between the poles of hard and soft law goes part way 
towards mitigating against these descriptive inaccuracies but creates 
conceptual problems. As ideal-types, the properties of hard and soft law take 
the form of ‘logical opposites’. Their combination creates incoherence: 
centralisation is pitted against decentralisation; singular against multi-level 
authority; command against deliberation; rigid and stable against flexible and 
revisable norms etc.26 Either the properties of each are mixed e.g. creating 
norms that are deliberatively produced but rigidly applied, or matched e.g. 
creating norms that are relatively (in)flexible.27 The fixation within the academy 
on the terms hard and soft law has limited the potential of research on 
hybridity, law and new governance.28 Redirecting its focus towards instruments 
of governance, as opposed to typologies of law, is a solution to this problem 
and allows for the application of this research to the social dialogue.29 
                                                        
25 Simon Deakin and Gillian Morris, Labour Law (6th edn, Hart 2012) 68 – 69. For an 
alternative view on the contractual effect of autonomous agreements see Dagmar 
Sheikh, ‘Autonomous Collective Agreements as a Regulatory Devise in European 
Labour Law: How to Read Article 138 EC’ (2005) 34(1) Industrial Law Journal 23, 47. 
26 Neil Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and New Governance in the European Union: 
Rethinking the Boundaries’ (2005) EUI Working Paper Law No. 2005/15 7. 
27 ibid. 
28 On the false distinction between hard and soft law see Mark Dawson, ‘Soft Law and 
the Rule of Law in the European Union’ in Antoine Vauchez and Bruno de Witte (eds), 
Lawyering Europe: European Law as a Transnational Social Field (Hart 2013) 221. 
29 A similar extension of de Búrca and Scott’s work has been made by Ter Haar and 
Copeland but to modes, rather than instruments, of governance and has subsequently 
been considered by Armstrong. See Beryl Ter Harr and Paul Copeland, ‘EU Youth 
Policy: A Waterfall of Softness’ (EUSA Twelfth Biennial Conference, Boston, March 
2011); Kenneth Armstrong, ‘EU social policy and the governance architecture of 
Europe 2020’ (2012) 18(3) Transfer 285; and Kenneth Armstrong, ‘New Governance 
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8.3.2 (Re)developing hybridity 
 
Of de Búrca and Scott’s types of hybridity, instrumental/developmental 
hybridity best captures the interaction between autonomous agreements and 
new generation texts necessary for their successful combination. When 
adapted for the social dialogue, instrumental/developmental hybridity stipulates 
a relationship whereby autonomous agreements provide a dynamic framework 
for the operation of new generation texts.30 This could manifest itself as a new 
generation text providing information as a mandated implementation monitoring 
process that is subsequently used in the development of an autonomous 
agreement; for example, a specific provision, goal or the overall structure of the 
agreement. This potential for ‘transformation’ resulting from hybridity is 
recognised by Trubek and Trubek, who focus upon “situations of real 
integration and mutual dependence” between law and new governance.31 
Hybridity is thus cast as a theory capable of accounting for change beyond the 
initial combination of law and new governance, to their progressive 
development together. 
 
This understanding of hybridity is similar to that expressed in literature on post-
colonial theory, in particular, post-colonial cultural theory, with regard to 
modern cultural, social and political relationships.32 Here, Peterson explains 
that the appropriation and development of the term in post-colonial cultural 
                                                                                                                                                                 
and the European Union: An Empirical and Conceptual Critique’ in Gráinne de Búrca, 
Claire Kilpatrick and Joanne Scott (eds), Critical Legal Perspectives on Global 
Governance: Liber Amicorum David M Trubek (Hart 2014) 249. 
30 de Búrca and Scott (n 22) 8. 
31 David Trubek and Louise Trubek, ‘New Governance & Legal Regulation: 
Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation’ (2007) University of Wisconsin Law 
School Legal Studies Research Paper Series Paper No. 1047 (this quote 
accompanies the text with footnote 10). 
32 See George Wilson, ‘The View from Law and New Governance: A Critical Appraisal 
of Hybridity in Peace and Development Studies’ in Nicolas Lemay-Hebert and Rosa 
Freedman (eds), Hybridity: An Interdisciplinary Perspective (Routledge: GlassHouse 
Series 2017). 
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theory has “found increasing currency in the analysis of externally driven peace 
and development interventions”.33 Indeed, Richmond and Mitchell describe 
how the process of ‘hybridization’ occurs at the ‘site’ where international peace 
interventions meet “the every-day activities, needs, interests and experiences 
of local groups”.34 This conceptualisation – of hybridity occurring between 
different entities or groups, unequal in terms of power – is most commonly 
associated with the work of Homi Bhabha. 
 
For Bhabha, hybridity occurs within a ‘third space’, between the dominant and 
subaltern.35 It results from an “immanent difference, distortion and fracture”36 
within identities, that creates a ‘contact zone’37 for relationships between 
identities. This is said to allow both influence over each another and,38 as 
claimed by Bhabha, for “the possibility of a cultural hybrid that entertains 
difference without an assumed or imposed hierarchy”.39 Freedman suggests 
that Bhabha’s contact zone may be a metaphorical or a physical space,40 in the 
case of the latter, enabling his work to be extended along 
structural/functionalist lines to hybrid norms and institutions. However, this 
                                                        
33 Jenny H. Peterson, ‘A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity: Accounting for Notions of 
Power, Politics and Progress in Analyses of Aid-Driven Interfaces’ (2012) 7(2) Journal 
of Peacebuilding & Development 9, 11. 
34 Oliver P. Richmond and Audra Mitchell, ‘Introduction – Towards a Post-Liberal 
Peace: Exploring Hybridity via Everyday Forms of Resistance, Agency and Autonomy’ 
in Oliver P. Richmond and Audra Mitchell (eds), Hybrid Forms of Peace: From 
Everyday Agency to Post Liberalism (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 1. 
35 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (Routledge 1994) 52-56. 
36 Gëzim Visoka, ‘Three Levels of Hybridisation Practices in Post-conflict Kosovo’ 
(2012) 7(2) Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 23, 25. 
37 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, Post-Colonial Studies: The Key 
Concepts (Routledge 2000) 118. 
38 Visoka (n 36) 25. 
39 Bhabha (n 35) 4. 
40 Rosa Freedman, ‘‘Third Generation’ Rights: Is There Room for Hybrid Constructs 
Within International Human Rights Law?’ (2013) 2(4) Cambridge Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 935, 941. 
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development is still premised upon an implicit understanding of hybridity as a 
process of combination. 
 
In response to concerns that Bhabha’s conceptualisation of hybridity leads to 
‘in-betweenness’ or liminality, contemporary accounts have suggested that 
hybridity should be viewed as a process that gives rise to new transcultural 
forms.41 As such, the allure of hybridity appears to lie in its perceived ability to 
transcend absolutes (Western versus non-Western, modern versus traditional, 
universal versus particular) and, in doing so, uncovering and acknowledging 
the complexity or ‘messiness’ of reality. Surprisingly, given the myriad ways in 
which hybridity has been conceptualised, ideas regarding “the series of 
iterations and in-betweens”42 that lead to the creation of hybrids have remained 
somewhat underdeveloped. The division between hybridity as in-betweenness 
and hybridity as a process is apparent in literature on peace and development 
studies.43 
 
The work of Richmond and Mac Ginty, respectively, provides examples of 
these configurations. Richmond’s ‘local-liberal hybridity’ describes the 
relationship between ‘the local’ and ‘the international’, where both co-exist, 
rather than assimilate or dominate.44 Although scope is provided for local 
resistance, modification, and adaptation to the liberal peace, ‘local-liberal’ 
hybridity is said to represent a combination of different political practices.45 Mac 
Ginty’s ‘hybrid peace’ considers the role of agency and structure in the process 
of hybridisation, including the power of liberal agents to enforce and incentivise 
compliance and local actors to resist and maintain alternatives.46 These 
                                                        
41 Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin (n 16) 118. 
42 Peterson (n 33) 12. 
43 Visoka (n 36) 25. 
44 Oliver P. Richmond, ‘Resistance and Post-liberal Peace’ (2010) 38(3) Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 665, 687. 
45 Oliver P. Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace (Routledge 2011) 189. 
46 Roger Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms 
of Peace (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 69. 
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processes are presented as taking place against a background of conflict and 
disparities in power between liberal agents and local actors.47 
 
As Freedman recognises, hybridity can thus be understood in multiple ways: 
either as a theory, as a process and/or as an entity.48 The result is a trade-off: 
as hybridity becomes more conceptually inclusive, its explanatory potential is 
diminished. Kraidy’s challenge for scholars to develop “tools to tackle [this] 
vexing ambiguity”49 must be accepted. Literature from law and new 
governance and peace and development studies considers hybrid entities as 
outputs but approaches the inputs of theory and process in different ways.50 
Whereas research has often focussed upon hybridity as a process of 
combination, little work has been undertaken on the transformative potential of 
hybridisation. Here, Trubek and Trubek’s research on the transformative 
potential of hybridity is the exception and can be interpreted as a call for 
conceptual clarity, for hybridity to be elevated from its use to describe the 
combination of two entities, to the creation of a new distinct entity. Given the 
significance attributed to the term, a distinction can be drawn between those 
theories that advance only a ‘partial’ understanding of hybridity and those that 
invest more in its ability to serve as a descriptive and normative frame of 
reference for the investigation and design of regulation. 
 
This modest contribution to legal theory has the potential to have a significant 
impact upon the design of social partner agreements. Designing regulation on 
this basis holds the promise of improving the implementation of autonomous 
agreements and, as a consequence, the potential success of an EU minima. 
Towards this end, consideration must be given to the individual properties of 
each governance instrument in order to create a governance architecture that 
facilitates hybridity. However, it is also possible that transformative hybridity 
                                                        
47 ibid. 
48 Freedman (n 40) 940-42. 
49 Kraidy 70. 
50 Hybridity as understood in terms of inputs and outputs is developed by Freedman (n 
40) 940-41. 
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may be achieved based upon the development of an existing relationship of 
partial hybridity between an autonomous agreement and new generation text. 
This has been described as a process of ‘programmatic development’,51 
whereby transformative hybridity develops through progressive stages with the 
operation of law and new governance together. The autonomous social partner 
agreement on crystalline silica is the only agreement, including those 
implemented by Council Directive, to display hybridity in this form. The 
agreement is explored below as potential mode for the design of an EU 
minima. 
 
8.4 The Crystalline Silica Agreement 
 
The ‘Agreement on Workers Health Protection Through the Good Handling and 
Use of Crystalline Silica and Products Containing it’,52 was originally signed 
between 15 European employers’ organisations and 2 European industry 
federations from the chemical and metallurgical industries on 24th April 2006. 
With the signature of the European Expanded Clays Association on 17th June 
2009, the agreement is estimated to cover more than 2 million workers in an 
industry worth over €250 billion.53 To date, very little research has been 
conducted on the operation of the agreement. Although its unique institutional 
features have been recognised,54 it has not been investigated from a legal or, 
indeed, regulatory design perspective. 
 
The main aim of the Crystalline Silica Agreement is to minimise exposure to 
respirable crystalline silica at work, by applying good practices in order to 
                                                        
51 See Wilson (n 32). 
52 Agreement on Workers Health Protection through the Good Handling and Use of 
Crystalline Silica and Products containing it (OJ [2006] C279/2) (Crystalline Silica 
Agreement). 
53 NEPSI, ‘Welcome to the NEPSI Website’ <http://www.nepsi.eu> accessed 3 
February 2018. 
54 Marco Peruzzi, ‘Autonomy in European Social Dialogue’ (2001) 27(1) International 
Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 3, 18. 
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prevent, eliminate or reduce potential health risks to exposed workers.55 
Crystalline silica – simply understood as fine grain sand – is used in multiple 
industries in the production of products such as bricks, cement and glass. 
Inhalation of crystalline silica can lead to the development of silicosis and, 
consequently, an increased risk of lung cancer.56 In recent years, respirable 
crystalline silica has been likened to asbestos with the number of claims for 
exposure rising significantly (especially in the United States).57 An ancillary aim 
of the agreement is to increase knowledge of these potential health risks and to 
promote the use of good practices.58 Recent research on the application of the 
agreement in Finland has shown that over the course of its operation, 
workplace exposure to respirable crystalline silica has decreased ten-fold.59 
 
Negotiations on the Crystalline Silica Agreement were initiated in 2003 by the 
European Silica Producers Association in response to the EU Scientific 
Committee on Occupational Exposure Limits’ recommendation that an 
occupational exposure limit (OEL) be introduced for respirable crystalline 
silica.60 There is currently no harmonised OEL for respirable crystalline silica at 
EU-level, however all Member States apart from Germany have their own 
national limits. Respirable crystalline silica is exempt from registration under 
REACH, whereas it has become standard practice, although not legally 
necessary, for it to be labelled as ‘STOT RE Category 1’ under the 
Classification, Labelling and Packaging Regulation (STOT stands for ‘Specific 
                                                        
55 Crystalline Silica Agreement, Article 1. 
56 See Claudio Peluccchi et al., ‘Occupational silica exposure and lung cancer risk: a 
review of epidemiological studies 1996 – 2005’ (2006) 17(7) Annals of Oncology 1039. 
57 The Actuary, ‘Is silica the new asbestos?’ <http://www.theactuary.com/archive/old-
articles/part-6/is-silica-the-new-asbestos-3F/> accessed 3 February 2018. 
58 Crystalline Silica Agreement, Article 1. 
59 See Tapani Tuomi et al., ‘Application of Good Practices as Described by the NEPSI 
Agreement Coincides With a Strong Decline in the Exposure to Respiratory Crystalline 
Silica in Finnish Workplaces’ (2014) 58(7) The Annuls of Occupational Hygiene 806. 
60 Scientific Committee on Occupational Exposure Limits, Recommendation for silica, 
crystalline (respirable dust) (2002) SCOEL/SUM/94 final. 
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Target Organ Toxicity’ and RE for ‘Repeated Exposure’).61 Debates continue 
within the context of the revision of the Carcinogens Directive regarding 
whether respirable crystalline silica should be included as a carcinogen or 
rather an OEL set under the Chemical Agents Directive.62 A similar threat of 
EU legislation motivated Eurosil to propose the Crystalline Silica Agreement 
and negotiate its form with the European industry federations (a typical 
example of the ‘shadow of the law’ or the maxim ‘you negotiate or we 
legislate’).63 
 
The Crystalline Silica Agreement is unique in many respects: it was the first 
multi-sectoral autonomous agreement; is implemented through a network of 
links from site to European sector level by a bipartite council (unlike 
agreements implemented in accordance with national procedures and 
practices as per Article 155(2) TFEU); and has been adopted as a blueprint for 
similar regulation outside of the EU.64 The agreement was concluded 
                                                        
61 Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, 
amending and repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EEC, and amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (Text with EEA relevance) (OJ [2008] L353/1). 
62 Directive 2004/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to carcinogens or 
mutagens at work (Sixth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of 
Council Directive 89/391/EEC) (codified version) (Text with EEA relevance) (OJ [2004] 
L229/23); and Council Directive 98/24/EC of 7 April 1998 on the protection of the 
health and safety of workers from the risks relating to chemical agents at work 
(fourteenth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 
89/391/EEC (OJ [1998] L131/110. On the revision of the Carcinogens Directive see 
Tony Musu, ‘Revision of the Carcinogens Directive: anything happening?’ (HesaMag 
Autumn/Winter 2013) 
<http://www.etui.org/content/download/12306/105754/file/HESAmag_08_EN.pdf> 
accessed 3 February 2018. 
63 Brian Bercusson, ‘The Dynamic of European Labour Law After Maastricht’ (1994) 
23(1) Industrial Law Journal 1, 20. 
64 The agreement has been applied in Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, Turkey and the 
USA. 
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independently of the sectoral social dialogue committees, although the social 
partners received financial help and technical assistance from the Commission. 
In a somewhat unusual move, employers’ associations that were not 
recognised as social partners were granted temporary recognition by the 
Commission for the purpose of the negotiations. The Commission has since 
referred to the agreement as innovative,65 whilst former Commissioner for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Vladimír Špidla, 
commented at its signing that it was dynamic and a good example of 
partnership.66 
 
8.4.1 Hybrid architecture 
 
Until now the uniqueness of the agreement’s governance architecture has not 
been recognised and, as such, has not been investigated. The relationship 
between the agreement and the new generation texts it utilises can be 
described with reference to de Búrca and Scott’s work on hybridity. This 
appears to be unintentional with no evidence of ex ante design but, given the 
relative success of the agreement, provides important insights into how an EU 
minima could be designed in order to improve its functioning (specifically 
efforts to improve implementation). 
 
The Crystalline Silica Agreement is structured around a bipartite council that is 
responsible for, amongst other considerations, implementation and application. 
Known as the NEPSI council – an acronym for the ‘European Network for 
Silica’ resulting from the agreement – the body serves as an important bridge 
between the provisions of the agreement and the various new generation texts 
                                                        
65 NEPSI, ‘Reading Guidelines’ 
<http://www.nepsi.eu/media/2481/nepsi_reading_guidelines.pdf> accessed 3 
February 2016. 
66 Vladimír Špidla, ‘Keynote Address’ (‘Signing ceremony of the Agreement on 
Workers Health Protection through the Good Handling and Use of Crystalline Silica 
and Products Containing it’, Brussels, 25 April 2006) 
<http://www.nepsi.eu/media/2487/2006-04-25_spidla.pdf> accessed 3 February 2018. 
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it utilises. The agreement requires a risk assessment be performed at site level 
for potential exposure to respirable crystalline silica dust, followed by the 
organisation of health surveillance should it be required (this is in addition to 
the implementation of the good practices as held in the good practice guide). 
The NEPSI council is responsible for reviewing the agreement every two years 
from site to European sector level. 
 
The structure of the agreement’s operation is detailed in the graphic below: 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.nepsi.eu/agreement-good-practice-guide/agreement.aspx  
 
When viewed through the lens of control theory,67 the agreement and the 
resulting NEPSI council can be understood as serving a command and control 
function; providing a framework for structuring interaction with new generation 
texts. The (re)developed account of hybridity presented above recognises that 
hierarchy is not a property restricted to traditional hard law instruments but that 
soft law instruments, such as autonomous agreements, are also capable of 
performing a similar function. 
 
                                                        
67 See Colin Scott, ‘The Governance of the European Union: The Potential for Multi-
Level Control’ (2002) 8(1) European Law Journal 59, 64. 
Biennial report by the NEPSI council on the application of the agreement and good practices
Monitoring of the application of the agreement and the good practices
Provision of information, training and instruction to the workforce
Organisation of health surveillance
Implementation of good practices
Performance of risk assessment for potential exposure to respirable crystalline silica dust
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Various new governance instruments are utilised by the Crystalline Silica 
Agreement. The main provisions of the agreement are supplemented by 8 
annexes that mandate the use of new generation texts for purposes such as 
monitoring potential exposure to respirable crystalline silica dust and collecting 
information for the biennial reporting exercise on the application of the 
agreement. Of greatest interest is the relationship between the agreement and 
the good practice guide (which is the main instrument for its application). In 
accordance with the Commission’s own categorisation of new generation 
texts,68 good practice guides can be understood as ‘tools’ or, more specifically, 
training materials. 
 
The good practice guide is held under Annex 1 of the Crystalline Silica 
Agreement and contains an introduction to the agreement, silica and the silica 
industry, respirable crystalline silica and its health effects, and advice on risk 
management. The good practice guide also includes a task manual comprised 
of separate task sheets for use at site level, providing general, and more 
specific, guidance for limiting exposure to respirable crystalline silica. Article 
5(3) of the agreement provides that “Annex 1 [containing the good practice 
guide] may be adapted in accordance with the procedure provided for in Annex 
7”. The focus of this procedure is the revision of the task sheets rather than the 
good practice guide in general. Article 1 of Annex 7 encourages employers and 
employees to submit new or revised task sheets to be considered for adoption. 
The NEPSI council makes a decision on the adoption of submitted task sheets 
at the end of its biennial reporting exercise. 
 
Whereas the task sheets held in the good practice guide may be added to or 
altered in light of experience with their application, provision is not made for the 
use of such experience to inform the development of the framework the 
agreement provides or, as transformative hybridity would demand, the broader 
functioning of the agreement e.g. its objectives, definitions, or principles. This 
governance architecture is similar to de Búrca and Scott’s description of 
                                                        
68 European Commission (n 17). 
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situations of fundamental/baseline hybridity;69 whereby new governance 
instruments serve to improve the effectiveness of law e.g. the Crystalline Silica 
Agreement mandates the use of the good practice guide and provides for the 
adaptation of the task sheets in order to improve its implementation. De Búrca 
and Scott argue the dynamic of such relationships is strictly one way;70 the 
agreement can change the new generation text but the reverse is not possible 
(this is similar to early suggestions for the combination of framework 
agreements and OMC-like processes in the social policy field).71 This partial 
form of hybridity is visible upon closer analysis of the agreement and is 
presented below as a basis against which to outline a hybrid governance 
architecture for an EU minimum wage policy. 
 
8.4.2 Operation 
 
Since the entry into force of the Crystalline Silica Agreement ten years ago, the 
NEPSI council has completed its biennial reporting exercise four times. A 
preliminary report on the application of the agreement was published in 2007, 
followed by full reports in 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014. These reports show the 
agreement has reached a stage of maturity; the number of workers covered by 
risk assessments increased by 5% between 2008 and 2014,72 whilst those 
covered by health surveillance increased by 10% during the same period.73 
Importantly, during this time, the number of workers who had been provided 
with information, training and instruction on the task sheets increased from 
44% to 66% of the total workforce.74 
 
                                                        
69 de Búrca and Scott (n 30) 7. 
70 ibid. 
71 Fritz Scharpf, ‘The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of 
Legitimate Diversity’ (2002) 40(4) Journal of Common Market Studies 645, 662. 
72 NEPSI, ‘2014 Executive Summary on the Application of the Agreement’ 
<http://www.nepsi.eu/media/4508/nepsi%202014%20executive%20summary%20publi
c.pdf> accessed 3 February 2018. 
73 ibid. 
74 ibid. 
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Figures from the biennial reports show that as the number of workers provided 
with information, training and instruction on the task sheets has increased, so 
has the number of workers aware of the general principles promoted by the 
agreement (increasing by 22% between 2008 and 2014).75 The task sheets aid 
implementation efforts by involving workers at site level in the application of the 
agreement (the task sheets are based upon the general principles expressed in 
the agreement). The partially hybrid governance architecture of the Crystalline 
Silica Agreement further facilitates the involvement of workers by allowing the 
task sheets to be added to and altered in light of experience with their 
application. The sense of ownership over the agreement this engenders is 
recognised in literature on regulation as being necessary for more effective 
implementation.76 
 
To date task sheets have been added to the good practice guide in 2011 and 
2012. These include guidance on the wet and dry cutting, sanding and grinding 
of materials that produce respirable crystalline silica dust. In 2014, the Belgian 
National Action Committee for Health and Safety in the Construction Industry 
submitted five task sheets for inclusion in the good practice guide but funding 
was not available for their translation into English in order for inclusion. 
Funding difficulties also prevented the translation of the task sheet adopted in 
2012 into all 22 languages of the agreement. 
 
Powers conferred upon the NEPSI council give it considerable influence over 
the future development of the agreement. As suggested in chapter 3, for an EU 
minimum wage policy a similar body, for example, a wage council, should be 
established to deal with the general operation of the agreement and, as 
discussed below, issues of strategic importance such as the level at which 
minimum rates of pay are set. 
 
                                                        
75 ibid. 
76 OECD, Reducing the Risk of Policy Failure: Challenges for Regulatory Compliance 
(OECD 2000) 19 and 26 (which provides an example specific to occupational safety 
and health regulation). 
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For example, in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Crystalline Silica 
Agreement, the NEPSI council may discuss issues of importance for the 
working of the agreement and publish recommendations regarding its possible 
revision. A similar clause in an agreement on an EU mina would allow a wage 
council to suggest amendments to the rates of pay detailed in the agreement. 
A new generation text could be used to allow workers to provide feedback on 
the broader functioning of the agreement e.g. whether its objectives have been 
met and, if so, how they should be revised. Representative of management 
and labour in Member States could provide direct feedback to the wage council 
– via a reporting exercise – on wage developments in linked sectors and 
whether the floor set in the agreement is comparable (and is thus fulfilling its 
main function of fostering solidarity between workers). 
 
A target for wages in the sector the agreement covers, for example, 55% of the 
national median wage in the metalworking sector, could be set as a main 
objective. This figure could serve as a basis for the future revision of the 
agreement, with a commitment to continuous improvement on behalf of 
national social partners who have secured higher pay rates for their 
members.77 Once this target has been met for all workers, the wage council 
could set a higher target in concert with the social partners. 
 
Unlike the partial hybridity displayed by the Crystalline Silica Agreement, this 
proposal is modelled upon a transformative approach to the design of 
regulation; a target wage is set as an objective of the agreement which is then 
subject to periodic review by the social partners in light of experience with its 
operation. This process could be performed by a new generation text that 
requires representative of management and labour in Member States to 
provide feedback on progress towards the target wage and outline their 
                                                        
77 This commitment to continuous improvement and the subsequent discussion of 
democratising regulation is explored in literature on legal experimentalism. For an 
appraisal specific to labour law, see Charles Sabel, Dara O’Rourke and Archon Fung, 
‘Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulation for Continuous Improvement in the Global 
Workplace’ (2000) KSG Working Paper No. 00-010. 
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suggestions regarding its revision to the wage council.78 Furthermore, it could 
be integrated into a biennial reporting exercise (as with the Crystalline Silica 
Agreement). 
 
In keeping with transformative hybridity, the new generation text informs the 
broader functioning of the agreement i.e. the level at which the target wage is 
set. Both governance instruments are mutually dependent upon each other for 
success; in order to maintain a progressive target wage the agreement is 
dependent upon the new generation text for information about the progress of 
national social partners towards this objective, whereas the new generation 
text is dependent upon the agreement to exert pressure on the social partners 
to ensure participation, specifically through the wage council. A situation 
ensues whereby both instruments progressively develop together, with 
changes to one subsequently affecting the other. Unlike partial hybridity, 
transformative hybridity sees the new generation text alter the functioning of 
the agreement e.g. the objective of attaining an initial target value of, for 
example, 55% of the national median wage in the sector concerned. 
 
This hybrid approach to the design of regulation can be said to foster 
ownership amongst those who have a stake in its success. Management and 
labour are directly involved in setting the targets against which they are judged. 
Adapting a new generation text for this purpose, for example, for reporting, 
ensures information is available for the revision of the agreement (regulatory 
failure is often a consequence of norms becoming out-dated over time). 
Changes necessary for the successful operation of the agreement can be 
made without the need for formal renegotiations e.g. a new target wage can be 
suggested by national social partners and set by the wage council rather than 
through the consultation and approval of all signatories to the agreement 
(which is often time consuming). Transformative hybridity sees the agreement 
                                                        
78 This suggestion speaks to the idea of reflexive law and the dual aim of inducing self-
regulatory processes and avoiding over prescription with regard to outcomes. For a 
broad overview specific to labour law, see Ralph Rogowski, Reflexive Labour Law in 
the World Society (Edward Elgar 2013). 
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provide a framework for this interaction, managing ongoing discussions in 
order to facilitate its more effective implementation. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
 
Adopting a hybrid approach to the design of social partner agreements seeks 
to improve implementation by combining the various policy instruments 
available to the social partners since the launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000. 
The framework provided by literature on law and new governance is a useful 
starting point for understanding this combination which, with further 
development, serves as a firm foundation against which to suggest a hybrid 
regulatory design for an EU minimum wage policy (based on an autonomous 
social partner agreement, operating in combination with a series of new 
generation texts). 
 
As experience with the operation of the Crystalline Silica Agreement illustrates, 
there are tangible benefits to be gained from combining the policy instruments 
available to the social partners. New generation texts are especially suited to 
situations that require a differentiated approach to the implementation of 
standards, whilst their employment alongside autonomous agreements allows 
for the retention of centrally set targets. 
 
For the idea of an EU minimum wage policy, this could mean the social 
partners commit to set wages in national-level collective agreements at a rate 
no lower than 55% of the national median wage in Member States but are free 
to suggests revisions to this rate – in cooperation with a centrally organised 
wage council – as and when it is met. National collective agreements also 
appear ripe for similar experimentation with hybridity; formal implementation 
monitoring processes could be combined with agreements in the same way 
suggested for new generation texts and autonomous agreements. 
 
However, this approach to the design of an EU minima is not without its 
limitations. As highlighted in the previous chapter, institutional support must be 
forthcoming in order for it to stand a realistic chance of success. Alternative 
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regulatory strategies such as hybridity may be capable of improving the 
implementation of autonomous social partners agreements but they are still 
dependent in large part upon support from the Commission, the social partners 
and the national procedures and practices of their affiliates for implementation. 
 
Indeed, this is further demonstrated by the history of the Crystalline Silica 
Agreement, where the Commission provided the additional funding, technical 
assistance and capacity building initiatives necessary for its conclusion and 
continued operation. If the social partners wished to follow this model for the 
conclusion of an EU minima, they would be well advised to more strongly 
articulate their vision for the social dialogue to the Commission and request 
further help and support. Only by doing so can the most be made of regulatory 
strategies like hybridity and, subsequently, do the policies they seek to give 
effect to – e.g. the idea of an EU minima – stand any chance of success. 
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9. Conclusion 
 
This thesis investigated the idea of an EU minimum wage policy and, as a 
consequence of significant gaps in current literature, sought to develop a 
proposal that could be adopted by law-makers. This involved finding a 
workable basis and outlining how such a policy would operate in practice. 
These aims were justified as significant contributions towards academic debate 
and as being of fundamental importance for developing a workable proposal. 
 
Early in the thesis, the idea of an EU minimum wage was forwarded that was 
based upon coordinating wages in Member States around a target value set 
against mean or median wages. In comparison to common response to the 
idea of an EU minima, it was argue that – taking into account the heterogeneity 
of wage levels and industrial relations systems in Member States – the only 
practical way forward for such a proposal was as a form of coordination. This 
would see Member States or, indeed, social partners, set their statutory 
minimum wages or those set by collective agreement against a certain target 
(for example, 60% of the national median wage). 
 
The development of an EU minima was justified as a counterbalance to the 
Union’s interference in wages and wage-setting mechanisms in Member 
States. Irrespective of its limited ability to act in the area of pay (as per Article 
153(5) TFEU), the complex economic governance arrangements the Union has 
developed were investigated. It was shown that the Article 153 exemption on 
the Union regulating in the area of pay has not prevented it from indirectly 
regulating wages and wage-setting mechanisms in Member States, both in the 
past and at present. Indeed, it was argued that current debates on the idea of 
an EU minimum wage policy understate the influence of the Union on wages. 
 
As an alternative approach, this counterbalance was fleshed out as a 
solardistic wage policy, aiming to take account of the losses labour has made 
to capital, in terms of wage share, over the last four or so decades. This 
justification – of reversing the negative consequences of economic governance 
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for wages in Member States – was argued to fit well with the idea of an EU 
minima, in particular, as a uniform response from social society. 
 
This point was picked up when the thesis turned to consider the potential legal 
and normative foundations for an EU minima. Contrary to common suggestions 
that the Union or the Member States should be placed at the helm of an EU 
minima, this thesis argued that greater attention should be paid to the capacity 
of the social partners, including both representatives of management and 
labour at EU and national level. This was suggested both as a response to the 
limited competence of the Union to act in the area of pay and because of the 
benefits of involving societal actors – like the social partners – in law-making 
processes. 
 
This approach was argued to have important consequences for the idea of an 
EU minima which sets it apart from current suggestions; not only does it 
remove the centrality of the Union in its development but its has important 
implications for its scope (social partner agreements are commonly reached at 
cross-industry or sectoral levels, they do not, and cannot, cover an entire 
national economy). Any policy based on the social dialogue would be less of an 
EU-wide minima and, more realistically, a ‘transnational’ wage policy, restricted 
to the national affiliates of European signatory associations. 
 
Looking in closer detail at the operation of European social dialogue in the 
search of a basis for an EU minima, however, revealed a complex system of 
multi-level governance. By way of example, the autonomous route of the social 
dialogue is dependent for its success on the national procedures and practices 
of management and labour for implementation, and the ability of the social 
partners to organise at EU-level and reach agreements. 
 
Explained in another way, it appears less ‘autonomous’ of public forms of 
power and more contingent on the existence of institutional structures and 
support for success. Furthermore, the development of ‘new’ governance-style 
instruments and their adoption by the social partners raises questions about 
the impact they are having on the uptake of autonomous agreements, for 
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example, are they interchangeable and, as a consequence, in competition, or 
is it possible they could be used together (alongside each other or in an 
arrangement designed to facilitate their interaction)? 
 
It was argued that in order for the most to be made of the opportunities the 
social dialogue provides – as an alternative space for the social partners to 
give effect to their own agreements – there was a need for these so-called 
‘hidden dynamics’ to be better understood. It was only against this more 
detailed understanding of the operation of the social dialogue that an effective 
EU minimum wage policy could be articulated (that could stand a realistic 
chance of being adopted by the social partners and of serving a solidarity 
enhancing function). Here, studying the autonomous route of the social 
dialogue through the lens of transnational legal pluralism shed light upon the 
complexity involved in its operation and served as a basis for the development 
of a more complete policy proposal. This approach had been overlooked by 
scholarship on European industrial relations and its employment in this thesis 
constitutes a first exploration of its utility for building a better understanding of 
the operation of the social dialogue. Furthermore, by adopting the social 
dialogue as a ‘case study’, important insights were gained into its limitations, in 
particular, concerning the contingent role of the state in regulating. 
 
These insights served to reveal the full range of instruments available to the 
social partners – whether legal or not – and encouraged experimentation with 
their combination in furtherance of labour law’s objectives. For the autonomous 
route of the social dialogue, this was argued to involve exploring the possibility 
of combining autonomous agreements and new generation texts. 
 
This approach was argued to improve the effectiveness of social partner 
agreements, which is especially important in light of the limited support they 
receive from the national affiliates of social partners and Member States after 
their implementation. This combination was informed by research on hybridity, 
law and new governance, and was used as a basis to develop a 
‘transformative’ understanding of the combination of different policy 
instruments. The development of this framework is unique and contributes a 
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new perspective to the design of regulation, in particular, for European social 
partner agreements, that has not previously been explored. Here, autonomous 
agreements are seen as proving a outline – for setting a target minimum wage 
– which is supported by new governance instruments – such as reporting 
exercises – for ensuring progress is made towards the realisation of a target 
wage by covered national affiliates. 
 
This unique approach to the design of regulation has implications beyond 
suggestions for the design of an EU minima, as a strategy that could be 
adopted for improving the effectiveness of other agreements (including at 
national level). 
 
However, this approach to the design of an EU minima is not without its 
limitations. As highlighted in literature on transnational law, institutional help 
and support must be forthcoming in order for it to stand a realistic chance of 
success in practice. Alternative regulatory strategies such as hybridity may be 
capable of improving the implementation of autonomous social partners 
agreements but they are still dependent in large part on the European 
Commission, the social partners and the national procedures and practices of 
their affiliates for their effective implementation. 
 
As such, it is possible to articulate a form of EU minimum wage policy which 
takes into account the difficulties of regulating in Europe but its success will still 
be dependent on a wide range of structural and institutional factors.  
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